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1. Introduction and Presentation of a Problem 
“An investment in knowledge pays the best interest.” 
Benjamin Franklin (cited by Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. xviii) 
In the rapidly growing, globalized, and partly digitalized economy of today, some 
organizations are doing well, whereas others are only striving for survival. The necessity to 
expand to achieve success serves as the basic difference between the two: limitations to local 
markets confine companies to limited markets, thus, limited growth potential. Large 
businesses seldom face such a problem, primarily because of significant resources, economies 
of scale (ES) and experience curves (EC), whereas for small- and medium-sized 
manufacturing enterprises (SMMs) it is a rather critical issue. Their prospects for growth 
depend, in the first line, upon how to obtain additional resources and how to optimally engage 
them through contractual agreements. Furthermore, expansion is likely to require change of 
current practices (upstream and downstream vertical integration), thus, significantly 
increasing potential risks (Chang & Zhou, 2009, p. 9).  
Passive going with the stream, on the other hand, is likely to lead to constant 
deterioration of sales, since in today’s world where, according to Richard Love (CEO of 
Hewlett-Packard), „[t]he pace of change is so rapid that the ability to change has become a 
competitive advantage“ (Kotler & Armstrong, 2009, p. 49), adaptation to change or constant 
Change Management (CM) (thus, ongoing adaptation of strategies and operations to rapid 
internal and external metamorphoses) is a necessity for survival and success in the short, mid 
and long term. Consequently, nothing is constant but change (Krause, 2010, p. 9).  
Entering new markets implicates entering, dealing with and working on totally new 
markets. The opening up strategy presupposes, in turn, the selection of the new market, 
timing, mode and scope of entry (resources and strategic commitment), as well as developing 
respective marketing strategies (Remmerbach, 1988, p. 176). In particular, basic market entry 
(ME) decisions concern the following aspects: the size of the foreign market (present vs. 
potential), the purchasing power of the target market (present vs. future wealth), the suitability 
of the product for the chosen region, nature of indigenous competition (Kotelnikov, 2001). 
Furthermore, the benefits-costs-risks tradeoff helps rank countries in terms of future economic 
growth rates, free market system indicators, stability rate, capacity for growth, inflation rate, 
rates of private sector debt, etc. (Kumar & Subramaniam, 1997, p. 54). In case of an 
innovation, first mover advantages should be necessarily compared with those of late 
followers (Kotelnikov, 2001).  
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The new ME concept deals with numerous issues, challenges, and problems which 
shed light onto the degree of risks, control, required resources, and skills as well as the 
potential growth of ROI. The selection of the target market and the product for sales 
constitutes the initial stage of exploring a new territory. It is based on internal and external 
analysis (SWOT): information on customer preferences and social structure of the target 
market, potential competitors (especially, the presence of global players), suppliers, scarcity 
vs. abundance of resources, political regulations, trade barriers, etc. Subsequently, a 
respective market entry mode (MEM) is chosen (Kotelnikov, 2001; Kotler & Armstrong, 
2009).  
Yet, just as mentioned above, many factors as well as their weighted contributions to 
achieving the company’s goals have to be considered before the final choice is made. In the 
Information Age of today, where knowledge (not labor, land, or financial capital) is regarded  
not only as a basic source of prosperity and social upliftment, but also as invaluable 
intellectual asset or even the new currency of the era of globalization and revolutionary IT, 
proper management of knowledge is a must (Stewart, 2001). In fact, transition from the 
industrially-based economy of the past to the knowledge-based society of tomorrow is marked 
by the enormously growing demand for knowledge (K). Consequently, K turned into a new 
product (“both raw material and finished goods”) (Leonard, 1995, p. 3). 
As a result, K, as the key driver of global economy and competitiveness on a planetary 
level, has to be paid special attention to (World Bank, 2007, p. 3; World Bank Institute, 2012, 
p. 1). Its proper analysis and application (in business environment, in particular) open up 
incredible vistas, primarily for the emerging economies (BRIC: Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) and the Third World countries (African continent). Thus, K helps achieve fast access 
to new chances to eradicate poverty, to secure organic growth and constant development, 
economic stability, and sustainability (Dahlman & Utz, 2004, p. 10). Moreover, back in 1996, 
the World Bank articulated its new strategy related to supporting poor countries all over the 
world not only with financial aid, but primarily through sharing of K, experience and best 
practices as well as learning guides as a the basic tool and an indispensible prerequisite to 
secure improvement and growth. Hence, the “Knowledge Bank” concept of the World Bank 
confirms the paramount significance of K as a new or parallel currency of today’s global 
society (Knowledge Bank, 2012). 
In fact, only constant learning and striving for perfection secured by K assets may lead 
to fundamental improvements (effectiveness, efficiency, and top quality). The time of the 
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“Working Smarter”, not the “Working Harder” Strategy finally arrived (Caballero & 
Hammour, 1994, pp. 1350-1351).  
Thus, if applied correctly, K can become a constant source of competitive advantage 
(CA), material well-being and success in the long run. Yet, it is indispensible to learn how to 
search for it, store it, create, share and use it properly. Furthermore, in view of the information 
influx (data deluge), the quality and consistency of data will become one of the basic 
problems for the generations to come (Cisco, 2011).  
There exist numerous classifications of K. The fathers of Knowledge Management 
(KM) – Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 59) – discriminate between two fundamental types of 
K: tacit and explicit. Explicit K is easily formalized and communicated, codified, and is 
stored in books, documents, CDs, etc. Tacit K, on the contrary, is highly individual and 
experiential, thus, very difficult to formalize, verbalize, share (thus, copy), since it is literally 
stored only in the minds of people. As a result, it is tacit K that serves as the source of CA. In 
addition, Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, pp. 5-7), also underscore the relevance of constant K 
creation and innovation to secure the company’s organic growth and sustainability: simply 
being knowledgeable does not suffice any more.   
According to Lundvall (1996, p. 5), on the contrary, K is subdivided into different 
channels and stages of the recursive K creation process: Know-What, Know-Why, Know-How 
and Know-Who. This process implicates the necessity of answering the What, Why, How and 
Who questions before applying the acquired K to repeated situational judgments in practice. 
In addition, K can also be viewed from the following perspectives: Resource Based 
Theory (RBT), Organizational Capability Theory (OCT) and Knowledge Based Theory 
(KBT) (Leonard, 1995). These theories will serve as the research foundation for the current 
thesis. In particular, the author will apply the premises of the aforementioned theories to 
investigate the following issues:  
Is Knowledge to be regarded as Information, Data, or Capital? 
Can Knowledge be regarded as a company’s strategic asset?  
In view of the aforementioned, the author of the given research aims at indentifying 
basic characteristics of K. In addition, the paper will focus on the classification of K aspects, 
detailed analysis of each K component and its contribution to the optimal MEM solution.  
Section 1 of the thesis provides a short introduction and presentation of various MEM. 
Section 3 deals with the aforementioned theories. Section 4 investigates the main components 
of Knowledge. The Results Section is dedicated to the presentation of the results of the 
research coupled with a short Conclusion of the thesis and a Further Research chapter.  
11 
 
2. Market Entry  
2.1. Entry Modes  
The key word in considering a foreign market entry (FME) is globalization. In order 
to survive, firms have to act accordingly or even manage to outperform in a smarter way. 
Ongoing technological advancements secured by IT-based solutions, primarily the Internet 
and its social media, coupled with globalization open up new perspectives and provide 
opportunities which were practically impossible some decades ago. Capitalization on such a 
rapid technological progress is therefore a must in order to secure organic growth and 
sustainability in the long run.  
Globalization and digitalization of national economies offer an opportunity to discover 
and expand into new markets. On the one hand, it is an extremely lucrative perspective 
secured by global coverage and international markets as opposed to local, regional, or national 
presence. In view of the aforementioned, FME became a daily practice for all companies that 
could afford it financially. On the other hand, FME is a very challenging and risky initiative, 
since global coverage implicates quite a number of problems to be solved and barriers to 
overcome. For instance, a new country stands for a new partner with a different culture, 
religion, convictions, way of living, standards, tastes, even needs. This, in turn, significantly 
reshapes the scope, timing, and strategy of entry. Thorough preparation for a FME and the 
subsequent presence in the overseas market (control issues, protection against opportunism of 
foreign partners, effectiveness of acquisition of new partners’ knowledge-based resources, 
flexibility of acquired resources, etc.) serve therefore as primary prerequisites for securing 
stability and profitability in the long term (Li, 2007, p. 771).   
Generally speaking, FME is defined as a form of international investment which 
stands for entering totally new markets with new or already existing products or services in 
order to expand and gain success. It goes without saying that the primary motivation for 
going abroad is related to enormous growth potentials (thus, higher returns and brand 
awareness) (Hilmi, Ketata & Safa 2007, p. 243). Other reasons for international expansion 
encompass cheaper labor and raw materials, lower costs of production, improved markets, 
trade, and business conditions, better government policies, and macro-economical framework 
(Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 243). In addition, firms may sometimes be forced to relocate their 
businesses when government imposes trade barriers. Consequently, global expansion is 
intended for achieving required resources. 
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In view of complex transformations that a firm has to undergo, international joint 
ventures (IJVs) are usually a primary strategy for multinational companies (MNCs). 
Moreover, according to numerous studies, MNCs prefer to start their investment projects with 
neighboring countries that are marked by familiarity, cultural and institutional similarity, ease 
of access, and cross-border spillovers (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 243). 
Nevertheless, different countries may offer different opportunities, advantages, 
benefits, as well as disadvantages, risks, and control issues. The main strategic decision to be 
made hereby is to decide whether to buy or to build a completely new entity (To buy or not to 
buy, that is the question!). The most relevant problems faced by MNCs are asymmetric 
information, demand uncertainty, wrong timing, high establishing costs, exchange rate 
fluctuation, cut-throat competition, lack of CA, lack of K of foreign market peculiarities, 
technological mismatches, cross-cultural differences (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 243).  
Consequently, there exist numerous factors that have to be necessarily taken into 
account before deciding whether to expand into foreign markets. Indispensible research on 
determinants and patterns of entry has to be made in advance. The primary set of factors that 
determine the FME choice includes the analysis of political, economic, socio-cultural, and 
technological determinants (PEST), potential growth, and opportunities. Of significant 
importance are also political hazards, legal restrictions, and country risks (Hilmi et al., 2007, 
p. 244).  
As a matter of fact, the choice of MEM was always heatedly discussed in literature. 
First and foremost, it is related to the risk perceived (decision-making under uncertainty) and 
contextual specificities. In general, the correlation between risks and actors’ contribution is 
negative. Generally, overall risks may be subdivided into environmental risks (complexity of 
market risks, traditional factor risks and the exchange risk), industrial sector risks (due to 
industrial concentration, customer preferences, market supply), and firm-specific risks (due to 
differences of the infrastructure marketing, lack of experience, and cultural differences) 
(Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 244). 
Hill, Hwang & Kim (1990, p. 117) claim that each of MEM offers a unique portfolio 
of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats coupled with a dissimilar level of control 
over foreign processes, resource obligations, and diffusion risks. The ultimate choice of 
market for expansion depends upon the weighted degree of risks to be tolerated in a foreign 
country, control over operations and management, commitment of resources to be placed at 
disposal, and the ROI to be expected. Global strategy and competition are of significant 
importance to the concluding stage of choice of a suitable EM.  
13 
 
In addition, from the Transaction Cost Analysis perspective, companies normally 
face a tradeoff between benefits of increased control and costs of resource commitment and 
risk (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986, p. 1).  
According to Hill et al. (1990, p. 120), there exist three groups of variables that 
influence the EM decision, namely: strategic, environmental and transaction specific 
variables.  
Strategic variables influence the EM choice primarily through control requirements. 
Different strategies implicate various degrees of control over operating and strategic decisions 
related to foreign affiliates (thus, different EM) (Hill et al., 1990, pp. 120-122).  
Environmental variables influence the EM decision, first and foremost, through their 
impact on the suitable level of resource commitment, or, in other words, strategic flexibility 
(Hill et al., 1990, pp. 122-124).  
Transaction specific variables influence the EM decision through their impact on 
diffusion risks and the appropriate level of control (Hill et al., 1990, pp. 124-126).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Variables Influencing EM Decision (Source: Hill et al., 1990, p. 120) 
Just as mentioned above, primary considerations or reasons for entering foreign 
markets may vary from company to company, industry to industry, and country to country. 
However, basic similarities traced all over the globe include profit, growth and security 
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goals. Normally, corporations have a mix of all goals. Yet, one goal, assuredly, dominates 
over the others (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 242).   
Profit goals always implicate cost reduction secured by ES, tax reduction, higher 
demand, KH acquirement, cost reduction in labor, resources, energy, transport, ROI, etc. (Hill 
& Jones, 2012, p. 16). Moreover, global expansion proves attractive both for SMEs and 
MNCs and secures the increase in profitability non-achievable by purely domestic operations 
(Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 16).  
Just as mentioned above, globalization is gaining pace at an exponential speed today. 
This, in turn, leads to similar needs, wants, and customer preferences, thus, to the abundance 
of similar products offered all over the globe. Standardization of demand and supply renders 
the world more and more competitive. Hence, in order to survive, businesses have to be 
prepared to compete on a global scale from the very beginning. Otherwise, survivability turns 
into a rather critical issue for them even in the short run (Levitt, 1984, p. 2). 
According to Porter (1998, pp. 11, 20-21), finding viable ways for long-term profit 
maximization is a must (in view of the inevitability of competitors in future). This, in turn, 
implicates either radical cost reduction of value creation activities (cost leader strategy), or 
performing value creation activities in such a way that it renders consumers willing to pay a 
premium price charged for the company’s output (product differentiation strategy), or a 
combination of both (hybrid strategies). International expansion, as an inevitable by-product 
of the aforementioned options, implies the rise in profits through increasing returns from the 
company’s core competencies (CC) and the realization of ES (Microsoft) and location 
economies (LE) (Walmart) (Hill & Jones, 2012, 149-150).  
Companies operating internationally have the opportunity to earn a much greater 
return from their distinctive skills (or CC), to realize location economies via dispersing 
particular value creation activities to those locations where they can be performed most 
efficiently, to realize greater experience curve economies achieved through reducing value 
creation costs enabled by building sales volume more rapidly (economies of scale) and 
reducing costs of value creation (restructuring, lean production, and business process 
reengineering) (Hill & Jones, 2012, pp. 149-150).  
Growth goals implicate unlimited expansion plans – with no government restrictions 
and scarcity of resources (materials, labor, KH, etc.) (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 17). Thus, the 
international expansion strategy is a viable way of securing greater returns by transferring the 
company’s skills and product offerings derived from its CC to foreign markets where 
indigenous competitors lack such skills (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 299).  
15 
 
Security goals, on the contrary, implicate risk diversification, the possibility of 
granting patents in exchange for a royalty payment in order to prevent KH outflow, CA, 
corporate takeover defense, etc. (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 16).  
Porter (1998, p. 120) argues that CA of a company located in a particular country are 
determined by certain attributes which are unique to that country. In particular, the researcher 
identifies four basic attributes:  
 natural resources and created capabilities;  
 the level, variation, composition and quality of output demanded by domestic 
consumers;  
 the presence of clusters of suppliers or supporting industries;  
 the extent and patterns of inter-firm rivalry and the effects that the latter have 
on the innovatory and competitive strategies of domestic players. 
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2.1.1. Classification  
While expanding, companies attempt to increase their competitiveness through foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Market-seeking FDI companies are looking for new customers (new 
distribution channels), whereas resource-seeking FDI prioritize natural resource seeking. 
Efficiency-seeking FDI seek cost reduction opportunities (buyer-driven) or regional 
proximity (producer-driven), thus, cheaper inputs to secure ES through horizontal and vertical 
integration. Strategic asset-seeking FDI seek for the acquisition of new assets (technologies, 
skills, brand names, distribution networks, and high-valued production facilities) in order to 
diversify their portfolios and complement manufacturing and technological K (Hilmi et al., 
2007, pp. 243, 246). The latter represent tacit K and are, thus, the primary source of CA.  
Asset-exploiting FDI exert a direct influence on the company’s performance (financial: 
ROA and profitability, and operational: efficiency and market share), whereas asset-
augmenting FDI impacts it indirectly, through competitiveness, depending upon the firm’s 
capacity to absorb new assets (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 246). Moreover, FDI have two primary 
impacts in the host market: on industries’ competitiveness and restructuring, thus, they are 
also connected with change management and learning.  
The decision as to which MEM to choose depends primarily upon the chance and risk 
analysis, strength of the company’s own resources and conformity to international goals. 
There are two main types of FME modes: equity (international joint ventures (IJV), wholly-
owned subsidiaries (WOS, mergers)) and non-equity (exporting, contractual agreements 
(international licensing agreements (ILA), franchising), cooperation) modes.  
 
Figure 2: Forms of Collaboration (Source: Pellicelli, 2003, p. 8) 
Just as mentioned above, corporations have to take one fundamental strategic decision 
as to whether to buy already existing facilities (business) or build a completely new one from 
the ground up (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 290). The distinction between equity and non-equity 
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modes is, thus, not trivial, since in case of FDI, MNCs enjoy the three basic advantages of 
ownership, location, and internalization (Peng, 2011, p. 336). As opposed to developed 
nations, emerging economies (which possess no high-caliber technology and management 
KH) are marked by a different framework: “linkage, leverage, and learning” (Peng, 2011, p. 
342). Linkage refers to the ability to identify and bridge gaps, leveraging on ES, ESC and 
constant learning from all over the globe (Peng, 2011, pp. 342-343). Consequently, the 
answer to this basic question impacts all the subsequent decisions of the company: timing, 
scope and strategy of FME.  
The following figures graphically illustrate the logic behind the strategy decision-
making based on the market cycle phase and the corporation’s attitude towards a MEM 
overseas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: FME Strategy by Market Cycle Phase (Source: Hill, 1994) 
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Figure 4: The Wholly New Entry Flowchart (Source: Hill, 1994) 
There exist two different classifications of wholly owned modes (WOM) or FDI. In 
the case of a WOM, the firm owns one hundred percent of the stock, since there are no 
partners to share costs, risks, gains with. The primarily advantage of WOM is tight control 
over operations, which, in turn, implicates the realization of LE and ES coupled with tight 
control over technological KH (Peng, 2011, p. 122), benefits of total profits and full control 
over the WOS (Chan, 1995, p. 39). And just as stated above, the main disadvantage of WOM 
consists in the necessity to bear all the costs and risks related to opening up a foreign market 
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(Peng, 2011, p. 122). Moreover, the firm incurs much higher costs and runs higher risks 
especially in R&D, production, financing, and market penetration (Chan, 1995, p. 39).  
On the other hand, the level of control is highest in case of a WOM (Hill et al., 1990, 
p. 121). That means that control over daily operations and certain strategic decisions may be 
delegated to the WOS, but ultimate control always resides in the firm’s headquarters. 
Resource commitment is very high, as the corporation has to bear all the costs associated with 
opening up and serving the foreign market. The risk of KH dissemination, on the contrary, is 
likely to be lowest of all. Yet, the possibility of KH outflows to competitors is never excluded. 
Consequently, the residual risk of dissemination is still present (Hill et al., 1990, p. 122). 
A corporation may either initiate an operation overseas from the ground up 
(Greenfield Operation) (GFO) or it can acquire an established firm and use it to promote its 
products abroad (Brownfield Operation (BFO) or Acquisition) (70% of worldwide FDI) 
(Peng, 2011, p. 340).  
GFI is a form of a FDI which implicates setting up a new plant in the host country and 
producing goods overseas upon constructing new operational facilities from the ground up (a 
WOS) (Raff, Rayn & Stähler, 2007, p. 2). This type of investment is optimal if the host 
market is very much or very little competitive (Müller, 2001, p. 1).  
It goes without saying that a new WOS is a very complex and potentially costly 
project, but it is the firm’s 100% property and therefore implicates full control and potential 
of above average returns in the long run.     
GFI is usually regarded as an alternative to other MEM such as M&A, JV or ILA, 
when physical capital-intensive plants are planned (Raff et al., 2007, p. 2).  
In accordance with Hill (1994) and Peng (2011, p. 340), the main advantages of GFI 
include: 
 exclusive impact on a new business formation; 
 exclusive shareholder rights; 
 an exclusive position as an innovation leader (thus, own standards); 
 no necessity to search for a cooperation partner or production facilities;  
 equal organizational culture in the core and new business, etc.  
The disadvantages of GFI include, on the contrary (Hill, 1994; Peng, 2011, p. 340): 
 it is extremely risky and costly: high time, high staff, high KH, and high 
performance requirements (high risks due to high costs of establishing a business abroad and 
from scratch, establishing distribution networks, finding reliable and professional staff, and 
acquiring essential K of the foreign market from third parties); 
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 high risks related to wrong timing of entry; 
 high risk of cost overrun;  
 high risk of invincible technical problems, etc.   
GFI are normally associated with creating new long-term jobs and therefore are 
primarily preferred by developing countries (as hosts) through offering prospective buyers 
numerous tax-breaks, subsidies, and other incentives (compromising at the same time on 
corporate tax revenue), thus, boosting the country’s HC, K, KH, and technology share and 
enhancing economic growth in general (Hilmi et al., 2007, pp. 248-249).  
Contractual entry mode, on the contrary, is a long-term non-equity association 
between an international company (actual or emerging) and a legal entity overseas which 
involves transfer of K and/or skills. This MEM tends to reflect relatively smaller 
commitments to overseas markets (Peng, 2011, p. 336). According to other researchers, 
contractual entry strategies are based on cross-border interactions of K assets, whereas the 
association between a firm and its foreign partner is governed by an explicit contract. 
Contractor (1990, p. 31) claimed that the contractual EM is an optimal solution when the 
global market for technology transfer is efficient and transactions costs are kept low.  
The basic characteristics of the contractual EM (as a non-direct way of investing 
overseas) are as follows: (1) the governance by a contract, which, in turn, secures a moderate 
level of control over the foreign partner and, thus, sales and income, (2) the exchange of 
intangible resources, which can be pursued both independently and in conjunction with other 
ME strategies, and (3) the generation of a predictable level of earnings derived from foreign 
operations (Hill, 1994).  
The most common types of contractual entry strategies are exporting, licensing and 
franchising. Further contractual entry modes that will be covered in this paper include 
strategic alliances (SA), cooperation, contract manufacturing (CM), management 
contracting (MC), OEM contracts, and turnkey projects. 
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2.1.1.1. Licensing  
According to Hill (2003, p. 482), an international licensing agreement (ILA) is defined 
as an agreement which allows an overseas entity (licensee) to manufacture, exclusively or 
non-exclusively, a proprietor’s product and sell it for a defined period of time. In addition, the 
ILA grants the right to use the proprietor’s commercial and industrial property (e.g. 
technology license, inventions, patents, trademarks and franchising, copyrights, formulas, 
processes, designs, managerial skills, etc.) in return for compensation, usually a royalty 
payment or other (normally calculated as a percentage of sales). Hence, ILA serves as a 
legitimate means of capitalizing on intellectual property in an overseas market (Kotelnikov, 
2001; Root, 1987).  
In view of a significant transference of K assets from the licensor (or proprietor), the 
level of control of the latter is rather low, primarily since the company’s authority over 
operational and strategic decision-making is extremely limited. Secondly, strategic 
considerations as to the choice of ILA depend upon the level of respect the host government 
displays for intangible property and the licensee’s ability to choose the right partners and have 
them cooperate, not compete (Hill, Hwang & Kim, 1990, p. 118). 
 
Figure 5: Licensing (Source: Cavusgil et al., 2008, p. 10) 
Generally speaking, licensing is an extremely attractive EM for companies that are 
new to international business operations or SMEs (Kotelnikov, 2001). The licensee covers 
most of the costs related to entering into and serving the foreign market. Yet, on the other 
hand, he also owns all the revenue-generating assets, thus, depriving the proprietor from extra 
income from his own KH (yet, the licensee perceives most of the commercial, exploitation, 
and political risks). As a consequence, the level of resource commitment for the licensor is 
low (lower-risk EM) and limited to personnel required for training licensees and subsequently 
for monitoring their behavior for any violation of respective licensing contracts (Cavusgil, 
Knight & Riesenberger, 2008, p. 10).  
 The dissemination risk, on the contrary, is rather high. The primary risk is associated 
with the risk that the proprietor’s specific advantages in technical KH might be expropriated 
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by a licensing partner. And since no licensor desires to rear a potential competitor (or have 
reduced quasi rents), protective measures are a must (e.g. cross-licensing or exchange of KH) 
(Kotelnikov, 2001).  
The principal motives for establishing an ILA include: 
 resource scarcity, 
 ability to keep the market name, 
 import barriers and high tax (Beamish et al., 1992; Beamish & Safarian, 
1999).  
In addition, ILA allow the licensor to increase earnings without the necessity to open a 
new operation overseas (WOS). Moreover, it is a lucrative way of participating on foreign 
markets with barriers to FDI.  
The following table visualizes the basic advantages and risks of the Licensor and 
Licensee. 
Licensor Licensee 
Advantages Risks Advantages Risks 
Fast coverage of R&D costs due 
to extra income from technical 
KH  
Income influx depends upon the 
licensee’s performance  
Low R&D 
costs 
Risks that 
products 
might not 
succeed in the 
market  
Expansion of available products 
with little additional capital and 
time investments  
Licensee as a potential 
competitor in future and the risk 
of opportunism  
Access to 
advanced 
technologies 
Fast ME without much risk in 
various countries simultaneously 
(rapid global expansion) (well-
codified knowledge) 
Trademark or image ruined by 
the inconsistent product quality 
Profit from 
an 
established 
brand name 
or well-
known 
copyrighted 
material 
Licensor may 
refuse or fail 
to provide 
support   
Risk of violating intellectual 
property rights  
Lack of control over the 
licensee’s operations 
(exploitation of assets, 
marketing, strategy) 
Relatively low startup costs 
(especially appropriate for SMEs 
lacking resources) 
Minimized political risks (the 
licensee owns the business locally 
100%) 
No experience curve and 
location economies  
Opportunity costs (rents 
generated through other EM 
might be substantially higher) 
Table 1: Advantages and Risks of Licensing 
 (Source: Own Work based on Beamish, 2008, p. 25; Kotelnikov, 2001) 
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2.1.1.2. Franchising   
Franchising is a specialized form of licensing (Hill, 2003, p. 485). It is an longer-term 
commitment agreement where the parent company (the franchisor) gives a semi-independent 
business owner (the franchisee) the right to use its business format in the overseas market in 
exchange for a compensation (primarily fees or royalty calculated as a percentage of the 
franchisee’s revenues) (Peng, 2011, p. 311). In other words, the franchisor not only sells 
intangible property (trademark) to the franchisee, but also insists on the franchisee’s consent 
to abide by strict rules as to how the business has to be run on a daily basis (location, 
methods, design, staffing, supply chain, etc.). Therefore, franchising is most appropriate for 
service firms. Mcdonalds and Coca Cola are the most vivid examples of this MEM (Pellicelli, 
2003, p. 11).  
According to Cavusgil et al., (2008, p. 15), franchising is characterized by the 
following factors:  
 supply of a total business system;  
 strong corporate identity, since the franchisee acquires the right to be identified 
with the franchisor’s trademark (for the franchisor, it translates into foreign returns from 
customer service and brand name assets); 
 Franchisee has an opportunity to receive training, ongoing support, incentive 
programs and the right to participate in cooperative marketing programs.  
 Franchisor sets guidelines for the franchisee (operation manuals, managerial 
guidelines, etc.) to follow; the latter also has to purchase materials from the franchisor.  
 
Figure 6: Franchising (Source: Cavusgil et al., 2008, p. 15) 
The following table summarizes the primary advantages and disadvantages of the 
franchising MEM:  
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Franchisor Franchisee 
Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages 
Expansion without using 
own resources, relief of 
many costs and risks related 
to opening a new market 
Large capital and time investments, 
tight control mechanism as compared 
to other MEM (e.g. exporting, 
licensing) 
Most suitable for 
individuals or SMEs 
Little space for 
creativity and 
own ideas 
Control over the franchisee, 
low political risk involved 
No manufacturing, thus no location 
economies and experience curve 
  
Access to “global” brand 
names, high recognition 
among customers 
Highly dependent upon the quality of 
franchisees (master franchise as an 
additional layer of control on a local 
level) 
Usage of resources of 
a successful 
franchisor 
Financial risk if 
product/ service 
does not 
succeed 
Access to local expertise Impact of intercultural differences Relatively low risk of 
business failure 
Motivation of franchisees as 
entrepreneurs 
Franchisee as a potential competitor 
in future due to knowledge and 
strategic spillover 
 
Table 2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Franchising (Source: Cavusgil et al., 2008, p. 15) 
As opposed to licensing with its tendency towards transference of limited rights or 
resources as well as short duration, franchising puts a broader package of rights and resources 
at the franchisee’s disposal. On the other hand, ILA implicates the involvement of intellectual 
rights and trade secrets, whereas franchising is limited to trademarks and operating KH. 
Thus, licensing is most suitable for manufacturing; franchising, on the contrary, - for the 
servicing industry (Gutterman, 2002, p. 123; Kotelnikov, 2001).  
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2.1.1.3. Outsourcing 
In view of increased globalization and liberalization of world trade, access to formerly 
restricted zones of global specialization is now open practically to all countries. This, in turn, 
implicates that cost leaders or differentiators that aim at competing on an international scale 
can significantly improve their cost structure. This is enabled by outsourcing (either 
domestically or overseas).  
Outsourcing implicates that one or more of the company’s value-chain activities or 
functions are performed by outsiders – independent specialized companies that focus on 
acquiring skills and K in just one kind of activity. As a result, ES enable them to secure the 
desired quality of products (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 328; Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 244). 
MNCs or other global players engage in strategic outsourcing to strengthen their 
business model and increase profitability. The process usually starts with the identification of 
the value-chain activities that form the basis of the company’s CA or distinctive 
competencies (to protect them from competitors). The systematic analysis of the non-core 
functions, on the contrary, helps managers assess whether outsourcing those activities by 
specialized companies could be more beneficial (differentiation or cost advantages) (Hill & 
Jones, 2012, p. 330). 
Because of constant pressures to reduce costs, normally, it is the manufacturing 
function that is outsourced (also referred to as contract manufacturing (CM)). According to 
Hill & Jones (2012, p. 328), over 60% of all global product manufacturing is outsourced 
today. As vivid examples serve Nike which does not make its athletic shoes and Apple that 
assembles none of its own products. These are produced or assembled under contract at low-
cost locations dispersed globally. Therefore, in view of the complexity of value chains of the 
aforementioned MNCs, quality issues are the primary problems the latter may expect in case 
of production inconsistency or disputes with their subcontractors (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 328). 
Apart from CM, strategic outsourcing may also include outsourcing of other kinds of 
non-core activities such as IT, HR, and logistics (Peng, 2011, p. 99). For instance, Microsoft 
outsources customer service in India (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 330). Yet, R&D, marketing and 
sales always remain in the company (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 331).  
The basic benefits of CM are labor cost advantages, lower costs in energy, raw 
materials, and overheads (ES and LE), savings via taxation, lower political and economic 
risks, and quicker access to foreign markets (e.g. Boeing, Nike, IKEA) (Peng, 2011, p. 99). In 
addition, the client does not have to maintain manufacturing facilities, purchase raw materials, 
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or hire labor in order to produce finished goods. As a result, much less capital investment is 
required (Kotelnikov, 2001).  
Moreover, in view of the lowered cost structure (Motorola) and increased product 
differentiation (Dell’s customer service) secured by subcontractors, the company can fully 
focus only on its distinctive competencies that are vital to sustain its CA and profitability in 
the long run (e.g. Cisco Systems focuses on building its CC in product design, marketing and 
sales, and supply-chain management) (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 331).  
The main disadvantages of CM include lower production standards and therefore 
potential quality issues, lack of management control, ethical issues (backlash from the home-
market employees regarding HR and labor issues coupled with inhuman conditions of labor in 
subcontractors’ countries (e.g. Nike)). In addition, the contract manufacturer may become a 
future competitor (potential security and confidentiality issues as a result of holdups or losses 
of important information). Hence, it is indispensible to select a reliable partner who could 
meet the required quality standards and low-cost requirements, as well as just-in-time delivery 
terms (Kotelnikov, 2001). In addition, a parallel sourcing policy (outsourcing by two or more 
service providers for the same component) may considerably reduce the risk of holdups (Hill 
& Jones, 2012, p. 332). 
 As opposed to CM, management contracting (MC) implicates outsourcing 
managerial functions. Thus, MC is an agreement under which operational control of an 
enterprise is vested by contract in a separate enterprise which performs the required 
managerial functions in return for a fee. MC involves not just selling a method of doing things 
(e.g. as in the case of franchising or licensing), but involves actually doing them. MC can 
encompass a wide range of functions, such as technical operations of a production facility, 
management of personnel, accounting, marketing services, and training (Kotelnikov, 2001).  
Generally speaking, MC are characteristic of companies with the lack of local skills to 
run a project (primarily, in the hotel and insurance industries). Consequently, MC is an 
alternative to FDI, since it does not involve so much risk and can yield higher returns for the 
home company when foreign government actions or regulations restrict other MEM.  
The basic advantages of MC include loss of control, flexibility, and quality, time 
delays, compliance issues (Kotelnikov, 2001). 
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2.1.1.4. OEM Contracts – Supply Business     
OEM stands for Original Equipment Manufacturer that can be marketed by another 
manufacturer (IBM, 2003, p. 66). In other words, OEM contracts allow selling originally 
manufactured (or genuine) parts or products under the buyer’s own brand name and logo (re-
branding).  
OEM contracts are applied in most industries. E.g. Chrysler markets cars produced by 
Mitsubishi. In computer industry, many parts are supplied under OEM contracts (e.g. Acer, 
Compaq) (Borrus, Ernst & Haggard, 2000, pp. 126-128).  
A tremendous surge in applying OEM began in the mid-1990s. At that time a large 
number of high technology OEMs were revising their manufacturing strategies to improve 
performance and reduce asset and operations costs. In the economic downturn of today, 
challenges for supply chain partners that assumed greater responsibility for manufacturing are 
growing, whereas the provision of OEMs with broader business solutions becomes tighter and 
tighter (Delatre, Hess & Chieh, 2003, pp. 1-2). 
As a matter of fact, most carmakers do not produce their parts themselves. Instead, 
they use outside independent companies who help them design (ODM or original design 
manufacturers) or produce (OEM) parts. Therefore, when it comes to automotive parts, 
OEM stands for replacement parts produced by the manufacturer of the original part (Kidder, 
2002). 
The opposite of OEM parts is aftermarket parts or parts produced by other 
companies, not the original manufacturer, but that fit and perform just like the original ones. 
As a rule, aftermarket companies purchase rights to reproduce parts similar to OEM ones and 
supply them to the same wholesale distributors. Yet, in view of various specific techniques 
applied in the production of OEM parts (tacit K or technical KH), aftermarket parts have 
minor differences in appearance and feel. On the other hand, aftermarket companies also 
attempt to surpass the original OEM product through improving it by redesigning it (Niosi, 
1994). 
OEM can be regarded as “disguised” exports. It is also an intermediate step between 
exporting and FDI, just as licensing is. In such a way, OEM exporters may effectively 
delegate marketing functions to foreign firms and learn about foreign preferences, thus, 
reducing the marginal cost of a possible entry into local production in future. OEM importers, 
on the other hand, may further on set up a JV to manufacture the product locally if the OEM 
contract proves successful (Niosi, 1994, pp. 165). 
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Thus, the main advantages of OEM contracts consist in: (1) the possibility of the 
purchasing company to buy necessary (standardized) components without the necessity to 
establish and operate its own operations; (2) the possibility of taking advantage of low cost 
parts and/or products secured by ES and specialization (purchasing economies, cutting edge 
of product development, production technology, and sophisticated quality control); (3) 
increased time-to-market of finished goods (indispensible in view of shortened product life 
cycles). This, in turn, allows the purchasing company to fully concentrate on its CC (Kaya, 
2009, pp. 1-2).  
The major disadvantages, on the contrary, include quality issues, since the OEM 
essentially determines the quality of the final product. A higher quality product, vice versa, 
results in an increased market potential (Kaya, 2009, p. 1).  
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2.1.1.5. Mergers  
Mergers take place when two or more industry competitors (or equal partners) agree to 
go forward as a single new company rather than remain separate in order to achieve CA that 
arise from a large size and scope of operations (horizontal integration) (Hill & Jones, 2012, 
p. 311; Kotelnikov, 2001). 
Normally, merging firms are small-size and create a new entity to pool their operations 
whereas an acquisition implicates that one big company uses its capital resources (stock, 
debt, or cash) to purchase another company (or swallows the target company) (Kotelnikov, 
2001). Therefore, mergers are also referred to as mergers of equals, whereas acquisitions or 
takeovers – as hostile mergers. This is primarily due to the fact that pure equality of mergers 
practically never exists in practice. Usually one company purchases another under the pretext 
of a merger (technically, an acquisition).  
Mergers are common in most industries. As a good example serves Boeing which 
merged with McDonnell Douglas to create the world’s largest aerospace company (Hill & 
Jones, 2012, p. 311). 
The number of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is increasing these days, since some 
companies gain CA over their rivals and attempt to suppress competition, thus, improving CA 
and profitability of its single-business model (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 311).  
On the other hand, the coordination and transformation period takes enormous 
financial resources and causes instability among management (M&A, 2012, p. 9), which in 
most cases lead to a higher rate of unsuccessful M&A (about 50%) (Kotelnikov, 2001). Thus, 
it is imperative that the complexity of M&A be not underestimated. On the other hand, M&A 
may enable abnormally high and long-lasting returns, which, in turn, explains their popularity 
in recent years (Gresham, 2008).  
In view of the aforementioned, M&A are indicative of “confidentiality bubbles”, 
when information flows are restricted due to confidentiality agreements. The takeover of 
Chrysler by Daimler-Benz in 1999 serves as a good example of it (Oxbridge Writers, 2012). 
The basic advantages of mergers are ES (cost reduction, removal of duplicate 
departments, increased profit margins), ESC (efficiencies related primarily to demand side 
changes, scope of marketing and distribution), increased market share enabled by the buyer’s 
absorption of a major competitor, synergy effects (increased opportunity of managerial 
specializations, increased bargaining power over suppliers, and buyers, etc.), cross-selling, tax 
benefits (buying a loss maker reduces the buyer’s tax liability), geographical diversification, 
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resource transfer (combination of scarce resources, overcoming information asymmetry), etc. 
(Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 312; Kotelnikov, 2001).  
The basic problems of mergers encompass brand and quality issues coupled with 
coordination and integration problems (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 313; Kotelnikov, 2001). 
With the ongoing globalization and liberalization, M&A increased considerably 
starting from the mid-1990s. Yet, most host governments do favor GFI more, since they add 
to country production capacity, thus, contributing to capital formation and employment 
generation. M&A, on the contrary, are more relevant for multinationals (foreign-owned 
capital stock) (Hilmi et al., 2007, pp. 248-249). 
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2.1.1.6. Acquisitions  
Acquisitions (also Brownfield investments (BFI)) take place when an organization 
purchases or leases already existing manufacturing facilities in order to launch a new 
production facility or to expand/upgrade the existing one to secure superior returns 
(www.investopedia.com). This kind of investment is optimal when the host market is 
characterized by intermediate values (Müller, 2001, p. 1). Moreover, acquisition is the core 
MEM to quickly achieve a greater market share (thus, greater market power) and is primarily 
preferred by MNCs that may buy a competitor, a distributor, a supplier, or a business in a 
highly related industry (either through a friendly or hostile acquisition) to capture CA in the 
overseas market (Kotelnikov, 2001). The hostile acquisition implicates the purchase of the 
target company’s stock (thus, gaining control over its assets and operations). 
Hill (1994) stated that advantages of BFI are the disadvantages of GFI and that their 
costs depend on the goodwill of the overseas company to be acquired. The main advantages 
and motivations for an acquisition are (Hill & Jones, 2003, pp. 312-313): 
 the fastest and the largest market entry and market penetration of all MEM 
alternatives through acquisition of a complementary product/ technology/ business /markets / 
distribution channels, etc.;  
 fast realization of ES and economies of speed enabled by the acquired 
additional mass;  
 fast refunding of the flowed inventions and quick generation of profits;   
 a lower risk investment due to easier and more accurate estimations of costs, 
risks, and benefits;  
 the possibility of absorption of the already existing strategies, structures, and 
processes, and experienced HC; 
 low risks related to product development; 
 an easy way to overcome ME barriers, etc.  
The disadvantages identified by Hill & Jones (2003, p. 316) include: 
 poor offers from firms that can be acquired; 
 high resource requirements; 
 high danger of non-acceptance in the host market; 
 integration problems as the most complex issue of all: primarily because of 
culture and organization differences, different control systems, relationships, etc.); 
 financial problems because of increased levels of debt;  
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 competitive constrictions;  
 too much diversification (thus, lack of performance management in the long 
run), etc.   
In view of its updating power, BFI are often preferred to revive the abandoned or 
ineffective facilities (e.g. to reconstruct old mills).  
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2.1.1.7. Strategic Alliances  
Strategic Alliances (SA) are cooperative agreements between independent partners 
(actual or potential competitors) who intend to collectively manage to achieve objectives of 
common interest (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 1). According to Inkpen & Ross (2001, p. 132), SA are 
often difficult to realize because of their cost- and time-consuming nature. They are also more 
complex and fraught with more uncertainty than other MEM. That is why SA emerge only 
after a long-term negotiation process.  
On the other hand, SA are characteristic of a turbulent economy (technological 
innovations that break barriers between sectors, ever-increasing competition, market 
globalization) (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 2). In the globalized world of today marked by converging 
industries, blurred traditional lines between business sectors and the same basic product 
offerings worldwide (Levitt, 1984, p. 2), SA seem to be the only rational way of developing 
complex skills within a limited time frame. Furthermore, SA help decrease competitive 
intensity excluding potential entrants and also secure the establishment of complex value 
chains that will serve as further entrance barriers.  
The basic forms of SA are: shared research, formal JV and minority equity 
participation (Kotelnikov, 2001). 
The logic behind SA is the Defend, Catch-up, Remain, and Restructure strategies 
(Kotelnikov, 2001). Therefore, the primary motivations for SA are (Lymbersky, 2009, pp. 
207-209; Hill, 1994): 
 increased ES and ESC, thus, significant cost reduction;  
 ease of market entry enabled by shared risks and costs, shared K and expertise 
(acquisition of new KH);  
 synergy and CA, thus, no concerns about rivalry;  
 relatively high flexibility; 
 financial benefits guaranteed by limited capital requirements; 
 easy implementation of standards, especially in case of developing and 
commercializing a system technology (e.g. in the electronic industry).  
Basic disadvantages, on the contrary, encompass (Lymbersky, 2009, pp. 217-220; Hill, 
1994): 
 a long reconciliation process because of the incompatibility of partners, 
conflicts over distributing earnings and constantly changing circumstances;  
 threat of KH outflow, thus, loss of critical technology, CC, and skills (or CA);  
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 hampered balance between cooperation and competiveness, which may lead to 
the asymmetry of distribution of critical resources and CC and even to the erosion of the other 
partner’s competitive position or a take-over;  
 lame motivation enabled by limited commitment;  
 complicated profit measuring;  
 limited access to information and significant problems caused by the wrong 
partner choice.  
In addition, SA are always sector-specific, dependent upon the strategies adopted in a 
specific market and necessarily presuppose organizational culture change (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 
14).  
 
Figure 7: Drivers of SA Using Telecommunications as an Example (Source: Pellicelli, 2003, p. 14) 
Generally speaking, SA have a long history. The alliance between Ford and Mazda, 
e.g., dates back still to 1931 (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 2). Another classical example of a SA is 
Caltex which got access to petrol deposits in Bahrain upon creating an alliance with a crude 
oil supplier from the Middle East (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 2).  
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2.1.1.8. Joint Ventures   
In contrast to WOM, International Joint Ventures (IJV) are established by already 
existing firms which pull together complementary resources (financial, technical, HR, 
goodwill, KH, team spirit, and other intangible assets) in order to secure returns that none of 
the parties could obtain acting on its own (Hill, 2003, p. 486; Kotelnikov, 2001). Therefore, 
IJV can be defined as an enterprise in which two or more investors share ownership and 
control over property rights and operations.  
The common objectives of IJV include: a fast and effective ME (entering into new 
geographic markets or related businesses), risk/cost/benefit sharing (increase in profit 
margins, acceleration of revenue growth), technology sharing and joint product development 
(share of scientists or professionals with unique skills), fast and easy access to new 
distribution channels and political connections, conformance to government regulations. In 
other words, JV are a practical vehicle for outsourcing operations and transfer of K (or CA, or 
even innovation), thus, securing enhancement of performance, quality, and efficiency of local 
companies.  
The level of control depends hereby on the ownership split and the number of parties 
involved, which, in turn, implicates that control must be necessarily shared among venture 
partners (Root, 1987, p. 7). The dissemination risk is, therefore, very high. The overall risk 
refers to the risk related to the fact that the corporation’s specific advantages in KH will be 
expropriated by a licensing partner. This, in turn, would reduce quasi rents that could be 
earned from the KH.  
In view of the conflicting pressures to cooperate and compete, IJV are frequently 
established only for a limited life span because of limited amount of assets, limited service 
life of assets, limited efficacy of joint manufacturing activities. Further factors and 
requirements to consider before setting up an IJV include (Hill, 1994):  
 understanding of CC, needs, and resources of overseas partners;  
 choice of an appropriate partner and securing the effective organizational 
design;  
 compatible corporate vision, strategies, management styles, and company size; 
 engagement and motivation of all partners to enable productivity of an IJV 
(ownership, control, length of agreement, pricing); 
 Capital and KH have to be united, so that partners’ inputs complement those of 
one another (shared resources and simultaneous protection of own proprietary resources).  
 financial strength and stability;  
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 complementary products, markets, and services;  
 effective two-way communication; 
 government intentions.  
In view of the aforementioned determinants, IJV involve a very long negotiations and 
coordination process, in which each party attempts to overtake the hierarchal control, 
maximize its advantage and own competitive position at the same time. A too hasty 
establishment of IJV and poor planning (cost overruns, poor analysis of customers and 
environment, etc.) lead to significant problems. On the other hand, IJV are most favorable 
when (1) partners’ strategic goals converge and their competitive goals diverge; (2) when 
partner’s size, market share and resources (finance and management skills) are much lower as 
compared to industry leaders; (3) K and property share coupled with simultaneous access 
limit to parties’ proprietary skills; (4) when IJV is used to reduce political friction in an 
overseas market. Thus, the primary benefits of IJV include: joint financial strength and source 
of supply for a third country.  
The disadvantages, on the contrary, encompass the following issues:  
 partners do not have full control of management or may have an ineffective 
blending of managers who are not accustomed to working together or approach issues in an 
entirely different way (thus, a slowdown in decision-making and efficiency);  
 impossibility to recover capital;  
 partners may have mistrust over proprietary K and disagree on third party 
markets (asymmetric new investments);  
 different views on expected benefits (performance ambiguity) and other 
financial disputes;  
 cultural clashes;  
 conflicts over the termination of the relationship (Gutterman, 2002, pp. 4-6).  
During the Cold War and political susceptibility of the communist party to foreign 
property of means of production, IJV were the only means of entering Eastern European 
markets (low-cost labor vs. technology and financial means). In the early 90s, IJV turned into 
the best way for setting up collaborations between the post-communist and capitalist worlds 
(modernization of production facilities) (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 10).  
 
 
 
 
37 
 
2.1.1.9. Cooperation   
Cooperation is a contractually arranged or silently agreed upon collaboration between 
legally and economically independent companies in order to achieve common goals and 
objectives (Contractor & Lorange, 2002, p. 26). The main characteristics of cooperation are 
just-in-time supply, public-private partnerships (regardless of sectors), common objective 
setting, optional collaboration, etc. (Hill, 1994). The basic motives for choosing cooperation 
as a foreign MEM are advancement of mutual interests and success, external growth, product 
and K connection, cost reduction and cost optimization, innovation, and tax benefits 
(Contractor & Lorange, 2002, pp. 27-28; Beamish & Killing, 1997, p. 4; Hill, 1994).  
Advantages of starting cooperation include primarily synergy effects enabled by 
sharing risks, responsibilities, CC, and benefits (Kotelnikov, 2001; Beamish & Killing, 1997, 
p. 134). In particular, advantages are related to collaborative labor, better information and 
experience flow, collective accomplishment of large projects, collective and advanced further 
education of staff, corporate advertising campaigns, improved customer service, constant 
productivity growth and quality enhancement, improved market position secured by a broader 
and more attractive portfolio of products and services. Risks of cooperation, on the contrary, 
encompass significant losses of company autonomy, waste of time and effort related to long 
coordination and planning (thus, high coordination costs), share of KH, liabilities of partners, 
the wrong choice of partners, etc. (Contractor & Lorange, 2002, pp. 13-14; Kotelnikov, 2001; 
Hill, 1994). 
In view of the fact that governmentally recognized partnerships may enjoy significant 
tax benefits, cooperation is often favored over corporations in terms of tax policy (especially 
in developed countries where dividend taxes are levied before dividends are distributed 
among partners). On the other hand, partnerships of politicians and corporations may lead to 
ethical problems and corruption. Thus, anti-trust laws which are called forth to restrict 
monopolistic practices and foster free market competition are a must (Kotelnikov, 2001).  
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2.1.1.10. Exporting   
First and foremost, it should be pointed out that exporting is almost always the first 
EM companies consider before entering a foreign market due to its simplicity in 
implementation, minimal risks and limited international marketing effort. Subsequently, they 
may switch over to another MEM. In addition, exporting is the basic MEM used by 
manufacturing firms where there are barriers to investment (Peng, 2011, p. 166; Kotelnikov, 
2001).  
One distinguishes between Indirect and Direct Exporting. Indirect exporting 
presupposes the participation of domestically-based intermediaries (importers or distributors) 
that overtake export transactions, whereas production is effected in the home country (Peng, 
2011, p. 312). Direct exporting, as the most common mode of exporting for SMEs, 
implicates, on the contrary, selling directly to foreign markets, i.e. involving no local market 
middlemen. Nevertheless, sometimes intermediaries in the overseas markets may overtake the 
job (Peng, 2011, pp. 312-313). 
The major types of direct exporting include direct agents who are responsible for 
marketing exported goods overseas (sales on commission) and direct branches or 
subsidiaries where the organization uses its own sales teams to sell in foreign markets 
(Kotelnikov, 2001; Hill, 1994). 
Apart from the aforementioned advantages, benefits of exporting also encompass ES, 
avoidance of costs associated with setting up manufacturing facilities in a foreign country, 
better protection of intangible property (e.g. patents). In addition, exporting allows a company 
to participate in the overseas markets with barriers to FDI (Kotelnikov, 2001; Hill, 1994). 
Disadvantages, on the contrary, include high transport costs (especially for bulk 
products), trade barriers, susceptibility to exchange rate fluctuations, and problems related to 
dealing with local marketing agents. Nevertheless, the indicated problems may be 
successfully solved if the company sets up a wholly owned marketing subsidiary in the host 
country (Kotelnikov, 2001; Hill, 1994).  
Generally speaking, direct exporting is most recommendable for companies with the 
primary focus on international markets as their crucial marketing distribution strategy (e.g. 
for manufacturers of highly technical services or production machinery), whereas indirect 
exporting is advisable for firms which prefer to avoid financial risk as threat to success, since 
the export partner normally overtakes most of the expenses related to sales in the overseas 
markets (Peng, 2011, pp. 312-313).  
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Nowadays, the Internet is becoming an increasingly important foreign EM. In the 
past, Internet sales were limited only to domestic marketing. Today, a surprisingly larger 
number of companies receive orders from all over the globe (Amazon). This development 
results, in turn, in the so-called international Internet marketing (Albaum & Duerr, 2008, p. 
571).  
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2.1.1.11. Turnkey Projects  
Turnkey projects (TKP) implicate that a product or service can be implemented or 
utilized with no additional work required by the host company. The only thing that is left is 
just to “turn the key,” so to say. Therefore, the contractor agrees to handle all the details of 
the project for a foreign client including training of the operating personnel (Albaum & Duerr, 
2008).  
In view of the utmost complexity, TKP are very popular in sales to foreign 
governments and serve as a means of exporting process technology in chemical, 
pharmaceutical, petroleum, and mining industries (Onkvisit & Shaw, 2008, pp. 243-267).  
The primary advantages of TKP are related to earning great economic returns from the 
KH and exporting process technology (especially to countries where FDI is limited by host 
government regulations). TKP are less risky as compared to FDI in countries with unstable 
political and economic environment (Albaum & Duerr, 2008, p. 383).  
The basic disadvantages of TKP include the fact that the investor has no long-term 
interest in the host country. Further disadvantages encompass the threat of creating a potential 
competitor, since selling a source of CA automatically implicates selling the CA to potential 
rivals (Kotelnikov, 2001).  
 
SUMMARY:  
The choice of a specific MEM is a rather case-specific. Each has its advantages and 
disadvantages, risks and benefits. Yet, in general, the choice of the FEM depends upon the 
following decision criteria: market size and growth, risk perceived, host government 
regulations, competitive environment and cultural distance, local infrastructure. 
 
Figure 8: Effects of FDI on Home and Host Countries (Source: Peng, 2011, p. 194) 
In addition, FDI increase insecurity and risks of job loss and reduced wages in the 
invested industries as well as income distribution in the parent country caused by the 
relatively higher demand for skilled and unskilled labor (not to mention of ethical issues). 
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Still, the job-creating effect of FDI exceeds the job-substituting effect. At worst, their impact 
on employment both in the home and host countries is neutral (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 247).  
From the perspective of the host country, proper balancing between positive 
(technology transfer, increased exports, upgraded skills) and negative effects of foreign 
investment (financial volatility, anti-competitive practices, dependence on foreign ownership) 
both in the short term (entailing economy deterioration) and in the long run (increase in host 
economy performance) is the primary task of governments to secure not only quantity, but 
also quality FDI.  
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2.2. Market Entry Strategies 
According to Hill & Jones (2012, p. 261), market entry strategy (MES) aims at 
identifying and taking actions that will reduce costs of value creation and/or add value 
through better serving consumer needs. As opposed to strategy development for a single 
country (with one government, one legal system, one currency, and one accounting system), 
international strategic management implicates dealing with multiple governments, currencies, 
and cultures. This, in turn, underscores the relevance of international complexities that offer 
three basic CA: global efficiencies, international flexibility, and worldwide learning. 
Consequently, effective international strategic management should be understood as an 
ongoing and comprehensive process that has to be constantly updated and adapted to 
(Lymbersky, 2008, pp. 23-25; Kotelnikov, 2001).  
Just as mentioned above, an internationally operating company may improve its 
efficiencies in a number of ways: through location efficiencies, economies of scale and 
economies of scope (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 26). Location efficiencies are achieved when 
production or R&D are placed in a country with cheap labor and/or skilled workforce. This, in 
turn, lowers the product price and distribution costs, improves quality and customer service. 
One of the illustrative examples is Volkswagen that placed its production in China (low-cost 
labor). IBM, on the contrary, capitalizes on India’s skilled programmers (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 
26; Kotelnikov, 2001).   
Economies of scale designate an increase in economies due to the increase in the scale 
of production. Daimler e.g. produces its M Class SUV in Alabama and then delivers it 
throughout the world. Centralized production and decentralized marketing prove much more 
cost-effective than building factories in various countries (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 26).  
Economies of scope are achieved by diversifying the company’s product lines in each 
of the countries of entry in order to lower overall production costs and enhance overall bottom 
lines. In particular, this strategy implicates that one single product is related to comparatively 
high distribution and marketing costs, whereas costs per unit are significantly reduced in case 
of a diversified product portfolio (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 26). 
International flexibility turns out a successful strategy in case of changes in demand, 
economies, political systems, changes in law in the home country. Most corporations modify 
their production or processes because of domestic changes. Yet, some do not, since 
international demand flexibility offers a valuable solution. A good example is the chicken 
processor Tyson Foods which benefited from the increased demand by health-conscious US 
consumers for chicken breasts. The surplus of chicken legs and thighs were sold at the 
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Russian market where dark meat is preferred over the light one, whereas the Chinese market 
was targeted with chicken feet which are considered a tasty delicacy there (Lymbersky, 2008, 
p. 26). 
Worldwide learning, which is of primary importance for the author of the current 
thesis, is an integral part of global operations: companies learn through adapting their 
business models, processes, and marketing techniques to local requirements. This invaluable 
K can be also used in other countries (e.g. some corporations may learn how to deal with 
strikes or how to quickly and efficiently end one) (Mintzberg et al., 2003, p. 284). 
Yet, the most important example of worldwide learning is “emerging opportunities.” 
This term implicates K share and K diffusion to secure constant improvement and sustainable 
CA in all subsidiaries internationally. E.g. General Electric introduced a system of 12 
management councils. Their members are senior executives who meet on a regular basis and 
have to present an idea that could also be applied in other business units. As a consequence, 
creative, innovative, and, assuredly, effective solutions are spread quickly, whereas their 
implementation is effected almost simultaneously in all subsidiaries all over the globe. 
Another good example is the Bayern AG, Germany, which offers highly skilled young 
managers an International Management Trainee Program (different job positions in sales, 
marketing and controlling over three years abroad) (Lymbersky, 2008, pp. 27-29).  
In view of the aforementioned coupled with extremely competitive markets driven by 
the liberalization of world trade and ongoing globalization, a MES is a must (Mintzberg et al., 
2003).  
To find the right balance between global efficiencies, worldwide learning and 
multinational flexibility (or cost pressures coupled with pressures for local responsiveness), 
companies normally have to adopt one of the following four strategies: global strategy, 
international strategy, multi-domestic strategy and transnational strategy (Hill, 2003, p. 
422).  
 
Figure 9: Market Entry Strategies (Source: Lymbersky, 2008, p. 29) 
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2.2.1. Global Strategy 
Establishing a successful global strategy (GS) is a long and tedious process where the 
main issue consists in understanding the nature of global industries and dynamics of global 
competition (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002, p. 28). GS is based on the assumption that the world is 
the market with homogeneous wants and needs, or one big Village, so to say. Thus, 
companies prefer to market a standardized product, not to customize it (e.g. SAP standardized 
cross-company software). ES are therefore an integral part of GS (Hill & Jones, 2012, p.  
C251; Mintzberg et al., 2003, p. 283).  
Sometimes only one department can be used for global marketing. Standardized 
marketing and distribution, centralized decision-making coupled with production outsourcing 
are typical characteristics of GS. E.g. Sony produces its TV sets, stereos, and gaming consoles 
for the global market, whereas only cheap parts like power supplies and fuses are adapted to 
some local markets (Lymbersky, 2008, pp. 30-31).  
Hill et al. (2012, p. 334) claim that GS involves configuring the firm’s value chain to 
maximize value adding at each stage. The strategy in question demands high degree of control 
over operations in different affiliates. Therefore, a WOS for centralized production is favored 
most. GS is also highly concentrated, which implicates that oligopolistic interdependence 
spills over national boundaries and significantly impacts competitive strategies of the parties 
involved.  
Bartlett & Ghoshal (2002, p. 31) provide a illustrative example of Matsushita Electric 
and Panasonic Corporation whose GS resulted in a strong global distribution network; the 
company-wide mission statement; high level of financial control; more applied and market-
driven R&D; ability to reach the target market quickly and impose own standards, since an 
individual country’s buy-in was not required any more. 
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2.2.2. International Strategy 
According to Hill (1994), international strategy (IS) stands for manufacturing and 
marketing in major host countries under the control of the headquarters coupled with inland 
R&D. Corporations that follow this strategy are established brand names such as e.g. IBM, 
Procter & Gamble.  
The basic components of IS encompass distinctive competence, resource deployment, 
scope of operations, and synergy (Lymbersky, 2008, pp. 32-33). The company’s distinctive 
competency can be characterized either by technological KH (e.g. Anti Lock Brakes of 
Bosch GmbH, Germany, which are very hard to beat even today) or management KH (e.g. 
McDonalds and its distinct efficiency in customer service known worldwide) (Hill & Jones, 
2012, pp. 291-292).  
Resource Deployment implicates deployment of resources upon choosing an 
appropriate market for entry: i.e., a WOS (100% ownership) vs. only a limited percentage of 
investment coupled with the involvement of other investors. An illustrative example is 
Disneyland Paris, whose parent entity, Disney, made a strategic decision to sell a certain 
percentage of the stock of its holiday and recreation center in Paris to outsiders (instead of 
bailing it out of financial difficulties all on its own) and saved the economized finances for 
more lucrative ventures and acquisitions instead (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 33). 
Scope of operations (SO) stands for a geographical region or a market that the 
company intends to enter (high-quality market vs. low-cost market). SO is tied to distinctive 
or CC, since resources might be scarce in certain regions. In addition, distribution costs might 
be too high to capitalize on the advantages of the distinctive competence. Thus, SO focuses on 
where CA could be exploited to advantage most. E.g. Texas Instruments focuses on digital 
signal processors that can convert analog signals into digital signals. Such chips are found in 
mobile phones or modems of all kinds today (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 33). 
Synergy implicates that the company’s benefits outweigh the sum of single benefits. 
British Airways e.g. gives away and/or sells merchandising products on their flights. These, in 
turn, lead interested people to Internet sites of merchandise manufacturers and/or sellers in 
new foreign countries, which again suggest visiting them directly through booking a flight 
with British Airways (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 33). 
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2.2.3. Multi-Domestic Strategy 
According to Hill (1994), a multi-domestic strategy (MDS) is identified as a 
customized product offering adapted to specific local conditions. MDS is based on the so-
called home replication strategy (HRS) which implicates the replication of the home market 
advantages in an overseas market, or the transfer of the company’s CA from its home market 
abroad. German carmakers BMW, Mercedes, Audi e.g. apply this strategy worldwide 
(Lymbersky, 2008, p. 30). Yet, in the case of MDS, multi-replication of the home strategy 
takes place: subsidiaries in each country of entry are relatively free to customize their 
marketing, products, and operations to suit local consumers most.  
Hill et al. (1990, p. 120) stated that MDS is based upon the assumption that national 
markets differ considerably with regard to consumer preferences, competition, operating 
conditions and political, legal, and social structures. Thus, MDS is marked by a low degree of 
control and favors contractual agreements or IJV as the primary mode of entry.  
Besides, in the case of big cultural differences, customization is a very effective 
strategy. On the other hand, low ES caused by customization of production, distribution, and 
marketing lead to a more complex coordination process. Corporations that pursue a MDS are 
marketing-driven. E.g. customers of Unilever and Kraft have to be targeted with special 
campaigns in each market (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 30). 
Consequently, the main features of MDS are (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1997): product 
customization for each distinct market, decentralized control and local decision-making. The 
basic advantages include product differentiation, local responsiveness, minimized political 
risk, and minimized exchange rate risk.  
Philips is one of the vivid examples of a company that pursued MDS. Its strategy 
resulted in innovation from local R&D, lively entrepreneurial spirit, products tailored to the 
needs of individual countries, high quality due to backward integration (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 
2002, p. 101; Hill, 1994). On the other hand, MDS created numerous challenges for Philips 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002; Hill, 1994):  
(1) high costs incurred because of custom-tailored products and duplication throughout 
the world;  
(2) Innovation from local R&D resulted in R&D-driven, not market-driven, products.  
(3) Decentralized control entailed the necessity of national buy-in before a product 
launch, thus, time-to-market took very long. 
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2.2.4. Trans-National Strategy 
Transnational strategy (TNS) combines the advantages of the GS (ES, thus, 
efficiency) with those of MDS (no centralized decision-making, thus, flexibility). As a result, 
parts of production and R&D can be centralized, marketing and HR, on the contrary, are 
decentralized to adapt to specific and rapidly changing requirements of local markets and 
cultural differences. Yet, just like a MDS, TNS are often very costly to coordinate 
(Lymbersky, 2008, p. 31). 
As a good example serves IKEA, a world-known producer of inexpensive furniture. It 
goes without saying that the company’s cost-efficiency depends heavily upon standardization. 
On the other hand, IKEA’s marketing campaigns vary from country to country to appeal to 
local tastes and habits (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 31). 
 
SUMMARY 
In the final analysis it should be pointed out that the rise of numerous MNCs on the 
global arena is the indication of the essentially indispensible liberalization and 
internationalization of world trade. Rising costs, intense local and global competition, 
overseas opportunities and liberalized investment policies further contribute to the rapidly 
expanding globalization (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 243).  
As a result, MNCs located in developing countries are characterized by similar firm 
specific advantages as compared to those from developed countries. Nevertheless, the 
essence, proportion, and distribution of CA differ considerably: developed nations possess 
key assets, such as technological KH, global brands, intellectual property, whereas in 
developing countries production process capabilities and networks coupled with 
organizational structures prevail (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 243). In addition, developing countries 
are still focusing on raw materials (primarily, state-owned) as their major strategic export 
asset. Hence, they are still bound to lag behind internationally until the strategic importance of 
K and intellectual assets gains more weight on a national scale (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 243).  
In view of the above mentioned, it is obvious that the choice of MEM has significant 
impact on international operations and the company’s success in general. Therefore, it can be 
regarded as a frontier issue in international marketing (Wind & Perlmutter, 1977, cited by 
Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 2) and as one of the most critical strategic decisions for MNCs 
(Root, 1994, cited by Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 2). As a consequence, the choice of MEM will 
influence all future decisions and performance indicators of the company in overseas markets, 
and will entail a concomitant level of resource commitment that are so difficult to transfer 
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from one country to another (especially from high level to low level) (Zhao & Decker, 2004, 
p. 2; Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 243).  
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3. Firm Theories 
Just as mentioned above, K is the source of CA (Eisenhardt & Santos 2000, p. 1). 
Moreover, K is a dynamic resource that can expand and develop over time (and with its use). 
Intellectual capital (both tangible, or explicit K, and intangible, or tacit K, that resides in the 
minds of individuals) (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 59) is, therefore, used to create wealth 
(Stewart, 1997). The abundance of virtual products coupled with the current movement 
towards intellectual property confirms the aforementioned phenomenon.  
Consequently, the ongoing dialogue between tacit and explicit K plays a critical role in 
the dynamic process of organizational K creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 14). K 
search, articulation and share, K storage, creation, and transfer are an integral part of the K 
creation spiral.  
Nevertheless, since K creation is very difficult to control, it is easier to manage the 
environment in which it is shared, created and applied. Hence, culture is of paramount 
importance to secure CM and ongoing K share and new K creation. Thus, culture change 
serves as the foundation of proper knowledge management (KM). As a vivid example serves 
Procter & Gamble and its Open Innovation Strategy as well as the corporation’s close 
collaboration with lead users on a global scale (Huston & Sakkab, 2006, pp. 1-3).  
In addition, “firms are organizations that represent social knowledge of coordination 
and learning” (Kogut & Zander, 1996, p. 502). On the one hand, productivity grows with the 
division of labor, yet, on the other hand, specialization increases the costs of communication 
and coordination (the fundamental dilemma of MEM). Therefore, the shift from treating 
firms only as those concerned with ownership, incentives, and self-interest towards “unsocial 
sociality” leads to understanding of social K as an economic value and strategic asset that 
supports coordination and communication. Moreover, since firms are also social structures 
(i.e. learning, coordination and communication reside not only in physical products, but also 
mentally), the assemblage of elements that compose an organization are subject not only to 
the primarily considered technical feasibility and permissibility, but also to the logic of shared 
identity (Kogut & Zander, 1996, p. 502). 
Numerous studies show that sharing of KH with the goal of helping the entire 
organization learn from frontline employees’ experience, ideas, and insights is one of viable 
ways of transferring tacit K as a critical resource for ordinary work practice. On the other 
hand, mere codifying of tacit K into corporate policies, procedures, and beliefs as guidelines 
for effective action proves inadequate or even erroneous for generating new K, managing its 
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distribution, and fostering creativity and innovation, especially in large organizations (e.g. 
Xerox) (Bobrow & Whalen, 2002, p. 1). 
An extensive analysis of literature related to the topic in question leads to the 
conclusion that no prominent theories were developed recently, although a wide range of 
empirical studies were conducted to test the validity of the prevailing models. These, in turn, 
help identify the determinant factors that impact the choice of a specific MEM and measure 
their respective effects (Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 3).  
First and foremost, the “resource-based perspective on strategy” (RBP) is traditionally 
traced back to Edith Penrose and The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959). Its modern 
manifestation is dated back to 1984, the year of publication of Wernerfelt’s A Resource-Based 
View of the Firm and Rumelt’s Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm. Later on, works of 
Barney, Montgomery, Dierickx, Cool, Amit and others appeared. Their primary interest was 
placed around resources, capabilities, and competencies. Nowadays, the RBP is arguably the 
dominant contemporary approach towards strategy research (Foss & Robertson, 2000, p. 11). 
This, in turn, implicates that (1) firms are viewed essentially as repositories of competence 
(or repositories of K capital that allows its holders to perform activities and solve problems 
more efficiently as compared to others), and (2) the firm’s ability to accumulate, protect and 
eventually to deploy its competencies is regarded as the primary determinant of its long-term 
or sustained CA (Foss & Knudsen, 1996, p. 1). In view of its skill-like character, competence 
is, thus, on the one hand, tacit in nature and asymmetrically distributed, and, on the other 
hand, in the context of the theory of the firm and strategic management, it is viewed as a 
property of firms rather than of individuals (therefore, it is hard to replicate and transfer).  
In addition, in the last decade, a lot was said as to the role of MNEs in the global 
economy. Some view such corporations as agents for economic development upgrading the 
quality of indigenous resources and capabilities (Dunning, 1993, p. 362), whereas others 
argue that MNEs constitute potential threats to welfare and democracy (van Tulder & van der 
Zwart, 2006, p. 268). Those who have mixed feelings see MNEs rather as multinational 
creatures with a Janus face and take the standpoint that multinationals have to be sufficiently 
controlled by governments and international regulating bodies to secure their positive 
contribution to different countries’ economic welfare (Forsgren, 2008, p. vii).  
Generally speaking, the basic approaches towards understanding the MEM include: 
(Zhao & Decker, 2004, pp. 3, 27):  
(1) the Stage of Development (SD) Model (Johanson & Paul, 1975), according to 
which internalization of SMEs entails a slow incremental process of cultural and geographical 
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expansion and commitment. Thus, the SD Model is based on experiential learning moving 
from a low-commitment MEM (i.e. no regular export activities) to high-commitment modes 
(exporting via independent agents up to the establishment of an overseas WOS) depending 
upon the level of experience and K of the host market (Susman, 2007, p. 231). Furthermore, 
the strategies of smaller firms are normally subject to high degrees of serendipity or fortunate 
and unplanned discoveries made by chance (Meyek & Skak, 2002, cited by Susman, 2007, p. 
231);  
(2) the Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA) theory and its extensions (Anderson & 
Gatigton, 1986; Hill et al., 1990; Erramilli & Rao, 1993), according to which efficiency 
maximizing companies adopt the MEM which minimize transaction costs. The rationalists of 
the TCA theory underscore the primary relevance of risk, uncertainty and control for the 
MEM decision. Moreover, numerous uncertainties may be eliminated through government 
programs and network contacts (Susman, 2007, p. 232). Thus, indirect exporting is referred to 
as a MEM of relatively low risk, low resource commitment, low ROI, low uncertainty and 
low control, whereas FDI, on the contrary, - as a MEM of high risk, high resource 
commitment and high ROI (Chung & Enderwick, 2001, cited by Susman, 2007, p. 232); 
(3) the Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) Model or Eclectic Theory 
(Dunnig, 1977), according to which the choice of the respective MEM depends upon the three 
sets of advantages: ownership, location, and internalization (a static model). The Eclectic 
Theory is rational and focuses on the advantages that impact the internalization process. It 
was tested and supported by numerous researchers (Brouthers et al., 1999, cited by Susman, 
2007, p. 232), who conclude that the OLI Model is particularly suitable for predicting the 
MEM of SMEs (Nakos & Brothers, 2002, cited by Susman, 2007, p. 232);  
In addition, the ownership-specific advantages implicate the relevance of the resource-
based view (RBV), thus, necessitating the ownership of assets that substitute the firm’s core 
competences (e.g. patents, trademarks, raw material possession, and technological KH).  
(4) the Organization Capacity (OC) Model (Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997; Madhok, 1998), 
according to which the MEM decision is dependent upon the deployment and development of 
the firm’s capacity. This, in turn, implicates that the OC view of the firm-specific advantage 
extends far beyond its ability to reduce transaction costs. The rents stemming from the firm-
specific advantages are mostly entrepreneurial rents, thus, implicating the uniqueness of each 
firm as well as its resources and capabilities (Forsgren, 2008, pp. 56, 64);  
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(5) the Decision Making Process (DMP) Model (Root, 1994; Young et al., 1989), 
which view the MEM decision as a multistage decision making process, whereas the impact 
of organization efficiency and decision maker is ignored.  
Generally speaking, the choice of a respective MEM depends heavily upon the TCA 
theory and the RBV of the firm. In other words, when entering into new markets, firms have 
to consider the costs and resources required to sell and service their products overseas as well 
as to learn from customers, competitors, and other stakeholders. In addition, issues related to 
the choice of protecting the firm’s own intellectual capital is of paramount importance 
(Susman, 2007, pp. 233-234).  
Moreover, according to Ellis (2000, p. 445), K of foreign market opportunities is 
commonly acquired via existing interpersonal links rather than through systematic collection 
of data and market research. In addition, the relevance of social media, complaint 
management (Kotler & Armstrong, 2009, p. 154), and relationships marketing (Payne, 1993, 
p. 32) (as sources of invaluable information for improvement and organic growth) further 
confirm the importance of relationships and K as basic strategic assets in today’s business 
environment. Thus, network connections (such as existing customers) and motivation for 
expanding abroad impact the MEM significantly. If e.g. there is already a captive sales 
audience waiting for the seller, ownership overtakes a primary role (e.g. the WOS decision). 
If, on the contrary, the firm is the “initiator” and is seeking potential markets, then it is likely 
to contract for its sales and probe the new territory (Susman, 2001, p. 232).   
In the past decade, most of the significant studies were related to examining the 
influence of specific factors on the choice of the respective MEM. Among these determinants, 
institution attracted most attention. Some papers extended the TCA theory by complementing 
the framework of analysis with institutional factors (Brouthers, 2002, and Lu, 2002, cited by 
Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 4). Other researchers argued that institution affects the MEM choice 
by increasing the cost of uncertainty and transaction (Said & McDonald, 2002, and Meyer, 
2000, cited by Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 4). Further determinants which were examined 
empirically encompass (Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 4): 
 technology transfer (Mattoo, 2001), 
 immigrant effect (Chung & Enderwick, 2001), 
 market size (Nakos & Brothers, 2002; Eicher & Kang, 2002; Chung & 
Enderwick, 2001), 
 firm size (Leung et al., 2003; Nakos & Brouthers, 2002; Evans, 2002), 
 CEO successor characteristics (Herrmann & Datta, 2002), 
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 cultural distance (Leung et al., 2003; Chen & Hu, 2002; Gillespie, 2002; 
Evans, 2002; Cristina & Esteban, 2002), 
 industry barriers and firm advantages (Chen & Hennart, 2002; Siripaisalpipat 
& Hosbino, 2000), 
 international experience (Reuber & Fisher, 2003; Evans, 2002; King & Tucci, 
2002), 
 country risk and environmental uncertainty (Cristina & Esteban, 2002), 
 role of staffing (Konopaske et al., 2002), as well as 
 foreign exchange rate and host country currency (Baek & Kwok, 2002). 
All the aforementioned factors can be generalized grouped into country specific 
factors (cultural distance, institution, exchange rate), industry specific factors (market size, 
market structure, etc.), firm specific factors (firm capacity, firm size, etc.) and product 
specific factors (product type, product maturity, etc.) (Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 4).  
Just as indicated above, there is not much congruence as to which of the models is/are 
most applicable to the respective MEM: each model has its limitations and critical issues. Yet, 
apart from environmental and transaction-specific factors (or efficiency considerations) that 
influence MNCs’ choice of MEM, an MNC’s global strategic posture is also of paramount 
importance. The results of studies conducted by Chan & Hwang (1992, p. 50), underscore the 
significance of expanding in mindsets and decision-making beyond the narrow confines of 
each MEM decision. A global strategy mindset is, thus, a must, especially when it comes to 
considering an ILA, IJV, and WOS. 
As far as technology transfer is concerned, MNEs generally prefer direct entry to 
acquisitions, when technology transfer is related to high costs (thus, a smaller cost advantage 
over domestic firms and a high acquisition price). Host governments, on the other hand, prefer 
acquisitions, since they lead to a larger extent of technology transfer and a relatively higher 
acquisition price for the domestic firm (Mattoo, Olarreaga & Saggi, 2001, p. 22).  
In addition, a thorough understanding of local, indigenous markets and the ability to 
service these needs without compromising on the company’s goals, ethics, and reputation is 
key to success on an international scale. In particular, despite increased globalization and 
consolidation of markets, there are still significant discrepancies between various regions and 
nations which are necessarily to be taken into account (Hite, 1991, pp. 35-36).  
In view of the complexity of the MEM models and their paramount importance for the 
firm’s future, the author of the given paper will further focus on the knowledge based theory 
(KBT), resource based theory (RBT) and organizational capability theory (OCT) to 
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examine how these strategies influence the choice of the respective MEM. Various other 
theories suggest other interpretations. Yet, in view of the market dynamics and global 
complexity, it is evident that there is a gradual shift towards an integrated approach towards 
studying MEM (an amalgamation of most valuable and congruent ideas).  
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3.1. Knowledge Based Theory 
According to Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 8), knowledge is distinct from just data 
and information. It secures valuable insights and expertise for solving problems in daily 
practice. Thus, the Knowledge Based Theory (KBT) has to be more than just a concept of 
information and information processing, as it was viewed in the past. Nickerson & Zenger 
(2004, p. 3) claimed that K has to be necessarily formatted, whereas profit gaining is possible 
only if the firm is capable of continually discovering new K or new solutions from the already 
existing K. Moreover, K is embedded in multiple entities including organizational culture, 
corporate identity, the company’s policies, routines, and employees as primary carriers and 
creators of tacit K. Nelson & Winter (1982, pp. 63-64) defined organizational K as the 
“input-output combinations achievable with all possible mixes and levels of activities known 
to the firm.”   
Anyway, according to the KBT of the firm, knowledge is regarded as the most 
strategically significant resource of the firm. The logic behind this assumption is that K is 
very unique, and socially complex (e.g. expertise in a certain field) and, thus, it is extremely 
difficult to imitate it. Consequently, heterogeneous K bases serve as the foundation for SCA 
and superior performance in the long term.  
KBT was initially promoted by Penrose (1959) and later elaborated and empirically 
tested by other researchers. According to Einsenhardt & Santos (2000, p. 46), the KBT offers 
extremely useful theoretical insights into how to address the multi-level social processes 
through which K is sourced, transferred and integrated inside and outside the firm. Besides, K 
has the ability to create value both internally and externally. And although the KBV is not 
fully developed for mapping out strategy or “a theory of the firm in any formal sense,” it is 
capable of providing theory-building and managerial practice to secure a pluralistic 
understanding of K and views organizations as complex adaptive systems (Grant, 2002, p. 
135; Alavi & Leidner, 2001, p. 107).  
The foundations of the KBT are grounded upon knowledge transferability (especially 
critical for internal purposes), capacity of aggregation (ease of transferability depends upon 
the potential for aggregation; enhanced through common language and IT), appropriability 
(tacit and explicit K), specialization in K acquisition, K requirements of production (K is the 
primary input of production).  
Krogh (cited by Scharmer, 1999, pp. 2-3) claimed that over the past few decades KM 
passed through three main stages: 
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1. During Stage 1, K was simply located and captured through technical systems. 
At the initial stage of KM, firms had to find the right people to make the process work. This, 
in turn, implicated the ability to identify key HC, transform it into structured capital, keep the 
right documentation, analyze data, etc. Market leaders of Stage 1 can be characterized through 
building K bases primarily using business information systems via collecting and analyzing 
information about competitors, new scientific trends, business development, etc.  
2. Stage 2 deals primarily with transferring and sharing K captured internally or 
in the organization. Ng (2002, p. 2) stated that the biggest challenge hereby, to achieve a CA, 
lies in the effective transfer of K. Krogh (cited by Scharmer, 1999, p. 3) claims that in order to 
share K, it is imperative to establish infrastructure and trust between all stakeholders and 
partners. The primary issue resultant from Stage 2 is related to the identification of the basic 
factors that motivate staff in order to secure that K is shared willingly and on a daily basis as 
well as to find effective and novel ways of building strong relationships to enable effective K 
sharing among respective stakeholders (Scharmer, 1999, p. 2).  
Unfortunately, most companies speak of negative experiences associated with K 
sharing. According to Nickerson & Zenger (2004, pp. 12-13), the two impediments of K 
sharing are: a) people are cognitively inhibited in the tempo with which they can learn or are 
susceptible to new information (e.g. different people accumulate and apply K differently), and 
b) employees tend to self-interest, which may lead to opportunistic behavior and opportunistic 
K sharing patterns. Therefore, on the one hand, K transfer may implicate not only transfer of 
best practices, expertise, and insights among employees, but also unleashing creativity and 
innovation to secure constant growth and sustainability. On the other hand, K sharing might 
also lead to the leakage of valuable firm-specific tacit K (especially KH or CA), thus, leading 
to losses of a unique competitive position (Liebeskind, 1996, p. 93).  
3. Stage 3, according to Professor Krogh (cited by Scharmer, 1999, p. 4) is 
characteristic of firms which survived the first two stages. At this level, new K is created. This 
is primarily done through focusing on business processes, thus, underscoring the relevance of 
a shift from the merely IT-based solutions of Stage 1 (e.g. large-scale intra- and inter-firm 
KM) to organizational structures (Stage 2) up to creating new values (Stage 3). Consequently, 
simply being knowledgeable does not suffice any more: firms need to be K-creating (Nonaka 
& Takeuchi, 1995). Moreover, in view of complexity of the third stage, it is rather future-
oriented and aims, in the first line, at proactive thinkers (e.g. Nokia). K-creating corporations 
envisage which K they would need in future and, therefore, keep experimenting with new 
methods and test new solutions.  
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On the other hand, the KBV is not a flawless theory. Krogh (cited by Scharmer, 1999, 
pp. 4-5) identified some primary issues related to it. First and foremost, the KBV has to go 
beyond the concept of information and information processing prevalent some decades ago to 
secure advancement onto higher levels of KM, thus, leading to enhanced productivity and 
progress. Moreover, in view of KM complexity and its social context, speed, accuracy, and 
diligence as the primary peculiarities of the K-based economy of tomorrow (and as opposed 
to the Industrial Age of the past) have to be paid special attention. Besides, today high 
mobility and low loyalty of HC which are characteristic of modern organizational structures 
place additional challenges for companies creating new tasks, manageable only for more 
knowledgeable workers and based on ongoing K generation and creativity. In addition, shared 
leadership based on voluntary cooperation and voluntary giving coupled with care and 
support ought to create a climate more conducive to K sharing. Yet, for the time being, most 
K sharing experiences are still rather negative. Sometimes, even years pass until positive 
changes do emerge (Scharmer, 1999, pp. 4-5).  
Moreover, according to Scharmer (2000, p. 2), tacit K, as opposed to Nonaka & 
Takeuchi’s classification of K (1995), is subdivided further into tacit-embodied K and tacit 
not-yet-embodied K. The latter is also referred to as self-transcending K and requires a 
different type of K environment and learning infrastructure. Consequently, in order to 
compete on markets with increasing returns (as opposed to markets with constant or 
decreasing returns), market leaders have to find the type of K that will allow them to sense, 
tune into and actualize emerging opportunities. Hence, the true challenge is to develop the 
capacity for “precognition” or ability to sense emerging potentials (or coming-into-being of 
the new which is conventionally associated with artists, not business managers) to secure the 
firm’s long-term CA and organic growth (Scharmer, 2000, p. 3).  
 
Figure 10: Three Forms of Knowledge (Source: Scharmer, 2000, p. 6) 
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3.2. Organizational Capability / Capacity Theory 
The Capability Theory (CT) was born thanks to G.B. Richardson, who, in turn, was 
influenced by Edith Penrose (1959, cited by Garzarelli, 2006, p. 3). In the context of CT, 
capabilities are defined as specific or not easily transferable production K.  
According to Richardson (1959, cited by Garzarelli, 2006, p. 5), firms may share some 
capabilities of production, but they do not necessarily share coordinative capabilities for the 
production process. E.g. the production of electronics for cars shares similar capabilities with 
the production of electronics for laptop computers. Yet, the coordination of the above 
mentioned processes of production are normally not shared, as the two processes belong to 
different types of production processes, thus, defining the boundary between the firm and 
market or other firms.   
The two basic problems faced by organizations, according to the CT, are the search 
cost problem (search of capabilities dispersed throughout the larger economic systems to 
organize them in a most productive way) and the coordination cost problem (to match 
capabilities to stages of production (both internally and externally) and to secure economies of 
specialization) (Garzarelli, 2006, pp. 10, 13, 14). Thus, the benefits of specialization are never 
obtained at zero cost and always entail coordination costs due to differences in capabilities.  
Generally speaking, the organizational theory studies how organizations are 
structured. The pursuit of self-interest and power are the basic characteristics of firms. The 
sources of power are authority, expertise, control of resources, control of processes, control of 
decision-making, and, assuredly, information and K. According to Follett (1998, p. 113), lack 
of training is related to the inability of cooperative thinking and action. Thus, the key factor to 
organizational success is in getting people to coordinate in accomplishing the organization’s 
purpose (Barnard, 1938). Hence, it is imperative to motivate employees to join the 
community and then to have them contribute willingly.  
Logically, the identification of the motives and inducements that satisfy different 
employees are of paramount importance to secure long-term success of a firm. The primary 
incentives may include material incentives (money, compensation, bonuses), personal 
incentives (prestige, distinction, power), values (pride of workmanship, altruistic service, 
loyalty, patriotism), associational incentives (social compatibility and social status), 
opportunities (participation, efficacy), security incentives (job security, support) 
(Balachandran, 2009, pp. 251-252). These are, by the way, in resonance with Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs (Smoke, 2010, pp. 138-139).  
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Aulakh & Kotabe (1997) and Madhok (1998, pp. 260-261) introduced the 
organizational capacity (OC) theory (OCT) which is based on the organization theory (OT) 
(Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 3). This model, or rather theory, views firms as a collection of 
capabilities and K where individual skills, organization, and technology are regarded as 
inextricably interwoven components (Nelson & Winter, 1982, cited by Madhok, 1998, p. 
266). In particular, the evolutionary theory of organizational capabilities and behaviors by 
Nelson & Winter (1982, p. 58) underscores the relevance of motivation by profit 
maximization. In addition, OC are evolutionary, or intrinsically dynamic, thus, providing the 
source of continuing growth. Particular attention is also be paid to uncertainty, bounded 
rationality, institutional complexity, and the dynamics of the adjustment process, where 
imperfect information and imperfect competition coupled with transaction costs, increasing 
returns, and historical change are interconnected (Nelson & Winter, 1982).  
According to Nelson & Winter (1982, p. 16), routines, as part of OC, are 
characteristic of all regular and predictable behavioral patterns of firms whose function may 
be compared to the role of genes in biological evolutionary theory. Routines determine the 
firm’s possible behavior and serve as a persistent feature of the organizational organism. 
Regularities of individual behavior, on the other hand, that have expected consequences at the 
organizational level (Dosi, Nelson & Winter, 2000) are the analogue of organizational 
routines and provide understanding of how routinatization secures organizational functioning 
based on skills of individual functioning (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 73). Moreover, 
according to numerous researchers (Polanyi, 1962, p. 49; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Schein, 
2004), skills are (1) programmatic (most steps and details are executed without conscious 
volition), (2) the K underlying a skillful performance is, in large, tacit in nature, thus, it is 
difficult or impossible to articulate all the relevant details; (3) the exercise of a skill involves 
making choices, yet, in most cases, options are selected automatically.  
Consequently, in view of the aforementioned, organizations consisting of numerous 
members who perform many distinct roles and make complementary contributions to 
production, face a substantial coordination problem. Hence, it is imperative to study the 
relationships between organizational learning (OL), social capital (SC), the effectiveness of K 
transfer coupled with perceived organizational performance. The integration of OL capacity 
with SC networks lead to the holistic K sharing approach and management enterprise 
framework as significant strategies to secure organizational success (Rhodes et al., 2008, p. 
245). 
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Moreover, firm resources (physical capital, HC, and organizational capital resources) 
can be a source of SCA only when they are valuable or when they can exploit opportunities or 
neutralize threats in a firm’s environment. One firm resource that is required in the 
implementation of almost all strategies is managerial talent. Moreover, according to the 
RBT, the bundle of firm resources should necessarily be rare. If these resources are not 
imperfectly imitable, then it is assuredly a source of sustained CA (Barney, 1991, p. 106). E.g. 
computers or machines in general that can be easily purchased across markets are just part of 
the physical technology of a firm. K and information (or intangible assets) that reside in 
human minds and are deeply embedded in a firm’s formal and informal decision-making, on 
the other hand, may hold the potential of SCA (Barney, 1991, p. 114). Brand names and 
reputation which are dependent upon historical difficult-to-duplicate settings or informal 
social relations between firms and key stakeholders (or socially complex structures, thus, 
imperfectly imitable components) can also be a source of SCA (Barney, 1991, p. 115).  
On the other hand, routines have to be understood as:  
a) organizational memory, whereas the routinization of activity constitutes the most 
important form of storage of the organization’s specific operational K. Moreover, 
organizations basically remember by doing (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 99). Hence, exercise 
of a routine serves as a key resource of economies and cause of persistent differences among 
firms and innovation (Schrumpter, 1934, pp. 65-66). On the other hand, an individual lacking 
skills appropriate for novel situations leads to poor routines or skills of the organization as a 
whole.  
According to Sidney Winter (cited by Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. xxii), firms are 
“organizations that know how to do things.” Thus, it is not just a mere collection of people 
organized to produce goods and services, or both, but their ability to manage to produce 
depends upon what they know (in other words, the K embedded in the routines) and factors of 
production. Hence, material assets are of limited worth unless employees know how to use 
them. Consequently, “knowing how to do things” is critical for the firm’s success. Moreover, 
knowledge is the only unlimited resource that grows with its use (Davenport & Prusak, 
2000, p. xxii). So, not to capitalize on it contradicts all the principles of the economic theory.  
Summarized, it should be pointed out that the only sustainable CA that the firm 
possesses reduces to what the firm collectively knows, how efficiently it uses what it knows, 
and how readily it acquires and uses new knowledge (Danenport & Prusak, 2000, p. xxiv).  
According to Zander & Kogut (1995, cited by Mahoney, 2005, p. 201), the transfer of 
manufacturing capabilities is influenced by the degree to which capabilities may be codified 
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and taught to others. Therefore, the nature of dynamic capabilities and the nature of 
competitive positioning are critical issues in this context. Hence, routines are 
institutionalized, networks and knowledge are more dynamic components.  
It goes without saying that a product or an invention (idea, creation, etc.) is normally 
associated with just one person, whereas the inventor seldom overtakes all the stages of 
product creation, normally only finding the clue to the right solution. As a matter of fact, there 
are thousands of registered cases when people did not manage to finalize their inventions. 
Therefore, K, networks, and routines are very personal. As a vivid example serves Apple, 
where Steve Wozniak and his technical genius helped the company produce computers 
engaging his visual experience of digital information. Steve Jobs, Wozniak’s partner, emerged 
as a visionary leader and built strong network connections around his primary team. As a 
consequence, iPod, iPhone, and iPad products appeared (truly unique and inimitable 
products).  
In the case of Microsoft, Paul Allen whose genius was bound to the command line 
interface could not commercialize his product because it was not quite understandable for 
non-programmers. Bill Gates, on the contrary, who understood the roots of the problem, used 
his huge business connections to introduce personal computing on the desktop, thus, radically 
changing the world of today.  
b) routines as truce, since routine operation involves a comprehensive truce in intra-
organizational conflict (Cyert & March, 1963, cited by Mahoney, 2005, p. 192). Adaptations 
involve a perceived threat to internal political stability, and thus, success; 
c) routines as target: control, replication, and imitation: Replication is often a non-
trivial exercise, since it requires complex skills with large tacit components, acquired over 
years of experience, not to mention of high costs related to it (Nelson & Winter, 1982, cited 
by Mahoney, 2005, p. 192; Polanyi, 1962, p. 52). 
According to Leonard (1998, p. 19), the organization’s CC are related to employee K 
and skills, technical systems, managerial systems, and values and norms. Besides, in order to 
take advantage of CC, it is imperative to mitigate core rigidities of the firm. Critical issues 
hereby involve proper management of such information attributes as acquisition, evaluation, 
assimilation, integration, diffusion, deployment, and exploitation of K. Such information 
management is a process and a routine where internal K is constantly developed and 
integrated into the functioning of the organization (Madhok, 1998, p. 266).  
Zhao & Decker (2004, p. 9) maintained that the OCT postulates that the MEM 
decision, the firm’s boundary issue, is a capability related issue and is made under the 
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calculus governed by considerations related to the deployment and development of the firm’s 
capabilities. This, in turn, implicates, that the OT is necessarily taken into account when the 
MEM choice is made. The theory is still not perfectly developed and there are several 
restrictions to it. Yet, on the other hand, this theory is supported strongly by numerous 
empirical studies and the evidence of efficiency and effectiveness in the development, 
acquisition, and deployment of organizational capabilities in practice (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997, cited by Mahoney, 2005, p. 203). 
According to Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 48), most MNCs face a corporatewide 
problem related to the dominance of a specific strategic business unit (SBU). Thus, it is 
imperative to overcome it by developing organizational skills through moving competencies 
from one SBU to the others (via training - both adaptive and generating). Moreover, CA 
should be found in the resources and skills “inside” the company, as opposed to the market 
environment or “outside” the firm, as argued by Porter’s structural approach.  
According to Aulakh & Kotabe (1997) and Madhok (1998, p. 261), the EM decision, 
from the perspective of the OC, depends upon the deployment and development of the firm’s 
capacity. Zhao & Decker (2004, p. 9), on the contrary, argued that the assumption that the 
capacity of an individual firm is limited to ownership is not valid when the firm’s efficiency-
related decisions are significantly influenced by collaborative agreements. This, in turn, might 
significantly modify its overall capacity. The main conclusion, therefore, consists in the fact 
that strategy formulation depends not only upon the organization’s capacity, but also on the 
organizational efficiency. This, in turn, necessitates the relevance of developing measures for 
evaluating organizational efficiency (Zhao & Decker, 2004, p. 9). The impacts that have to be 
considered, according to the OCT, are, thus, related to decision-making, sociological and 
political factors. Hence, organizational capabilities serve as basic determinants which are 
developed through experience (the source of CA) and help the firms to compete both 
nationally and internationally (Madhok, 1998, p. 266).  
Furthermore, the OCT maintains that firms compete for a CA, and to gain it, they have 
to learn from each other. Therefore, collaboration is one of the most efficient ways of 
improving competitiveness. Madhok (1998, p. 266) claimed, that, from the OC perspective, 
the personality and sample of the firm’s experience and information management abilities (the 
two being interrelated), are critical for understanding the firm’s international activities.  
Chandler (1990, p. 172) stated that in order to develop OC or CC, firms have to make 
the following inter-related investments for achieving organizational capabilities: (1) 
investments in production facilities large enough to utilize the potential economies of the 
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technology (ES and ESC); (2) investments in product-specific marketing, distribution, and 
purchasing networks, and (3) investments in managerial recruitment and training to plan, 
coordinate, and monitor the firm’s dispersed operations. OC, in turn, provide an internal 
dynamic for the continuing growth of the firm. In particular, OC stimulate their owners and 
managers to expand into more distant markets both in their own country and overseas. In 
addition, they also encourage the company to diversify through developing products 
competitive in markets other than the original one, thus, turning it into a multi-product 
enterprise (Chandler, 1990, p. 177).  
Furthermore, since change is the only constant today, organizations have to learn to 
adapt and be flexible. In particular, in order to build a culture in which effort and experience 
coupled with cooperation, openness, lifelong learning lead to constant improvements, it is 
imperative to eradicate the fixed mindset that creates internal competition, defensiveness, and 
constant judgment. A growth mindset, on the contrary, encourages growth and constant 
improvements and leads to numerous benefits both for individuals and the organization as a 
whole (Sims & Nelson, 2011, p. 35). Therefore, the role of leaders to secure CA is crucial. 
Leaders create culture and manage it on a daily basis directing employees in the direction 
chosen. They are like artists who envisage future trends and help others get there too 
(Scharmer, 2000, p. 3).  
Moreover, according to Edgar Schein, the researcher of organizational culture (2004, 
p. 17), the cultural paradigm is acquired due to external adaptation and internal integration 
and is thus most difficult to change as opposed to other organizational attributes as products, 
leadership, etc. External adaptation helps firms to survive and grow. Therefore, valuable 
cultures hold potential for the generation of CA and sustainability. Internal integration, on the 
contrary, is acquired through daily socialization and secures the formation of the required 
social structures which enable everyday functinality, thus, reinforcing cultural values and 
beliefs. Hence, communication plays primary role in securing organizational success and 
fostering cooperation, voluntary K sharing, support, and trust (Schein, 2004, p. 27).  
According to Schein (2004, pp. 12-13), the cultural paradigm encompasses primarily 
myths (or explanations that maintain group cohesion anchoring the present in the past), rituals 
and ceremonies (performance appraisals, award ceremonies, committee meetings, 
management training programs), etc. Even the firm’s products as artifacts are its physical or 
tangible manifestation of corporate culture.  
As far as MEM are concerned, the compatibility between the requirements for a 
particular operation and the existing K base is a primary factor in the firm’s strategic 
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evaluation of a specific EM (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, and Tallman, 1991, cited by Madhok, 
1998, p. 266). The main issue hereby is the cost of development and deployment of requisite 
capabilities within the firm because the choice of the EM is influenced by the costs related to 
K replication within the firm resultant from a specific market transaction (Kogut, 1992, p. 22). 
But if the existing routines of K replication can be used, implementation costs may be 
significantly reduced (Galbraith & Kay, 1986, cited by Madhok, 1998, p. 266). On the other 
hand, if a firm possesses a strong K base and required routines, then internalization will be 
preferred because it increases efficiency of resource use and effectiveness of K transfer within 
the organization (Madhok, 1998, p. 266). In addition, companies can also consider less costly 
and more effective alternatives to supplement their resources, grab new K from competitors 
and integrate it into the firm’s K base (Huber, 1991, cited by Madhok, 1998, p. 266).  
Summarized, from the OC point of view, K resources are the main issue; 
collaboration within the company involves restructuring of the firm’s information 
boundaries; management and coordination of collaborative relationships are frequently 
reduced to management of K flows (Badaracco, 1991, cited by Madhok, 1998, p. 267). Due to 
this acknowledgment, ME by WOS results in the perpetuation of similar routines (Madhok, 
1998, p. 267); licensing is not really adequate because of subtle aspects of KH; IJV are more 
attractive for enhancing the firm’s capabilities in the core business because the development 
of all the necessary KH in-house is viewed as too slow, thus, unproductive (Madhok, 1998, p. 
267). Therefore, JVs provide a greater degree of K interchange.  
Licensing as a MEM will be preferred when there is limited experience in 
international operations, since experience builds up confidence. Hence, the greater confidence 
in the firm’s abilities and possibilities to manage all the issues on its own, the faster it will 
decide for a WOS as a preferable MEM.  
Consequently, the company’s K base is the evolutionary outcome of the OC pattern 
and nature of the firm’s experiences where the acquired set of experiences manifests itself in 
organizational routines, or the blueprint for the firm’s actions; it becomes the medium through 
which the firm’s behavior can be understood to external stakeholders (Madhok, 1998, p. 267).  
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3.3. Resource Based Theory 
A vast majority of empirical literature points out that the availability or access to 
similar resources does not guarantee similar results or outcomes. In fact, in view of the 
liberalization of world trade and increased globalization, most firms today have similar 
opportunities. Yet, still very few compete globally, whereas others cannot even compete on a 
regional level. Therefore, varying performance is resultant from the heterogeneity of assets 
(Lopez, 2005, p. 662). In other words, certain resources coupled with certain capabilities and 
established business relationships secure a competitive position and CA.  
Generally speaking, the RBV serves as the theoretical starting point in strategic 
management. In classical military roots, strategy stands for complex decision making to 
outperform competition. Yet, in the last decades, strategic management turned more into a 
“scientific discipline” and a field of research and managerial practices. In the 1980s, a 
synthesis in the RBV of the firm emerged (Peteraf, 1993, cited by Eikelenboom, 2005, p. 14). 
On the one hand, as opposed to Porter’s Five Forces (1980), the resource-based logic 
switched the focus from the “outside” to the “inside” of companies. As a consequence, the 
internal organization coupled with the firm’s valuable, rare and costly to imitate resources 
and capabilities were seen as a source of CA (Stacey, 2003, and Barney & Hesterly, 1999, 
cited by Eikelenboom, 2005, p. 14). On the other hand, since internal capabilities are 
connected to the external environment (competition, demand, globalization, lead users, Open 
Innovation, etc.), the RBV is often referred to as an inside-out approach. Therefore, the RBV 
is regarded as an influential theoretical view for comprehending how CA is achieved and how 
it could be sustained in the long run (Eikelenboom, 2005, p. 15; Schein, 2004, 17).  
 
Figure 11: The Relationship between SWOT, Resource Based Model and Environmental Models 
of Competitive Advantage (Source: Barney, 1991, p. 100) 
Generally speaking, the Resource Based Theory (RBT) postulates that firm-specific 
resources and capabilities are crucial determinants of the firm’s performance and, thus, 
economic rent (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 33). According to the creator of the RBT, Jay 
Barney (1991, p. 117), the two assumptions of the RBT are: (1) resources are spread 
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heterogeneously across firms; (2) resources cannot be transferred from firm to firm without 
costs. Thus, the bundle of valuable resources and capabilities are the source of the firm’s CA 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, pp. 1-2; Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 172). The major challenge for 
managers consists hereby in the identification, development, protection, and deployment of 
these heterogeneous and not perfectly mobile resources and capabilities in such a way that 
they provide the company with a sustained CA, thus, securing a superior ROI in the long run 
(in other words, a CA is independent of the time frame and unsusceptible to imitable actions 
of competitors) (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 33; Peteraf, 1993, p. 180; Barney, 1991, p. 
117; Rumelt, 1984, p. 562).  
Uncertainty, complexity, and intra-organizational conflicts, on the contrary, highlight 
the firm’s limitations to developing an appropriate RBT strategy, since decision making takes 
place ex ante (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, pp. 33-34). Moreover, Key Success Factors (KSF) 
should not be easily accessible, since otherwise they cease to be KSF. Therefore, the 
company’s unique resources have to fulfill the following criteria to secure a CA: (1) valuable 
(value creation outperforming competitors or reducing own weaknesses), (2) rare (to secure 
above average returns), (3) imperfectly in-imitable (not easily duplicable, whereas the source 
of inimitability of CA should be unknown to competitors (causal ambiguity)), (4) non-
substitutable (substitutable products will drive prices down leading to discounted future 
rents) (the so-called VRIN characteristics) (Barney, 1986, pp. 1231-1241; Dierickx and Cool, 
1989, p. 1506). 
In other words, when value is created, the company automatically improves its 
organizational performance both in terms of effectiveness and efficiency (e.g. Apple). 
Resources owned must be exclusive in order to achieve a SCA (e.g. Google). Resources 
should not be easily reproduced or copied by competitors (e.g. Apple’s proprietary software 
iOS5 is only available to use with Apple’s products). Resources must not be strategically 
equivalent resources that are not valuable or rare (e.g. patents).   
Just as mentioned above, as opposed to Porter’s strategic development process which 
looks at the relative position of a firm in a specific industry, the RBT can be regarded as an 
“inside-out” process of strategy formulation, since, in the first line, the firm looks at the 
resources it possesses. Subsequently, it assesses the potential for value generation and later on 
develops a strategy to capture the maximum of value and sustain it in the long run (Grant, 
1991, p. 1).  
Moreover, causal ambiguity is one of the basic factors of inimitability, in particular, 
if the resource for CA is either knowledge-based (tacit in nature) or socially complex 
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(difficult or even impossible to duplicate). Thus, knowledge-based resources can be defined as 
“the essence of the resource based perspective” (Conner & Prahalad, 1996, p. 477). In 
addition, resources might be imperfectly inimitable due to historical events (e.g. Nike was 
founded by two world-known athletes). As a result, such resources will lead to strengthening 
of the CA and will be impossible to replicate through acquisition or imitation. Summarized, in 
order to remain competitive in the long term, the firm’s strategic assets are to be not easily 
bought, sold, imitated, or substituted (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 38).   
From the RBV, resources are defined as “stocks of available factors that are owned 
or controlled by the firm” (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 35). They can also be referred to as 
“inputs” into the production process (Black & Boal, 1998, p. 131). To convert (externally 
available and transferrable) resources into final products, a wide range of other assets and 
mechanisms are applied (e.g. technology, incentive systems, trust, etc.).  
According to Amit & Schoemaker (1993, p. 35), firm-specific resources encompass:   
 technological KH (patents, licenses, trademarks; processes, systems and 
software);  
 financial assets (cash/assets on hand; the ability to easily raise capital; 
relationships with banks and other sources of cash, etc.);  
 physical assets (natural resources, location, land, property, etc.); 
 intellectual and human capital (skills of employees; specialized K and 
training; attitude towards customers; entrepreneurial perception; networks and communities 
of practices, Open Innovation, etc.);  
 reputational assets (public perception of the firm’s quality, fair treatment, role 
in community, etc.), and 
 organizational assets (flat organizations encourage creativity and innovation; 
entrepreneurial culture; ability to make fast decisions; short implementation periods, etc.).  
Capabilities, on the contrary, stand for the firm’s capacity to deploy its resources 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 35). They are information-based, tangible or intangible firm-
specific processes developed over time that secure superior performance. Capabilities are 
regarded as the main source of CA. Prahalad (1993, p. 45) refer to the capabilities that are 
crucial for the organization’s CA as “core competencies” (e.g. collective learning). Complex 
organizational capabilities (Competence = Technology x Governance Process x Collective 
Learning) pose a huge barrier for other firms to enter the market, thus, these are much easier 
to sustain in the long term. On the other hand, economies of experience or learning curves 
may be less relevant in a more dynamic environment of today, since radical changes occur too 
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fast and the K of the past may prove totally obsolete (or rather an impediment to growth) 
(Prahalad, 1993, p. 45).  
In addition, the experience of management, just as mentioned above, significantly 
effects productivity. When management attempts at the optimal usage of the available 
resources and fosters a truly “dynamic” interacting process, this, in turn, secures continuous 
growth.  
Abstractly, capabilities may be interpreted as “intermediate goods” generated by the 
company to secure improved productivity of its resources as well as strategic flexibility and 
protection of the final product. Unlike resources, capabilities are based upon the development 
and exchange of information among the firm’s HR. Capabilities are often indicative of 
functional areas. As a vivid example serve highly reliable services, product innovations, or 
manufacturing flexibility (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 35). In addition, the social context of 
certain resource conditions marked by tacitness of K accumulated through learning by doing 
(skill-based resources), complexity of inter-related resources, as well as specificity of certain 
resources helps secure competitive barriers (Wernerfelt, 1986).  
Routines, just as indicated above, are regular and predictable patterns of activity 
which encompass a sequence of coordinated actions by individuals (Nelson & Winter, 1982, 
p. 16). Routines result from the recurrent interaction (learning) between employees and other 
resources of the organization. Moreover, routines are marked by a high degree of semi-
automatism or tacit K that shows the limits to which capabilities can be articulated (Grant, 
1991, p. 2). 
Yet, CA may erode over time for two main reasons: depreciation and imitation by 
rivals. Thus, it is indispensable to analyze the firm’s resources for: (1) durability (rate at 
which they become obsolete); (2) transparency (degree of imitability); (3) transferability 
(e.g. geographical immobility, imperfect information, firm-specific resources, immobile 
capabilities which make resources not easily acquirable); and (4) replicability (the more 
complex the routines, the more difficult it is for a rival to replicate them inside his 
organization). Moreover, resources must be appropriable (or be able to capture rents derived 
from business activities) (Grant, 1991, p. 2). 
In view of the aforementioned, new entrants (except for technology-dependent 
industries where revolutionary innovations eliminate the advantages of early entrants) enjoy 
first mover advantages: (1) new entrants possess technological KH derived from “learning” 
or “experience” curves, where costs fall with cumulative output; success in patents or R&D, 
where advances in products or processes are related to R&D expenditures, thus, securing a 
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higher quality and higher level performance; (2) new entrants have experience, capabilities 
developed over time and scarce assets (controlling assets that already exist rather than those 
created through development of new technology), and (3) buyer switching costs and brand 
loyalty are rather high (later followers have to invest more resources to attract customers away 
from the first-mover firm) (Kim & Park, 2006, p. 45; Lieberman & Montgomery, 1987, pp. 2-
8).  
Summarized, capabilities include dynamic routines which secure the firm’s improved 
efficiency; resources, on the other hand, encompass HR, K transfer, finance, and technology 
(Moingeon et al, 1998; Makadok, 2001, pp. 388-389; Corner & Prahalad, 1996, p. 477). In 
order to sustain a CA, resources have to be skillfully used through capabilities. The relevance 
of K as a strategic asset is, therefore, undisputable. 
Moreover, it is of paramount importance to create barriers to imitation (“isolating 
mechanisms”), which are primarily characterized by information asymmetries, corporate 
culture, managerial capabilities, and property rights (Winter, 2003, p. 992). E.g. by creating 
an asymmetry (a skill, process or asset that competitors cannot easily duplicate at an 
affordable cost), companies can create a CA (e.g. Walmart). Nevertheless, the relevance of 
managerial practices (except for property rights) is critical in all of the aforementioned cases. 
On the other hand, according to Ma (2003, p. 76), SCA is, by definition, anti-competitive.  
Generally speaking, research based on the RBT covers the following issues: strategic 
management, marketing, international business, entrepreneurship, HR management, finance, 
and accounting. The RBT sheds light onto how companies achieve CA and sustain it in the 
long run (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p. 1). RBT explores strategic capabilities as a group of 
internal resources which are strategically important for the creation of a CA.  
Furthermore, based on the premises of the RBT, the value of the firm’s KH influences 
its collaboration preferences in international MEM (Madhok, 1998, p. 269). In order to 
maintain competitive internationally, firms enter foreign markets by locating their production 
close to their rivals, but using different resources and capabilities. The RBV supported by 
Lieberman & Montgomery (1998, p. 1113) underscores the relevance of resources (both 
tangible and intangible, including employees’ skills) for the timing of entry.   
Yet, on the other hand, static perspectives of the RBT and industrial organizational 
economic perspectives do not accommodate for evolutionary changes of network knowledge 
(Ng, 2002, p. 2). Knowledge-based CA, on the contrary, is the dynamic configuration of 
resource choices to the rapidly changing K in today’s social networks (Ng, 2002, pp. 28-29). 
Consequently, it goes without saying that K will remain one of the most important resources 
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of firms still for generations to come. Yet, the future of KM is likely to shift more in the 
quality direction (both embedded in corporate culture and daily operating procedures) 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. xv). 
The aforementioned analysis makes obvious to which extent K, resources and 
capabilities are interconnected within a firm, sometimes even causing market failures or 
impossibility to trade these units in perfect markets (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 44).  
Based on the aforementioned factors, a strategic asset can be defined as a set of 
difficult to trade and imitate, rare, appropriable and specialized resources, capabilities and K 
that secure the firm’s CA (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 37).  
The three theories examined in the above chapters are summarized in the following 
Figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Strategic Assets of a Firm (Source: (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993, p. 38) 
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4. Knowledge 
“Knowledge is power, but without the adequate management of that knowledge,  
the consequences for [organizations] could be devastating.” 
Cameron (2000, p. 3) 
Understanding sources of SCA is a primary issue for MNCs and a major area of 
research in strategic management. Just as mentioned above, strategic resources (both tangible 
and intangible) are heterogeneously distributed across firms and nations. These differences 
remain stable over time, whereas uncertainty and changes grow exponentially. This, in turn, 
underscores the relevance of understanding the links between the firm’s resources and SCA as 
well as the potential of specific resources for generating SCA (Barney, 1991, p. 99). 
Knowledge overtook the first-rate role in this context. 
Moreover, in the Information Age of today and in the transition phase towards to the 
K-based economy of tomorrow, it is knowledge (not capital, raw materials, land, or labor) that 
is the company’s key economic resource and source of wealth and sustainability. In other 
words, K differs significantly from resources of the industrial economy of the past (Stewart, 
1997).  
Furthermore, according to Dorothy Leonard’s Wellsprings of Knowledge (1995, p. 
xiii): “Products are physical manifestations of knowledge, and their worth largely, if not 
entirely, depends on the value of the knowledge they embody.” That implicates that all 
products and services are knowledge-intensive and that K has to be regarded as the primary 
strategic asset for each and every firm.  
In addition, since K accumulates slowly over time and is not a static pool
1
, but a 
wellspring, constantly replenished with new data, information, K, wisdom, ideas, insights, 
etc., accumulation of this ever-flowing source of corporate renewal and the development of 
the firm’s core capabilities are inseparably linked to constant or lifelong learning. Hence, “K 
is both raw material and finished goods in today’s corporations” (Leonard, 1995, p. 3). 
Moreover, the ability and willingness to share with others was always considered a 
unique way to achieve human happiness (e.g. in old civilizations), K being the most valuable 
thing of all (Cağatay, 1989, p. 277).  
Just as indicated above, effective use of K is imperative to secure economic growth, 
development and stability of nations (Dahlman & Utz, 2004, p. 10). According to the World 
Bank Institute, the Knowledge Econony Index (KEI) designed as an interactive tool for 
                                                 
1
 According to Cisco Visual Networking, the global mobile data traffic will increase 26-fold between 2010 and 
2015 (Source: Cisco, 2011).  
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quantifying countries’ ability to generate, adopt and dissiminate K and for benchmarking in 
the K-based environment on a global scale underscores the relevance of economic stability for 
securing higher susceptibity to K and innovation (The World Bank, 2012). 
 
Figure 13: KEI and KI Indexes (2012) (Source: The World Bank, 2012) 
First and foremost, it should be pointed out in this context that data, information, and 
knowledge are not interchangeable concepts (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 1). The clear 
distinction between these concepts and wisdom is reflected in the epistemological system 
called Data, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom (DIKW) Pyramid – one of the most 
fundamental and widely recognized models in KM (Firestone, 2001, p. 15). 
 
Figure 14: The Data, Information, 
Knowledge, and Wisdom Pyramid (Source: 
Firestone, 2001, p. 15) 
According to Milan Zeleny, one of the initiators of 
the Knowledge Pyramid, its elements may be 
referred to as ”know-nothing, know-what, know-
how and know-why” (Zeleny, 1987, p. 59). Data 
(know-nothing) is a set of discrete, objective facts 
about events. It may be also described as structured 
records of transactions (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, 
p. 1). Data is stored in some sort of technology 
system and is entered into the system by different 
departments: finance, accounting, marketing, etc. Quantitatively, firms evaluate data 
management in terms of costs, speed, and capacity. Qualitative measurements, on the 
contrary, are timeliness, relevance, and clarity (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 1; Zeleny, 
1987).  
As a matter of fact, all organizations need data. But some industries are heavily 
dependent on it (e.g. banks, insurance companies which have to keep track of all their 
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transactions), whereas for other companies, quality data matters more, as data has no inherent 
meaning (offering no judgment or interpretation of what happened, thus, providing no 
sustainable basis of action). Consequently, data has little relevance or purpose, yet, it serves 
as the essential raw material for the creation of information (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 1; 
Zeleny, 1987). 
According to Peter Drucker, one of the most important personalities in KM (cited by 
Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 2), information (know-what) is “data endowed with relevance 
and purpose.” In other words, it is a message that has a sender and a receiver and which is 
intended to make a difference in the receiver’s outlook and/or insight. Information moves 
around organizations through hard (wires, addresses, electronic mail-boxes, satellite dishes, 
etc.) and soft networks (ad hoc: less formal and visible) (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 3; 
Zeleny, 1987).  
Quantitatively, information is measured by connectivity and transactions. 
Qualitatively, on the contrary, it is measured by informativeness and usefulness (new insights, 
contributions to decision-making or new solutions to problems, etc.). Therefore, information 
is marked by value-adding: answering the fundamental questions who, what, where, when 
and how many, data becomes contextualized, categorized, calculated, corrected, and 
condensed (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 4).  
There is a heated discussion all over the world as to the relevance of technology 
(computers, in particular) for adding value to data. Assuredly, computers can help to add 
value and transform data into information (through data categorization, calculation, and 
condensing), but they rarely manage to contextualize data. In other words, computers will 
never substitute humans in their role of K creators (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, pp. 4-5; 
Zeleny, 1987).   
Knowledge (know-how) is a much broader, deeper, and richer term than data or 
information. K resides in humans and is part and parcel of human complexity and 
unpredictability. It derives from information as information derives from data. The 
transformation process involves comparison, consequences, connections, and conversation 
and is acquired exclusively through the process of learning (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, pp. 
6-7; Ackoff, 1989, p. 3).   
There is no accepted definition of K: epistemologists spend their lives trying to 
understand what it means to know something. But the working definition of K offered hereby 
runs as follows: “Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual 
information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating 
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new experiences and information” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 6). It originates in the 
minds of knowers. In organizations, it is embedded not only in documents or repositories but 
also in organizational routines, processes, and norms. Thus, K-creating activities take place 
only within and among humans. K, as a result, can be traced both as process and stock 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 6; Firestone, 2001).   
K is valuable because it is closer (than data or information) to action and practice. In 
business environment, it provides insights into measurable efficiencies in product 
development, and production. It may also be used to make wiser decisions about strategy, 
competitors, customers, distribution channels, and product life cycles (Davenport & Prusak, 
2000, p. 6).  Yet, the mere accumulation of K may soon lead to its transformation into data. 
Therefore, it is imperative to manage to reduce K to very few useful things only.  
According to Ackoff (1989, p. 7), wisdom (knowing why), the highest level of the 
DIKW Pyramid, is characterized by the ability of humans to evaluate choices and decisions or 
the evaluated understanding. Wisdom is also influenced by moral and ethical codes and 
secures understanding where there was no previous understanding, thus, reaching far beyond 
understanding itself, so to say. In fact, wisdom is very subtle and therefore extremely difficult 
to acquire, even over time. Moreover, according to Ackoff, it is regarded as a uniquely human 
state, since only humans have a soul. Therefore, wisdom can never be substituted by 
computers (even in future) (Ackoff, 1989). 
Summarized, the first three categories are based on past experiences and K already 
known, thus, pertaining to the present and the past. Wisdom, on the other hand, looks into the 
future and incorporates vision and design (Ackoff, 1989, p. 9). 
In view of K complexity and its ambiguity, it is indispensible to further spilt it into key 
components and analyze each of them in detail to better understand its subtleties and creation 
process.  
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4.1. Classification  
Today,“[we] are entering the knowledge society in which the basic source is no 
longer capital, or natural resources, or labor, but is and will be knowledge, and where 
knowledge workers will play a central role” (Skyrme, 1999, p. 11). As a consequence, 
interest in K (primarily, tacit K) which is regarded as the primary source of wealth is 
increasing tremendously (Johannessen et al., 2001, pp. 3-4). Therefore, maximization of the 
organization’s intangible assets and the subsequent capitalization on them are the primary 
tasks of KM.  
Moreover, according to Dr. J. K. Mishra (2009, p. 50), most of the K found in 
organizations is tacit (about 80%), i.e., it resides in individuals’ minds and is thus very 
difficult to “extract” or codify. And only about 15-20% of valuable K is explicit: i.e. can be 
found in books, databases, recordings, graphs or other images.  
Generally speaking, there exist various classifications of K and KM. KM can be 
approached either through the technological or hierarchical method (primary focus on ICT 
and well-articulated processes) or unassisted or “knowledge ecology” approach (Bergeron, 
2003, p. 111; Firestone, 2001, p. 23). The aforementioned approaches differ, first and 
foremost, in the type of K involved, initial investment cost, scalability and volume of 
transactions, ideal organization type, etc. (Handzic, 2004, p. 222). 
If the issues to be dealt with are too subtle and require very specific K, then an organic 
approach and a K worker are a much more suitable solution as compared to a computer 
database. In addition, a technological approach is most appropriate for larger organizations 
(training is required to secure effective use of enormous databases), whereas an organic 
method of managing intellectual capital (or improvement enabled by ongoing social 
interaction) is more feasible in smaller firms (Bergeron, 2003, pp. 111-113). By the way, the 
organic approach is most indicative of communities of practice which secure constant sharing 
of K and experience and cooperation on a global scale (Firestone, 2001, p. 23). 
Yet, according to numerous researchers, KM is marked by a very little dependence 
upon high tech solutions (Bergeron, 2003, pp. 111-113). In the past, it was technology that 
was regarded as the primary impediment to successful implementation of KM in practice. 
Nowadays, it is 90% attributable to organizational culture or culture change and only 10% - to 
technology (CHIPS Magazine, 2001). Other researchers provide other figures. Yet, in 
principle, they all agree to the following: technologies of today are the least impediment to 
implementing KM (or may be compared to the green light according to the street light 
analogy), leadership as the yellow light and culture change is viewed as the biggest 
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impediment to the successful implementation of KM projects (or the red light) (Asoh, Belardo 
& Neilson, 2007, p. 9).  
In view of the aforementioned, it is much more reasonable to combine the two 
competing KM strategies (technological and organic approach to KM) into an integrated 
approach and synthesize KM as a complex multidimensional concept marked by a 
combination of dynamic (r)evolutionary technological solutions (a catalyst for facilitating K 
generation and transfer even real-time and on a global scale) and the natural flow of K 
generation secured by social interaction (creation of a climate conducive to K generation and 
sharing: leadership and culture change) (Handzic, 2004). 
Just as indicated above, K is the precursor to any further decision. Therefore, it has to 
be classified and properly studied.  
Apart from the above mentioned approaches to managing K, KM can also be 
characterized by a diversified number of KM strategies. The main difference between them 
consists in the KM aspect that is primarily focused on. Therefore, some KM strategies 
concentrate on knowledge, whereas other strategies are directed at business processes, still 
others target at end results.  
 
Classification by Knowledge 
KM practitioners underscore the importance of combining K accessibility with K 
transformation, which are, first and foremost, indicative of constant adaptation and changes 
of the K creation process secured by learning. This perspective serves as the foundation of the 
“Knowledge Spiral” by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and the “Information Space” (“I-
Space”) Model by Boisot (1998). Innovation and learning are the primary outcomes secured 
by constant flow and transformation of intellectual assets.  
The “Knowledge Matrix” is one of the most accepted approaches to classifying KM 
strategies today. According to it, K is divided into tacit (or individual) and explicit (or 
collective). Their “Knowledge Spiral” is marked by the spiralling K process interaction, 
which, in turn, undergoes the following stages: Socialization, Externalization, Combination 
and Internalization (SECI Mode), thus securing ongoing new K creation and innovation. 
Hence, to render implicit K into explicit, tacit K has to be “extracted” from an individual’s 
mind and, vice versa, in order to make explicit K more implicit, K should be “re-internalized” 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 70; Mascitelli, 2000, pp. 179-183). 
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Figure 15: Knowledge Spiral 
(Source: Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 71) 
 
Figure 16: Contents of Knowledge Created by the 
Four Modes 
(Source: Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 72) 
The K creation cycle commences with Socialization (Phase 1) marked by interaction, 
information communication, and sharing of experiences and mental models (Tacit to Tacit, or 
field building). Phase 2 or Externalization is indicative of using metaphors or analogies to 
articulate hidden tacit K, which is otherwise almost impossible to articulate (Tacit to Explicit, 
or dialogue / collective reflection). Phase 3 or Combination is characterized by “networking” 
or combining the newly created explicit K with the already existing explicit K available in 
other SBUs of the organization, thus, crystallizing it into a new product or service (Explicit to 
Explicit, or linking explicit K). Phase 4 or Internalization implicates that explicit ideas turn 
anew into “Know How” due to practicing and repetition (or internalization) (Explicit to Tacit, 
or learning by doing). Then, K reverts to socialization and the K spiral re-iterates the 
generation of K again (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 70-71). 
Boisot’s I-Space Model is often referred to as the model of K asset development. In 
this sense, it resembles significantly Nonaka & Takeuchi’s Matrix of Knowledge Types. Yet, 
as opposed to its counterpart, Boisot’s I-Space Model acquired an additional dimension 
(abstraction or K generalization to various life situations). This, in turns, secures a much 
more detailed analysis of the K generation and transfer cycle (Snowden, 2010; Boisot, 
MacMillan & Han, 2007, p. 137; Haggie & Kingston, 2003). 
  
Generally speaking, the Information-Space Cube by 
Boisot locates K within a 3 dimensional cube. The 
three axes are: (1) from “un-codified” to 
“codified”, (2) from “concrete” to “abstract,” and 
(3) from “un-diffused” to “diffused” (Dalkir, 2005, 
p. 66). In addition, the Model is also characterized 
by a “Social Learning Cycle” (SLC) which, 
coupled with the aforementioned I-Space Cube is 
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Figure 17: Boisot’s Information-Space 
Model (Source: Snowden, 2010) 
used to simulate the dynamic flow of K assets. The 
K creation process undergoes, according to Boisot, 
the following sequence of stages: (1) scanning (scanning of insights in the generally 
available but often fuzzy content), (2) abstraction (generalization of the newly codified 
insights to numerous situations), (3) diffusion (the newly acquired “abstract” K is shared 
with others), (4) absorption (application of the newly codified K to real-life situations causing 
new “learning-by-doing” experiences or new tacit K), and (5) impacting (abstract K is 
embedded in rules and behaviour patterns) (Boisot et al., 2007, p. 68; Haggie & Kingston, 
2003). 
Boisot compares the K creation cycle with the laws of thermodynamics underscoring 
the dynamic nature of intellectual capital. Thus, according to his Model, K is characterized by 
the two opposite extremes: the “most ordered” K (highly abstract, highly codified and un-
diffused) or the lowest rate of entropy generation and the maximum potential for the useful 
value-adding versus the “least ordered” K (least abstract, least codified and most diffused) or 
the highest level of entropy production and the least potential for adding useful value. Hence, 
an organization targeting at increasing or sustaining its CA should be constantly in search of 
moving its intangible assets to the maximum value adding area. Nevertheless, the dynamic 
nature of the SLC implicates, on the other hand, that K is never constantly located at some 
distinct point (or the extreme maximum productivity point) due to the incessant cyclicity of K 
generation secured by its continuous usage and innovation or new learning experiences and 
new insights (Boisot et al., 2007, pp. 26-31; Mishra, 2009, p. 70).  
 
Classification by Business Processes  
According to Karl Wiig (1997) and the American Productivity and Quality Center 
(APQC), KM strategies are classified into six basic categories (Wiig, 1997, pp. 1-2; WIIG 
Model, 2011; Haggie & Kingston, 2003): 
(1) Knowledge Strategy as Business Strategy (K is viewed as a product);  
(2) Intellectual Asset Management Strategy (aims at exploiting and improving the 
already available K assets);  
(3) Personal Knowledge Asset Responsibility Strategy (aims at fostering K 
development and K sharing only in some individual employees);  
(4) Knowledge Creation Strategy (focuses on innovation and new K creation based on 
R&D);  
79 
 
(5) Knowledge Transfer Strategy (focuses on sharing best practices to secure 
improved quality, effectiveness and efficiency);  
(6) Customer-Focused Knowledge Strategy (aims at satisfying customer wants and 
needs). 
According to the classification by McKinsey & Company (1998), KM strategies 
applied by MNEs are grouped into the following five basic categories (Day & Wendler, 1998, 
pp. 19-20; Haggie & Kingston, 2003):   
(1) Developing and Transferring Best Practices (similar to Wiig’s spreading of best 
practices across the industry);  
(2) Creating a New Industry from Embedded Knowledge (revealing gaps in the 
market and the subsequent development of new products or industries);  
(3) Shaping Corporate Strategy around Knowledge (the strategy comes from the mid-
1990s' Monsanto’s experiences related to pursuing two different groups of business activities: 
one – based on best practices and the second one – based on innovation. The dissimilar (thus 
incompatible) strategies resulted in Monsanto’s decision to concentrate only on one strategy) 
(Junnarkar, 2011, p. 34);  
(4) Fostering and Commercializing Innovation (this strategy is similar to that 
advocated by Wiig and targets at sustaining CA through technological innovation and 
decreased time to market);  
(5) Creating a Standard by Releasing Proprietary Knowledge (this strategy is similar 
to the “Intellectual Asset Management Strategy” advocated by Wiig and can be best explained 
by the example of Netscape. Its declining Internet browser market share had to be urgently 
supported. As a consequence, the firm decided to change its corporate strategy: they made 
their source code publicly available for free. Free access to the Internet helped the company 
establish its browser as a worldwide standard. Profit, on the other hand, was generated in an 
indirect way: through a complementary product, the server software).  
 
Classification by End Results 
This classification was introduced by Treacy and Wiersema who put forward the idea 
of the three “value disciplines” (customer intimacy, product leadership, and operational 
excellence) (Haggie & Kingston, 2003). These activities are regarded as the primary focus of 
attention of market leaders, which rather than dispersing their efforts via pursuing all 
activities, normally focus only on one specific area of business activity and excel at it (CA or 
SCA). Outsourcing is one of the confirmations of the aforementioned.  
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The above indicated value disciplines underscore the importance of a trade-off 
between convenience, quality and price which are key determinants of a product purchase. 
As a result, the basic elements to any competitive business include: the business itself 
(“Operational Excellence”: sharing best practices, improving effectiveness and efficiency,  
 
Figure 18: Focus Areas for Value Disciplines 
(Source: Haggie & Kingston, 2003) 
reducing costs), its product(s) (“Product 
Leadership”: constant improvement of the  
existing product(s) and development of new 
products, application of the best marketing 
techniques), and its customers (“Customer 
Intimacy”: improving customer satisfaction, 
identification of customers’ preferences, wants 
and needs, etc.) (Haggie & Kingston, 2003).  
 
 
Other Approaches   
Another approach to KM strategies is Zack’s Knowledge Strategy (1999, p. 125), 
which is indicative of sustaining or (re)-establishing the organization’s CA. Zack's K Strategy 
is characterized by unique links between K and strategy, whereas the respective competitive 
knowledge is subdivided into: core K (the K required by all industry players to secure the 
normal functioning of a business; nevertheless, it does not necessarily implicate a CA), 
advanced K (CA is secured either through K differentiation or application of K in different 
ways as compared to rivals), or innovative K (K that secures a market leader position and is 
regarded as a differentiating factor in the entire industry) (Zack, 1999, pp. 125-127; Haggie & 
Kingston, 2003).  
According to Zack, in order to secure a competitive K position, it is imperative for a 
company, to apply a SWOT analysis and identify strategic gaps in its K base:   
 Exploration versus Exploitation (the degree to which K resources have to be 
improved versus the opportunity for leveraging the under-exploited K base), and  
 Internal versus External K (building up new K either externally or internally, 
or Closed vs. Open Innovation).  
As a result, companies that exploit internal K more frequently are regarded as rather 
“conservative,” whereas those which innovate more often than their rivals (e.g. thanks to 
Open Innovation) are referred to as more “aggressive” (Zack, 1999, p. 125; Haggie & 
Kingston, 2003).  
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A Synthesized Approach  
In view of a wide range of complex approaches to managing intellectual capital, a 
comprehensive KM Spectrum is necessarily indispensible. Such a framework was introduced 
by Derek Binney (2001, p. 33). 
According to Binney (2001; cited by Haggie & Kingston, 2003), KM activities are 
classified into 6 main groups:  
(1) Transactional KM (K is embedded in technology);  
(2) Analytical KM (K originates from external sources, mainly from customer-related 
issues, e.g. feedback and complaint management);  
(3) Asset Management KM (explicit K resultant as a by-product of everyday business 
activities can be exploited in numerous ways);  
(4) Process-based KM (improvement of business processes secured by sharing best 
practices);  
(5) Developmental KM (focus on continuous learning, training and staff development 
programs);  
(6) Innovation/ Creation KM (focus on new K generation through R&D and 
collaboration with other teams).  
Summarized, the most relevant KM strategies are presented in the following table:  
Transactional Analytical 
Asset 
Management 
Process Developmental 
Innovation and 
Creation 
Case Based 
Reasoning 
(CBR) 
  
Help Desk 
Applications 
  
Customer 
Service 
Applications 
  
Order Entry 
Applications 
  
Service Agent 
Support 
Applications 
  
Data 
Warehousing 
  
Data Mining 
  
Business 
Intelligence 
  
Management 
Information 
Systems 
  
Decision Support 
Systems 
  
Customer 
Relationship 
Management 
(CRM) 
  
Competitive 
Intelligence 
  
Intellectual 
Property 
  
Document 
Management 
  
Knowledge 
Valuation 
  
Knowledge 
Repositories 
  
Content 
Management 
  
TQM 
  
Benchmarking 
  
Best Practices 
  
Quality 
Management 
  
Business Process 
(Re) Engineering 
  
Process Automation 
  
Lessons Learned 
  
Methodology 
  
SIE/CMM, 
ISO9xxx, Six Sigma 
Skills 
Development 
  
Staff 
Competencies 
  
Learning 
  
Teaching 
  
Training 
  
Communities 
  
Collaboration 
  
Discussion Forums 
  
Networking 
  
Virtual Teams 
  
Research and 
Development 
  
Multi-Disciplined 
Teams 
  
Table 3: KM Spectrum and Applications (Source: Binney, 2001) 
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4.1.1. Key Components  
Unfortunately, the idea of KM is still in its infancy, learning the essential walking 
steps (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. vii). As soon as the running starts, so to say, the 
competition will intensify significantly. Yet, step by step, more and more companies institute 
K repositories, supporting diverse types of K: best practices, lessons learned, product 
development and customer K, HR management K, etc. Moreover, nowadays numerous 
magazines, journals, and newsletters address KM issues, whereas prominent business schools 
offer more and more courses and programs on the topic. Even the World Bank announced the 
shift of its original function of money-lending towards two basic strategies: dispersing 
development-oriented K on the same level of importance as the money it loans. As a 
consequence, the “Knowledge Bank” concept appeared (Knowledge Bank, 2012). Thus, KM 
is gradually becoming an essential feature of advanced business culture today (Davenport & 
Prusak, 2000, pp. vii-viii).  
Yet, unfortunately, the majority of organizations wastes too much time just acquiring 
K (or merely simply accumulating data), and spends actually not enough time on using K 
property. The so-called “analysis paralysis” is thus one of the primary challenges of KM 
today (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. xiii). 
Moreover, KM should be embedded in the familiar aspects of the business: business 
strategy (application of highly strategic K to increase effectiveness and efficiency of business 
processes), business process (better channeling of the flow of K through redesigning of the K 
process and elimination of non-value-adding activities), corporate culture (creating K-
oriented cultures that value creation, share and use of K), and corporate behavior (securing 
K-oriented behavior: focus on the factors that motivate and stimulate employees to create, 
share and apply K, managing information and K overload, eliminating the bottleneck of 
personal distraction and learning capacity) (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. iii).    
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4.1.1.1. Skills  
Henry Ford, the pioneer in the field of management, once stated, “Take out my 
building, take out my machines and all capital but leave my men with me, I will become Henry 
Ford again” (Khurana, Parveen & Sharma, 2010, p. 1). This statement underscores the 
critical role of HR in an organization. As a matter of fact, management of HR is one of the 
most important and challenging tasks, since the use of any other resources depends upon the 
human factor, not to mention of the fact that humans as the carriers of tacit K are the source of 
constant CA and organic growth.  
In fact, “all businesses are alike except as to people,” which highlights that achieving 
excellence of HR leads, as a result, to organizational excellence. Therefore, K, skills, abilities, 
values, and beliefs possessed by the organization’s workforce determine the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the organization in general (Khurana et al., 2010, p. 1). 
The starting point for managing K in an organization is to understand its core 
capabilities (CC). These constitute a CA for a firm: they are built over time and cannot be 
easily replicated. Thus, in order to create and maintain core technologic capabilities, it is 
indispensible to learn how to manage the K-creating activities and possess understanding of 
all the dimensions of the CC (Leonard, 1995, p. 4).  
As a good example serves Chaparral (Leonard, 1995, pp. 13, 23). Its expertise is 
embodied in the energy and skills of each and every individual who day by day accumulate 
experience. And although much of this K is tacit in nature, i.e. resides in people’s heads, it is 
also embedded in superior physical equipment and technical systems (e.g. cutting-edge 
equipment as an automobile shredder which is believed to be the fastest and most efficient in 
the world or some of the most advanced digital furnace controls found at Chaparral) and 
managerial systems (the organized routines guiding resource accumulation and deployment).  
Generally speaking, skills may be defined as learned capacity (or abilities) to fulfill 
certain tasks with the minimum outlay of time, energy, or both. From the employer’s 
perspective, professional skills coupled with the learning-to-learn skill (or knowing how to 
learn) are most desirable, since this set of skills secures fast execution of tasks and problem 
solving. Moreover, today with the growing uncertainty and necessity to constant adaptation to 
global change and innovation, the learning-to-learn skill gains more significance. It is cost- 
and time-effective, since it reduces the necessity for staff re-training (Ricketts & Ricketts, 
2011, p. 602).  
Just as mentioned above, skills and K embodied in employees is the dimension related 
to the organization’s CC. This dimension encompasses both techniques specific to the firm 
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and scientific understanding. One of engineers at Chaparral, e.g., is a recognized industry 
expert on the design of molds (Leonard, 1995, p. 20). This very person also helped design a 
set of measurement instruments including a clock accurate of one second in two million years 
(or to set atomic time standards). Such and/or similar skills which are based on public K or K 
available to all, that further require subtle understanding of the matter, are often referred to as 
T-shaped, meaning that they are both very deep (the stem of the T), but at the same time 
broad enough (the cross of the T) to enable K owners to explore the interfaces between their 
particular K and applications of that K in particular products. This combination makes the 
skills especially critical to the organization’s CC (Leonard, 1995, p. 20). 
In addition, the deep skill may be a rather rare occasion (not exclusive to one 
organization). Therefore, most companies hire an expert. E.g. Chaparral Steel metallurgists 
often apply for a consultation with experts from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) to augment their K on specific issues. On the other hand, their internal expertise 
secures understanding of how the metal composition of a particular mold interacts with the 
evolving crystalline structure of the steel to create particular shapes. This K is not obtainable 
from books or in the laboratory: only on-line experimentation can secure it (Leonard, 1995, 
pp. 20-21). 
Such K became critical in 1991, when the company decided to launch large structural 
beams for construction. The challenge was to provide an innovative design remaining a low-
cost producer. As a result, Chaparral management achieved its purpose by purchasing some 
expertise from outside specialists, whereas the unusual mold was designed in-house by its 
own specialist. It goes without saying that the main idea behind internal design was related to 
keeping the KH inside (Leonard, 1995, p. 21). 
 
Figure 19: Types of Skills and Knowledge (Leonard, 1995, p. 21) 
As a result, the three kinds of skills and K constituting CC are: (1) scientific (or 
public) K, (2) industry-specific K, and (3) firm-specific K. Moving from 1 to 3, skills become 
less codified and transferrable. In the above mentioned case study, the science of metallurgy 
is public (or codified in professional journals and textbooks). Industry-specific K about steel 
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manufacture is diffused among numerous experts, including suppliers and consultants 
(Leonard, 1995, p. 22). 
In-house or firm-specific K, on the contrary, is not easily duplicated. Consequently, in 
order to approximate Chaparral’s near-net-shape process, it does not suffice only to access the 
same scientific K of metallurgy and hire the same MIT consultants, and hire all the 
individuals involved in the process. It is also indispensible for a competitor to duplicate 
Chaparral’s CC – the ability to transfer technological KH into viable products. Thus, 
compilations of K derived from multiple sources (embedded in software, hardware, and 
accepted procedures) coupled with skills and expertise of multiple experts (especially those 
who possess K of various functions) lead to synergy effects when the outcome is greater than 
the sum of its parts (Leonard, 1995, p. 22). 
Apart from the aforementioned skills, problem-solving skills serve as the foundation 
in business (Ricketts & Ricketts, 2011, p. 360). They help easily recognize problems, invent 
and implement solutions, monitor and evaluate results. Creative thinking helps to transcend 
to innovation. Unsolved problems, on the contrary, lead to dysfunctionalities in the 
workplace, which further develop into impediments to flexibility, thus, to success. Individual 
capacity for creative thinking serves as the infinite source of new approaches to problem-
solving, organizational design, and product development. Therefore, creative problem solving 
(in particular, analysis of problem solving) could be one of the critical moves towards 
strategic goals (Leonard, 1995, p. 240). 
Furthermore, since most valuable K is primarily tacit in nature and in view of the 
complexity resultant from decentralized processes and organizational structures of the 
knowledge-based economy, communication skills are required to secure effective K transfer 
and the required integration.  
Interpersonal skills help employees easily interact with each other, avoiding stress, 
coping with undesirable behavior in others or ambiguity, etc. Teamwork skills are critical for 
cooperative problem-solving (Ricketts & Ricketts, 2011, p. 602), thus practical innovations 
and solutions (e.g. through brainstorming), since radical innovations require inter-disciplinary 
cooperation (e.g. communities of practice or Open Innovation) (Huston & Sakkab, 2006).  
Just as mentioned above, the learning-to-learn skill is key to acquiring new skills and 
critical thinking. It opens mental doors to thinking more efficiently, learning differently 
(smarter, not harder) as well as to creating and innovating. The learning-to-learn skill is 
particularly indispensible in the Information Age with its rapid change and obsolescence as an 
interminable danger. This, in turn, requires constant updating of employer-specific technical 
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K. In particular, it implicates the necessity to learn to distinguish between essential and non-
essential information to help employees discern patterns and relationships in available 
information, thus, significantly improving job performance. Hence, productivity, creativity, 
innovation, and competitiveness all depend upon the employees’ learning capability. Whereas 
machines and processes are easily purchased (or transferrable) between countries, human K is 
the key asset that secures CA and sustains it in the long run (Leonard, 1995, p. 240).  
One of the HR development mechanisms applied to identify, capture and use tacit K 
(or to secure no outflow of valuable tacit K when employees leave their jobs or as a result of 
downsizing) is job rotation. In such a way, employees rotate over various routine jobs in a 
department, division, or unit before they are due for promotion as managers, e.g. This 
technique helps them acquire diversified skills and a broader outlook (turning specialists into 
generalists). In addition, job rotation increases the inter-departmental cooperation and helps to 
reduce the monotony of the work (Khurana, Parveen & Sharma, 2010, p. 104).  
In addition, in view of the current data deluge, it is imperative to start structurizing the 
already available K to secure better quality messages and insights through determining which 
K is most valuable and synthesize it. Yet, such skills are not easy to find, since good K 
workers at any level should have a combination of “hard skills” (structured K, technical 
abilities, and professional experience) and “softer” skills (a sure sense of the cultural, 
political, and personal aspects of K), in other words, both technical KH and intuitive skills. 
Moreover, it is indispensible that K workers work closely with K users to secure K updating 
and constant progress (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 110).  
It goes without saying that organizations cannot exist without coordination. To be 
effective, employees need to understand how the organization works and how their actions 
effect organizational and strategic objectives. Therefore, acquiring skills in determining 
factors that impede or interfere with the organizational productivity and effectiveness 
(organizational skills) help one become a team builder or an innovator. Thus, organizational 
effectiveness skills are the building blocks for leadership. Proactive thinking and shared 
leadership have a positive effect on productivity (Hastings, Bixby & Chaudrhry-Lawton, 
1986). One of the approaches is the superteam which is characterized by a highly performing 
team that produces outstanding achievements at General Electric (Lymbersky, 2008). 
On the other hand, shared leadership as opposed to the traditional hierarchical system 
marked by employee empowerment and decision-making disclose a direct correlation 
between shared leadership practices and product improvement, creative and innovative 
problem-solving, and a more hospitable environment for culture change.  
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According to Leonard (1995, p. 89), individual, and thus organizational creativity is 
limited by background, training, and personal preferences in approach to problem solving. 
Yet, elimination of those core rigidities through constant reexamination of whatever 
perspective dominates at a certain period of time and ongoing learning and improving skills 
(specialization, cognitive style preferences, etc.) are likely to unleash creativity and stimulate 
innovation. One of the primary issues hereby is to ensure that the energy generated by the 
cognitive friction among individuals is channeled into creative K-building actions 
(encouraging the integrative skills of employees), not siphoned off into unproductive or 
couterproductive personal battles.  
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4.1.1.2. Articulation  
Just as mentioned above, the KBV focuses on K as the company’s most strategically 
important resource. In this sense, the KBV is an extension of the RBV. Organizational K as 
part of the company encompasses different types of K. It is not limited to scientific or 
technological K, but represents all types of K such as marketing, administrative, logistical K, 
and so forth, since all activities along the value chain require K and expertise (Choo & Bontis, 
2002, p. 701).  
In addition, in view of the prevalence of tacit K (about 80%) which resides in people’s 
minds is intangible, dynamic, and difficult to quantify, proper articulation of tacit K is thus a 
real challenge. Moreover, articulation (Tacit to Explicit) as part of the aforementioned SECI 
Model by Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 60) plays one of the major roles to improve the 
company’s learning capacity and organic growth. Articulation of tacit mental models can be 
viewed as “mobilization” of intangible resources, or a key factor for creating new K. New K, 
in turn, is indispensible to create CA and sustain it in the long run (Nonaka & Mascitelli, 
2000, pp. 179-183). 
Furthermore, in the Information Age of today with its prevalent media (traditional and 
digital, primarily, the Internet), attainment, storage and transmission of explicit K (easily 
coded, and symbolized) is reduced to accessing the right information. Thus, proper 
articulation through communication or dialogue coupled with finding the right metaphors and 
analogies to properly articulate the hidden tacit K is a must to transfer the skills and insights 
underlying the organization’s CC. According to the pioneers of KM, one of the most effective 
ways of grasping and elucidating the rationality underlying the tacitly-informed behaviour 
leading to the refinement of comprehension is brainstorming (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 
69). 
On the other hand, there is a risk hereby to transfer valuable tacit K to those who 
might leave the company and copy it elsewhere. Therefore, articulation should be regarded as 
a strategically relevant move (Lubit, 2001, p. 166). Hence, inter-firm information flows are of 
significant importance, especially when it comes to K-intensive industries marked by 
sophisticated mechanisms of disseminating technical K and expertise (Choo & Bontis, 2002, 
p. 537).  
According to Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995), Japan’s example of a globally successful 
country is associated with its constant search for talent, inspiration, and novelty. As opposed 
to the Japanese who underscore the relevance of non-linear and intuitive K (or tacit K), 
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Americans are more inclined to focus on explicit K (or unambiguous, scientific and formal 
data), which, in turn, just as indicated above, is not necessarily a long-term CA.  
The divergence between the two approaches leads, therefore, to incremental 
improvement in the case of Americans, and true creativity and innovation, on the other hand 
in the case of the Japanese. One of the vivid examples is the development of a breadmaking 
machine described in the book by Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995). In order to secure production 
of tasty and profit-making home-baked bread, one of the famous Japanese companies 
entrusted its engineers with finding the kneading mechanism for making the proper dough 
texture. Upon long-term experimenting, the team of engineers apprenticed themselves to a 
well-known master baker and spent long hours observing his special twisting motions and 
kneading techniques. As a consequence, the “socialization” of the master’s technical skills as 
well as the articulation of its tacit K embedded in the kneading techniques led to the creation 
of the kneading mechanism of the final product – the breadmaking machine. A propos, the 
breadmaker proved a huge success (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 95-107). 
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4.1.1.3. Commitment  
Mere K (formal education) coupled with professional skills does not suffice, since K 
or CA is not just pooling together diverse bits of data and information. According to Nonaka 
& Takeuchi (1995, p. 58), “knowledge, unlike information, is about beliefs and 
commitment.” In their theory of organizational K creation, both academics do adopt the 
traditional definition of K as “justified true belief.” Yet, as opposed to traditional 
epistemology which emphasizes the absolute, static, and non-human nature of K, typically 
expressed in formal logic, Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 58) shift the paradigm to the 
“dynamic human process of justifying personal belief toward the “truth.”  
Thus, K is a highly individual process of personal and inter-personal (or 
organizational) self-renewal, whereas personal commitment of employees coupled with their 
identity with the company proves a necessity (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 10). Moreover, 
commitment may sometimes be crucial to implement a company strategy, especially when it 
comes to servicing.  
Just as mentioned above, commitment as well as beliefs are both deeply rooted in 
individuals’ value systems (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 59). Furthermore, both information 
and K are context-specific and relational. They depend upon the situation and are created 
dynamically in social interaction among people, thus, constructing social K as a reality, 
which, in turn, influences their judgment, behavior, and attitude.  
In order to successfully manage the organization’s K base, it is imperative to possess 
the commitment and loyalty of its employees (Storey & Quintas, 2001; Pellicelli, 2003, p. 17). 
This is primarily due to the fact that most of the organizational K is highly personal (or tacit). 
The biggest challenges hereby are related to the behavioral “problems” or reluctance to share 
K willingly caused by the conflicts in the employment relationships (Hislop, 2003, p. 1).  
As a matter of fact, motivating an organization proves not an easy task, primarily 
because of insufficient communication, failure to integrate KM in everyday activities, lack of 
time or willingness to share K among colleagues (self-interest), failure to use K effectively 
(information overload and time-consuming search), difficulties of capturing tacit K, etc. 
Consequently, the acceptance of KM implementation should not be driven or imposed from 
top. The proactive use of KM systems, on the contrary, is based upon the use of incentives 
and cultural interventions: fostering commitment and motivation are indispensible 
prerequisites for the success of KM implementation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 57-60).   
Generally speaking, commitment may range from negligible or partial commitment 
(or avoidance, non-use, and unenthusiastic use) to absolute commitment (or skilled, 
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enthusiastic and consistent use) to the organization's KM program. As the primary motivators 
serve the three processes of compliance (reward), identification (relationships), and 
internalization (behavior congruent with the organization’s value system) (Malhotra & 
Galletta, 2003). 
Commitment by compliance results as a result of rewards, or punishments, which, in 
turn, implicates that the employee may not necessarily understand the value of the desired 
change and K sharing. Consequently, the latter will focus primarily on the maximization of 
incentives, not on maximizing value-adding. Quantity-based incentives for K sharing are 
likely to be associated with minimal investments. Yet, in the longer term, they will lead to 
information overload and waste of time and effort to locate the high quality information 
(Malhotra & Galletta, 2003). 
Commitment by identification results from the employees’ need for acceptance (both 
by peers and managers) and esteem based upon social recognition. This type of commitment 
is characteristic of the employees’ adoption of the values and beliefs associated with the well-
known or recognized figures in order to replicate their social image. Nevertheless, the basic 
disadvantages of commitment by identification are its relative ineffectiveness:  
(1) if the specific role model is ill-chosen, and  
(2) if the content of the desired behavior proves alien to employees (Malhotra & 
Galletta, 2003). 
Commitment by internalization is related to the need for imparting values that 
would guide culture change. Primarily, this is due to the fact that internalization of values and 
behavior patterns have a much longer-lasting effect than rewards, punishments, or social 
recognition (extrinsic rewards and rather manipulative methods of commitment) (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 62-69; Malhotra & Galletta, 2003), since they are related to deepest level 
of the culture paradigm (“basic assumptions”) (Schein, 2004, p. 25).  
As a consequence, commitment by internalization (a self-governing process of 
commitment) proves a self-generated and natural process, whereas the chance of deceiving is 
considerably lesser as compared to the two other types. In this case, employees sincerely 
contribute high quality K adding value to the overall K creation process and are genuinely 
invested in it as opposed to artificially inflating the quantity regardless of quality K (Malhotra 
& Galletta, 2003).  
Numerous research confirms that changes in employment enabled by downsizing and 
delayering, focus on flexibility of the workforce and the emergence of virtual organizations 
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have adverse effects on the organizational commitment. Even survivors of downsizing show 
much lower levels of loyalty and trust, as a result (Hislop, 2003, p. 2). 
On the other hand, paradoxically, as it may seem (despite the K deluge characteristic 
of these days), the creation and management of K as the source of CA, is becoming more and 
more difficult to achieve, primarily because of the constant evolution in organizational forms 
and structures (Hislop, 2003, p. 2). 
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4.1.1.4. Affirmation   
Nowadays, organizations start to understand the power of unleashing K among 
individuals. The main struggle consists in identifying how exactly to unleash that power and 
render employees willing to share their insights, instead of hoarding the K they possess. Thus, 
the major challenge is to figure out how to create a K-sharing culture in an organization.  
 
Figure 20: Knowledge Sharing: A Historical Perspective  
(Source: Thatchenkery & Chowdhry, 2007, p. 3) 
From the historical perspective, K sharing increased four-fold as compared to the 
1990s. Yet, only if K is shared appreciatively, managing K becomes no longer an issue. Thus, 
affirmation is rather a psychological need of sharing insights and ideas with others. This need 
may be fulfilled in the presence of an explicitly appreciative format to openly have a say 
without being questioned, critiqued or put on the defensive. Hence, to secure organizational 
excellence, it is imperative to institutionalize K sharing (Thatchenkery & Chowdhry, 2007, p. 
3). 
Moreover, it is necessary to locate and enhance the “life-giving-forces” or core values 
of organizations as “systems of shared meaning and beliefs where the critical ability is the 
continued construction and maintenance of the meaning and belief systems which assure 
compliance, commitment, and positive effect on the part of the participants” (Thatchenkery & 
Chowdhry, 2007, p. 46). 
K can take a long time to accumulate, but the things that a person really needs to know 
might enlighten the person like a stroke of a thunder. And if an appreciative culture of K 
sharing internalizes corporatewide, a breakthrough or innovation will become only the matter 
of time.   
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4.1.1.5. Doubt  
Deep down, a human being is credulous in character, since the most compound 
stratum of our lives consists in believing. Yet, enormous gaps of doubt might open up new 
vistas to our beliefs, since doubt often leads to new dimensions and insights. Therefore, doubt 
may be regarded as a modality of belief that belongs in the same stratum of life (Ortega, 
Gasset & García-Gómez, 2002, pp. 185-186).  
According to Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 23), questioning all beliefs in an attempt 
to create one’s own philosophy from scratch started long ago. The Platonic and Aristotelian 
views were inherited through intermediate philosophers by the two mainstreams of modern 
epistemology (the theory of knowledge): the Continental rationalism (René Descartes) and 
the British empiricism (John Locke). Descartes’ methodological skepticism was seen in the 
following question: “What can I hold as true beyond any doubt?” Descartes argued that 
objects cannot be sensible (e.g. wax changes its qualities if placed near fire), thus, true 
knowledge about external things can be obtained by the mind, not the senses (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995, p. 24).  
John Locke, the founder of British empiricism, on the contrary, criticized Descartes’s 
rationalism stating that things existing in the real world are objective in nature and that even if 
the sensory perception of things is illusory, something, undoubtedly, can be perceived. 
According to Locke, the human mind is a tabula rasa (“white paper, void of all characters”), 
that has no a priori idea and has to be filled with experience (sensations and reflections) to 
provide the mind with ideas (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 24). Therefore, experience is 
crucial to secure values and beliefs.  
In the eighteenth century philosophy the two streams of rationalism and empiricism 
were synthesized by Immanuel Kant. Kant argued that the basis of K is again experience. Yet, 
the philosopher disagreed with the empiricist argument that experience is the sole source of 
all K (closer to rationalism than empiricism). Moreover, in view of his vision of the 
“phenomenon” as the “transcendental object” or “thing in itself,” which transcends 
experience, his philosophy is often referred to as “transcendental idealism” (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995, p. 24). 
According to Descartes et al. (1947, p. 1997), K that may be defined as a conviction 
based on a reason so strong that it can never be shaken by any stronger reason. Yet, when 
there remains some reason which might lead to doubt, there is only a conviction, or no true K. 
Moreover, doubt implicates the intermediate stage between belief and complete disbelief. It is 
an alternate belief and disbelief, with an element of uncertainty (“I think so, but I don’t feel 
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sure”) (Russel et al., 1984, p. 142). This, in turn, is indicative of deep insights or profound 
knowledge (tacit K or intuition) which help find alternatives or accommodate the disbelief.   
It may be labeled as a paradox, yet, it is hard to describe genuine doubt except by 
saying that one believes in it (Ortega, Gasset & García-Gómez, 2002, p. 186). Hence, the 
difference between belief and doubt consists not in a “not believing,” as opposed to a 
believing, nor is it a “believing it is not the case that” as opposed to a “believing that it is.” 
The basic discrepancy between the two lies in that which is believed in. As a result, doubt 
places people in the sense of being placed on something unstable, non-solid, or a non-firm 
medium (Ortega, Gasset & García-Gómez, 2002, pp. 186-187). Thus, it is the instability of 
doubt that leads to the exploration of the terra incognito of K, securing new ideas, creative 
problem-solving and innovation.  
Since nothing is constant but change, K in the unstable world cannot be stable as well. 
Thus, humans cannot rely heavily on the solutions of the past: they need to have doubt (to a 
reasonable extent) to secure change and progress in the long run. As a result, doubt brings 
closer to the unlimitedness of K. On the other hand, doubt should not be in excess. 
Equilibrium between doubt and confidence is indispensible to secure sound decision making. 
It is of paramount importance, especially in business environment, where some decisions may 
involve not only the future of the company, but also the fate (social security) of millions of 
people worldwide. Not to mention of politicians whose decisions impact lives of whole 
nations.  
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4.1.1.6. Experience  
Even before the days of “CC,” “the learning organization,” “expert systems,” or 
“strategy focus,” all managers valued experience, KH and insights of their employees, or 
their K (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. xviii). As opposed to traditional theorists who viewed 
the company as a “black box” with resources going in, products coming out and the markets 
in which the company participated, today’s theorists pay more attention to the dynamics 
inside the box: the K embedded in routines and practices that the company transforms into 
valuable products and/or services in still rather imperfect “knowledge markets” (Davenport & 
Prusak, 2000, pp. xviii, xxi). 
One of the primary benefits of experience is the historical perspective which it 
provides to help evaluate and act in new situations and events, since K born of experience 
recognizes similar patterns and draws connections between the present and the past 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 8). On the other hand, it is imperative to point out in this 
context that the number of years of “experience” (or e.g. a bachelor’s degree or an MBA) 
does not quantify the value of experts’ experience (Sioma, 2000, p. 2). The experience of the 
latter is measured by the quality of experience-based insights, performance, actual 
qualifications, informativeness about the current discoveries and industry advances, etc.  
Moreover, the current trend towards leaner organizations and the quality movement 
intensify the relevance of quality K and quality experience, in particular. K develops over 
time, through experience – things done or experienced in the past. In addition, experience 
includes what people absorb from books and mentors as well as through informal learning. 
Therefore, “experience” and “expert” are related words. Both are derived from Latin and 
mean “to put to the test.” Hence, experts are people with profound K of a subject which was 
further tested and trained by experience. As a result, the firm that hires experts is ready to pay 
premiums for the experience-based insights provided by the latter (Davenport & Prusak, 
2000, pp. 7-8; Ortega y Gasset & García-Gómez, 2002, p. 200).  
According to Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 63), experience is key to acquiring tacit K. 
The mere transfer of information from one person to another (without some form of shared 
experience) would fail to project one’s own self into another individual’s thinking process or 
even express it in words.  
On the other hand, tacit K serves as the foundation of CA and organization K creation. 
Therefore, it is indispensible to focus on transfer of tacit K as the primary source of new K 
(future) based on a combination of best practices (past and present) and intuition. Hence, 
sharing of tacit K among multiple individuals with different backgrounds, perspectives, and 
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motives (e.g. communities of practices) is crucial to secure new K creation, and thus 
innovation and sustainability (Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 85).  
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4.1.1.7. Ground Truth  
Experience changes perceptions about what should happen into K of what does 
happen. Therefore, experience should be based on practice or ground truth, not theory or 
generalization. In fact, the word combination “ground truth” was borrowed from the U.S. 
Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) used to designate the rich truths of real-
life situations or K gained “on the ground” (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 8).  
It goes without saying that effective K transfer is critical for the army, since knowing 
what to expect and what to do in military situations might literally implicate a life-or-death 
matter. Thus, ground truth is translated into knowing what works and what does not. As a 
vivid example serves regular participation of experts from CALL in real military operations as 
learning observers. In such a way, they collect material and disseminate the gathered K in the 
form of photos, video tapes, briefings, and simulations. As a result, lessons learned in the 
early 90s, e.g., were passed on to the troops in later missions (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 
8). 
Moreover, the army’s key to success at managing K lies in its “After Action Review” 
(AAR) program which involves the analysis of what was supposed to happen and what 
actually happened. The comparison of the two leads to the identification of disparities and 
reasons for positive and negative trends. As a result, lessons learned are incorporated into 
formally documented procedures and training programs, and serve not only as a means of 
accountability, but also as K and a learning tool in the AAR (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, pp. 
8-9). 
Another breakthrough in the army’s K experience was due to the reflections of one 
senior officer who, late in his career, read Tolstoy’s War and Peace. Struck by the differences 
between Tolstoy’s true-to-life depictions of Napoleonic War battles and the rational 
abstractions of those taught in classes (the gap between ground truth (or real-life K) and 
rational analysis found in books), he prompted the necessity of introducing something similar 
to the present-day CALL program (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 9). 
In the battle between business competitors, strategists identify similar distinctions 
between how strategy actually works in practice and how it is taught in business schools. 
Thus, sharing and understanding details and meaning of the ground truth or real experiences is 
generally much more valuable than expounding on theories about them (Davenport & Prusak, 
2000, p. 9). Consequently, transfer of K of the everyday, complex reality of practice (intimate 
or tacit K of the world) secures invaluable insights into best practices, thus, providing growth 
and stability on a global scale (Pickles, 1995, p. 101). 
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4.1.1.8. Complexity  
Experience and ground truth indicate of person’s ability to deal with complexity. Since 
K is not a rigid structure, it can be easily contextualized. Moreover, K can deal with 
complexity in a complex way, so to say. This is one of the most essential sources of K value 
creation. In particular, it implicates that knowing “less,” even if the “less” seems to be clearer 
and more definite does not usually secure improved decision making. Certainty and clarity 
may often overlook quite essential (yet, minor) factors. Thus, reliance upon one single, un-
contradicted data source may give a feeling of omniscience or illusion of accuracy. On the 
other hand, such data may lead to non-adaptive action and thus failure in the long run 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000, pp. 10-11).  
It is imperative to point out in this context that K is aware of what it does not know. 
This fact is confirmed by many knowledgeable or wise people who become more and more 
humble as soon as they learn and know much. A very interesting thing that confirms the 
relevance of the aforementioned illusion of accuracy happened in one genetic-engineering 
firm. This company created a new tomato that could be stored longer and shipped later than 
current varieties. It was expected that the newly developed sort of tomatoes could become a 
real hit. Yet, it turned out that different sorts of tomatoes do not equally do in different 
climates (this fact is, by the way, known to all experienced farmers engaged in tomato 
growing). Thus, since the new tomato was derived only from one variety, it was a success 
only in some small areas. As a result, a scientific triumph turned into a commercial failure.  
Generalized, the above indicated example is a vivid illustration of an R&D-oriented 
product development, when either only one data source is used or when the new product is not 
market-oriented (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 10), whereas K transfer and digestion of 
change among various stakeholders is, unfortunately, limited to speed of learning or 
susceptibility to new ideas (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000, pp. 1, 11). 
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4.1.1.9. Judgment  
Unlike data and information, K is often highly personal, thus, contains judgment. K 
also refines or updates itself in response to new situations and information. Thus, it can be 
compared to a living system, developing and modifying itself via interaction with the outer 
environment (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 10).  
According to Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 59), both information and K are created 
dynamically in social interaction among people, thus, constructing social K as a reality, 
which, in turn, influences their judgment, behavior, and attitude. This, in turn, confirms both 
advantages and limitations of non-logical processes, and some circumstances in which such 
non-logical “good judgment” or “good sense” have an advantage over rationality (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995, p. 53). On the other hand, when K stops evolving, it turns into opinion or 
dogma. As a vivid example serve “experts” whose K seem to consist only of stock responses 
and the same old answer to any new question (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 10).  
In addition, judgment helps identify the problem severity and priority (Khan & Zhang, 
2005, p. 92) and is indicative of analysis.  
There exists a myth that managerial judgment, which is most relevant for strategy 
formulation, cannot be measured in view of its intangibility. Yet, managerial judgment is in 
fact quantified on a daily (even hourly) basis: by financial analysts, bankers, creditors, 
superiors, and subordinates. The effective results are achieved by the achievement of the 
enduring value of the shareholder’s investment and can therefore be easily improved (Sioma, 
2000, p. 1).  
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4.1.1.10. Rules of Thumb  
K works through rules of thumb: flexible guidelines to action evolved through trial 
and error and over long-term experience and observation. As a matter of fact, the term “rules 
of thumb” stand in the language of artificial-intelligence community for shortcuts to solutions 
in new situations when new problems resemble problems previously solved by more 
experienced workers. Rules of thumb help indentify patterns in new situations, and thus 
respond more effectively. As a result, the solution should not be built from scratch every time. 
Hence, K expressed through rules of thumb offers speed. It allows its possessors to solve new 
situations faster and much more efficiently, even when it comes to rather complex issues 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000, pp. 10-11; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 35). This, in turn, 
explains the relevance of training and practice to enable experience curves in organizational 
learning.  
According to Roger Schank, a computer scientist at Northwestern University, such 
internalized responses are referred to as “scripts.” Like computer program codes, they serve 
as efficient guidelines to complex situations (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 11). 
Scripts are shortcuts through numerous alternatives that save managers and K workers 
the trouble of consciously analyzing every step of the solution. They may be played so 
quickly that one may not even be aware of them. Thus, the solution is arrived at in a rather 
intuitive way, without humans’ realizing how they got there. This automatic or unconscious 
problem-solving secures very high speed of execution (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 11; 
Sioma, 1980, p. 62). According to Karl Weick, intuition is “compressed expertise” which 
implicates how K works and what it can do is very similar to rules of thumb (cited by 
Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 11). 
As a vivid example serves the skill of an experienced driver who knows how to drive, 
does a series of complex actions automatically as compared to a beginner. Moreover, a 
veteran driver also develops an intuitive sense of what to expect on the road. It is experience 
that makes the experienced driver aware of minute signs that might be indicative of danger 
which a beginner driver, on the contrary, would normally miss, since they are too subtle to be 
very taught at a driving school. The same is true of an experienced businessperson who 
quickly, without going through a definable process or even being unable to explain his or her 
“reasoning,” evaluates the situation and makes his/her decision making (Davenport & Prusak, 
2000, p. 11). 
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4.1.1.11. Values and Beliefs  
According to Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, p. 58), “knowledge, unlike information, is 
about beliefs and commitment.” Moreover, in the theory of organizational K creation, both 
academics adopt the traditional definition of K as “justified true belief.” As opposed to 
traditional epistemology which emphasizes the absolute, static, and non-human nature of K, 
typically expressed in formal logic, Nonaka & Takeuchi shifted the paradigm to the “dynamic 
human process of justifying personal belief toward the “truth.” 
Many people assume that organizations are objective and neutral and their purpose 
reduces to creating a product or a service. As a result, their goal may seem quite detached 
from values. Yet, according to Schein’s Model of Organizational Culture (2004) mentioned 
above, individuals’ values and beliefs have a tremendous impact on organizational culture 
(thus, K, in general), since organizations are made up of humans whose values and beliefs 
unconsciously impact their thoughts and actions. Moreover, organizations are characterized 
by histories, and stories told by employees or expressed through their actions and words, 
which, in turn, is indicative of the underlying corporate values and beliefs on the “artifacts” or 
physical level (Schein, 2004, p. 25; Davenport & Prusak, 2000, pp. 11-12; Leonard, 1995, p. 
24). 
A belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which people conceive an object. It can 
only provide an additional force and vivacity to their ideas (Russel et al., 1984, p. 137). As a 
matter of fact, values and beliefs are an integral part of K, thus, determining significantly 
what individuals sense, absorb, digest, and conclude from their observations. As a result, 
people with different values see one and the same situation or thing not identically, therefore, 
filtering the K through a personal prism of values and beliefs. A bustle of urban life may be 
regarded as energy and variety for someone who values it and as chaos and danger for 
somebody who prefers rural quiet. In business environment, different values and beliefs are 
translated into different degrees of risk taking (either as new opportunity or a threat) 
(Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 12).  
Moreover, according to Edgar Schein (2004, p. 17), organizational culture is defined 
as “[a] pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way you 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” The given definition underscores 
anew the primary importance of shared mental assumptions or shared values and beliefs as 
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basic determinants of judgment and behavior patterns that guide action and thought in 
organizations.  
Moreover, according to Hill & Jones (2008, p. 11), culture change within an 
organization is impossible without a respective accumulation of specific values and norms 
shared by the members of the same organization and which, in turn, will impact the members’ 
interaction and behavior patterns both internally and externally. Therefore, the infinite power 
of K to organize, select, create, learn, share, innovate, and judge comes from values and 
beliefs as much as from information and logic (Davenport & Prusak, 2000, p. 12). 
Hence, belief systems are of paramount importance and which is still more crucial for 
a firm is to manage to properly communicate and internalize its corporate values and beliefs 
to its employees and have them further articulate its corporate belief system both to customers 
(through final products, skills, cooperation, etc.) and among themselves or other stakeholders, 
thus, fostering voluntary K sharing, and culture of learning and constant change built on trust 
and mutual support (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Leonard, 1995; Smith, 1990).  
 
In view of the aforementioned, the author developed the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis (H) 1: As a result of the rapid globalization of technological standards 
(primarily enabled by the Internet and its ubiquity), the resultant convergence of markets as 
well as a relative high degree of homogeneity in customer preferences worldwide, 
standardization and adaption are basic strategies preferred when choosing a MEM. 
H 2: Bidirectional flow of technology is a rare occasion in view of the cut-throat 
global competition and uncertainty as to the outflow of technological KH, which then could 
be easily purchased and/or imitated. Thus, in the case of technological KH, a WOS is 
preferred to a JV. As an insurance against KH outflow serves cross-licensing. 
Managerial KH or tacit knowledge, on the contrary, is much more difficult to 
replicate. Therefore, franchising is the common MEM to capitalize on intellectual property.  
H 3: Successful experience in using a certain MEM (e.g. JV) in the past enhances the 
company’s inclination towards the preference of the same foreign MEM in future (JV). In 
other words, experience is a key determinant for the firm’s further steps.  
H 4: The choice of WOS vs. IJV as two basic strategic rivals depends primarily upon 
the company size, the degree of its multinational involvement, and R&D intensity. 
H 5: During the current financial crisis, outsourcing is rapidly gaining pace. In 
addition, M&A are one of the most preferable MEM during recession. 
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5. Results  
Globalization gains pace. Its coverage all over the globe helps not only parent 
companies to expand internationally, but improves host countries’ total investment capacity 
due to increasing flows of finances from abroad. Foreign direct investment (FDI) (and MNCs 
as major FDI providers) is therefore the most interesting way of investment that influences 
both economies of home and host countries (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 242). Different MEM have 
different performance outcomes: WOS should outperform IJV, and IJV should outperform 
acquisitions.   
In view of current turbulent economy marked by the economic downturn, converging 
industries and cut-throat global competition driven by globalization processes, SA are gaining 
pace (ranging from a sub-supplier contract (outsourcing) to franchising and ILA, from R&D 
partnerships to IJV and consortia (exports and external loans)) (Pellicelli, 2003, pp. 1-2).  
From the historical perspective, it should be pointed out that focus of companies’ main 
factor and objective changed just as radically as technology and lifestyles.  
Period Main Factor Main Objective 
1970s Product 
Performance 
The best product, the lowest cost, the most recent technology 
1980s Position in 
the sector 
Economies of scale and economies of scope 
1990s Capabilities 
and 
competences 
Innovation, advantages through changing conditions and emerging 
opportunities 
2000s Knowledge Acceleration of technological innovation, shortening of product life 
cycle, convergence of technologies, progress in IT, significant 
reduction in R&D costs, deregulation and globalization 
Table 4: Historical Perspective (Source: Pellicelli, 2003, pp. 2-3) 
Yet, just like in the old good times, SA manage (apart from efficiency issues, 
protection from competition and technology access) to set new global standards and 
overcome protectionist barriers (normally to secure subsequent M&A and the monopoly 
status by global market share) (e.g. Nestle’s acquisition of Haagen Dazs). 
In addition, in view of the long-term accumulation of K and experience, the optimal 
MEM depends to a certain degree upon the nature of the company’s distinctive competency: 
either in technological KH or in management KH. In the case of technological KH where 
proprietary controls are a must, ILA and IJV are to be avoided to minimize the risk of losing 
control of the technology. Therefore, for a high-tech company a WOS is a much better choice 
(Hill & Jones, 2012, pp. 291-292).  
105 
 
On the other hand, ILA and IJV must be structured to maximally reduce risks of KH 
expropriation on the part of licensees or JV partners. Technology licensing is an insurance 
against imitations and as well as the establishment of own technology as a standard or 
dominant design (e.g. as Matsushita did with VHS format for VCRs securing ongoing royalty 
payments) (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 292). Such actions are primarily taken to deter competitors 
from developing their own, possibly superior, technology. On the other hand, risks related to 
licensing outweigh risks of losing control of technology KH. Consequently, ILA should be 
applied with much caution.  
Management KH, on the contrary, is more characteristic of service companies (e.g. 
McDonalds or Hilton hotels) (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 292). In fact, management KH is tacit K 
and therefore much more difficult to replicate. Moreover, the most valuable asset in such 
cases is the company’s brand names additionally protected by international laws pertaining to 
trademarks. Hence, the risk of losing control over management KH to franchisees or JV 
partners is relatively low.  
In view of the aforementioned and while many issues related to technological KH do 
not appear in the case of management KH, numerous service companies prefer a combination 
of franchising and subsidiaries (WOS or JV) to control franchisees within a certain region or 
nation. From the political perspective, JV are favored more. 
It goes without saying that globalization requires constant cost reduction. Cost 
reduction pressures lead, in turn, to the choice of a combination of exporting and WOS. 
Manufacturing facilities are then placed in the centralized locations where factor conditions 
are optimal, whereas via exporting to the rest of the world, a company manages to realize 
substantial economies of location and economies of scale. A number of marketing subsidiaries 
(WOS) may be based in various countries to overtake distribution in a particular region. Thus, 
marketing WOS are preferred more to a JV arrangement or services of a foreign marketing 
agent, since they secure tight control over marketing activities, thus, no loss of revenue and 
income potentials (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 292). 
Furthermore, tight control over local operations enable the corporation to use profits 
secured in one market to improve its competitive position in a different location. Therefore, 
companies pursuing global or transnational strategies favor the establishment of WOS in the 
overseas markets (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 292).   
The following table provides an overview of primary advantages and disadvantages of 
basic MEM. 
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Entry Mode Advantages Disadvantages 
Exporting  Economies of location and 
economies of scale  
High transport costs 
Trade barriers  
Problems with local marketing agents  
Licensing  Low development costs and risks  Lack of control over technology  
No economies of location and 
economies of scale 
No global strategic coordination 
Franchising  Low development costs and risks Lack of control over quality  
No global strategic coordination 
Joint 
Ventures  
Access to local knowledge  
Shared development costs and risks  
Political dependency  
Lack of control over technology  
No economies of location and 
economies of scale 
No global strategic coordination 
Wholly 
Owned 
Subsidiaries  
Control over technological KH  
Economies of location and 
economies of scale 
Global strategic coordination 
High costs and risks  
 
Table 5: Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Entry Modes  
(Source: Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 166) 
According to the World Bank’s database, rapid globalization and aggressive 
competition on an international scale gradually lead to the complete exclusion of small-size 
players or newcomers from the global marketplace, thus, enabling the exclusive dominance of 
MNCs (80% of total exports). Radical cost reduction is extremely difficult to tackle for 
SMEs. About 57% of new entrants are forced to quit within the first year of entering the 
export market (Oluwarotimi, 2012). The figures speak for themselves.  
Another table is an overview of market entry modes by industry.  
Entry Mode Industry Reasons for Entry Examples 
Exporting Manufacturing Pressure for Cost Reduction  
 
Avon     
Licensing   Manufacturing  Technological Know-How  
Lack for Resources (SMEs) 
Dolby  
Franchising  Servicing (Fast-food)  
Clothing Distribution  
Management Know-How McDonalds 
Burger King  
Turnkey Projects  Chemical, 
pharmaceutical, 
petroleum, mining 
industries 
Technological Know-How  
Management Know-How 
 
Numerous public 
housing projects  
Outsourcing 
manufacturing  
Production 
Information 
Technology  
Pressure for Cost Reduction  
Skilled Workforce  
IKEA  
Management 
Contracting  
Hotel Industry  Management Know-How The Four Seasons Hotel  
Strategic 
Alliances  
Motor Vehicle Industry   Technological Know-How  
Management Know-How 
Pressure for Cost Reduction 
Microsoft-Toshiba  
Cisco-Fujitsu  
Mergers  Most industries  Technological Know-How  
Management Know-How 
Boeing and McDonnell 
Douglas  
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Pressure for Cost Reduction 
Acquisitions  Most industries Technological Know-How  
Management Know-How 
Pressure for Cost Reduction 
Pfizer acquired Warner-
Lambert  
Joint Ventures  Capital intensive 
industries (e.g. 
Electronics,  
Pharmaceuticals) 
Technological Know-How 
Management Know-How 
Fuji-Xerox  
Wholly-Owned 
Subsidiaries  
High Tech 
Electronics  
Pharmaceuticals  
Technological Know-How  
Management Know-How 
Pressure for Cost Reduction 
SAP  
Table 6: Entry Mode Choice by Industry (Source: Own Work) 
It goes without saying that K and experience gained from overseas operations are 
indispensible and be used as spillovers over the corporation’s all WOS. Their impact is easily 
confirmed by contribution of K intensive business services (KIBS) to growth opportunities 
within EU (1995-2007).  
 
Figure 21: Contribution of KIBS to Growth by EU Country, 1995-2007 (European 
Competitiveness Report 2011, 2011, p. 59) 
 
The above analysis of MEM results in the following conclusions:  
H 1: Standardization and Adaptation   
Increased globalization gradually leads marketplaces from national markets as distinct 
entities, isolated by trade barriers, and barriers of distance, time, culture, and religion towards 
one huge global marketplace (Levitt, 1984, p. 2). These converging markets completely 
reshape numerous industries. Standards in technology, customer preferences, and, thus, 
homogeneity in basic product offerings (e.g. global acceptance of Coca-Cola, Sony 
PlayStation, McDonalds hamburgers, the Nokia wireless phone, and Microsoft’s Windows 
operating system) lead to the introduction of global (probably, sometimes still unofficial) 
technological standards (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 147).  
Moreover, the prevalence of multinationals in exporting further intensifies the 
relevance of cost effectiveness on an international scale, and, thus, the inevitability of 
standardization and specialization worldwide (Oluwarotimi, 2012).  
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Figure 22: Changes over Time (Source: 
Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 285) 
On the other hand, lack of proactive steps taken as to 
significant reduction of cost structures might turn out 
the Achilles heal also for current market leaders, 
since over time competitors do come, and then the 
company is doomed. A vivid example is world-
known giant Xerox. Its competitors, Japanese 
companies like Canon managed to invent devices 
similar to Xerox’s patents, but priced them below the 
innovator’s products. As a consequence, Xerox’s 
global market share was rapidly eroded by 
competitors. Thus, proactive reduction of the cost 
structure are the winners’ strategy (Hill & Jones, 
2012, p. 160).  
On the other hand, disregarding certain issues (e.g. ethical or environmental problems 
caused by standardization and outsourcing in host countries) may partially or completely ruin 
the company’s reputation. In the highly digitalized world of today (due to its ubiquitous 
Internet, social media, etc.), negative reputation may mean automatic loss of a huge piece of 
the global market pie. A world-known example is Nike and its “sweatshop” production in 
Asia (Morris & Lawrence, 2010, pp.946-947).   
Adaptation to local peculiarities (cultural, religious differences) is evident, in view of 
the accelerated expansion into distant markets. E.g. in recent years, Western European, 
Japanese, and U.S. corporations increased their investments into nations of Eastern Europe, 
Latin America, and Southeast Asia (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 148). Yet, in view of significant 
changes in customer preferences overseas, rapid capitalization on the advantages of growth 
opportunities in the above mentioned markets is possible only through adaptation to local 
requirements. Hence, H 1 was supported.  
 
H 2: Bidirectional Flow of Technology  
Personal analysis and literature review on the global expansion of SMEs and MNCs as 
well as their preferred choice of the MEM strategy reveal that very few sizable companies 
today have strictly regional markets. Many SMEs, start-ups, or even industries are born today 
with a global outlook. The establishment of overseas subsidiaries to serve local markets and to 
outsource manufacturing in order to take advantage of low-cost labor or highly skilled 
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workforce are primary scenarios preferred internationally (Level 1, Assembly, and Level 2, 
Adaptation Strategies) (Leonard, 1995, p. 257).  
In the first line, this phenomenon is related to the uncertainty of losing technological 
KH, or tacit knowledge. Therefore, transferring capabilities at Level 1 and/or Level 2 boils 
down only to transferring compatible physical and management systems (or the mere 
duplication of technological capabilities of the original technology source in combination with 
training and spillovers). Level 3 (Product Redesign), on the contrary, which necessitates 
significantly much more effort and attention to teaching a recipient company about the 
science that underlies the technology or company culture, is preferred exclusively in the case 
of WOS or SA aimed at securing technological KH (Leonard, 1995, p. 257; Liebeskind, 1996, 
p. 93; Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 246).  
Level 4 (Independent Design), which implicates that the recipient country possesses 
exactly the same science base and is capable of interacting with the original source as an 
equal partner (bidirectional technology flow), seems, in all probability, to have been 
reached, only in very rare cases. Primarily because most innovations are controlled and 
strictly supervised by parent companies (or global market leaders) that attempt to prevent the 
outflow of technological KH by all means (Liebeskind, 1996, p. 93). Thus, the real 
relationship transformation from the parent-child to the parent-parent or equal creators (with 
cross-licensing as an insurance against technology outflow as an alternative solution) is rather 
a big rarity and is more indicative of SMEs, not MNCs (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 12). 
In addition, two-way technology flows have strategic differences all over the globe. 
While developed nations attempt to control K creation, developing countries are still looking 
for technology access (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 246). Industrial restructuring and updating 
towards higher value-adding activities (the resultant outcomes of FDI), on the contrary, are 
characteristic of both industrialized and emerging economies. Thus, in view of numerous 
synergy effects, FDI today are more complements (or enrichment) rather than mere substitutes 
of the obsolete (Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 247). 
Another interesting revelation of the current research consists in the asymmetry of K 
distribution among nations. Most future-oriented technologies or tacit knowledge is located 
in developed nations (prevalence of experience, managerial and technological skills and KH, 
global brands, intellectual property), whereas developing countries are mainly characterized 
by production process capabilities, networks, and organizational structure (defensive strategy) 
(Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 243).  
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Still another interesting revelation consists in the fact that rapid growth of emerging 
nations is primarily enabled not only by their increased exports of raw materials but also by 
their focus on proper knowledge management and adaptation of education standards to global 
ones, constant technological updating and R&D. Hence, the gradual shift towards knowledge-
intensive production is a global trend. Moreover, modern IT-based solutions, primarily the 
Internet with its digital and online libraries, distance learning opportunities as well as social 
media and communities of practice, serve as the infinite source of invaluable information 
which can secure quantum leaps towards innovation and sustainability both for developed and 
developing nations.  
Culture change and constant learning are therefore indispensible prerequisites for 
securing growth in the globalized and digitalized world of today. As a vivid example serves 
Procter & Gamble and its Open Innovation which aim at unleashing global creativity and 
innovation to secure organic growth and sustainability (Huston & Sakkab, 2006, pp. 1-3). By 
the way, the P&G’s Connect & Develop strategy is also widely used in the public sector. 
Primary knowledge-inhibiting (or sustainability-inhibiting) activities, on the contrary, include 
limited problem-solving influenced by only past solutions, inability to innovate using new 
methods and tools, limited experimentation, biased evaluation of external knowledge (new 
technology, customer feedback, etc.) (Leonard, 1995, pp. 35-41). 
In the final analysis it should be pointed out that one-way transfer of K and 
technology is only a short-term solution to a long-term problem (competitors or innovators 
will come sooner or later). Consequently, technology outflow will remain one of the basic 
problems of WOS for generations to come (Leonard, 1995, p. 222). Proactive thinking, on the 
contrary, based upon technology share and co-creation are likely to secure more radical and 
more lucrative solutions. Thus, H. 2 was supported.  
 
H 3: Experience   
As a matter of fact, the choice of MEM was always heatedly discussed in literature. 
According to numerous research, companies tend to be reluctant to adopt a FDI mode, when 
they first enter a foreign country. Yet, as soon as the barriers of language and culture are 
overcome, the likelihood of FDI increases (Hill et al., 1990, p. 117). Expansion overseas 
could be compared to the following proverb: “Get your toe wet first and see how cold the 
water is.” The globalized world with its partially standardized preferences and expectations 
facilitates FDI significantly. Yet, experience with the host market remains of utmost relevance 
to the choice of MEM.   
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Just as mentioned above, the choice of MEM is always related to the company’s goals 
(expansion, profitability, opportunity, and/or control), risk perceived (decision-making under 
uncertainty), and contextual specificities (unexpected outcomes enabled by learning, 
emergence of new ideas, insights, etc., and the environmental opportunities offered by the 
host country) (Hilmi et al., 2007, pp. 244-245). Yet, learning remains an indispensible 
determinant for securing success of a MEM.  
According to the Internationalization Theory, market uncertainty shapes the firm’s 
strategy for an international expansion because of lack of experience, demand, competition 
and the market itself, thus, the inability to estimate the present and future market factors. As a 
result, corporations prefer a more conservative or learning approach (Johanson & Vahle, 
1977). In terms of entry modes, firms normally prefer exporting at the stage as opposed to the 
later stage of the product life cycle (Johanson & Vahle, 1977). 
Moreover, literature overview shows that MNCs which enter overseas markets 
pursuing the IJV strategy outperform those that enter foreign markets by WOS (in whole). 
This, in turn, confirms the relevance of experience or gradual accumulation of K (and, 
assuredly, capital) in overseas markets as well as knowledge of customer preferences, 
customer and supplier databases, etc. (Chan, 1995, p. 39).  
 
Figure 23: Entry Choice Factors (Source: Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992, p. 5) 
In addition, substantial extension or rethinking of the overall international strategy is a 
must, primarily because of the necessity to consider organizational learning as one of the 
basic sources of new insights into organizational functioning or efficacy of internal K transfer 
(Eisenhardt & Santos, 2000, pp. 1, 25) as well as the relevance of searching for and 
coordination of capabilities dispersed throughout the larger social and economic systems to 
capitalize on benefits of global specialization (Garzarelli, 2006, p. 15). As opposed to 
developed countries which primarily target strategic asset acquisition (brand names, new 
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technologies and ideas), developing countries aim at technology-sourcing and learning (Hilmi 
et al., 2007, p. 246).  
Yet, K (market K, in particular) and market experience are sometimes very difficult 
and expensive to obtain (Lymbersky, 2008, p. 25). Therefore, K should be necessarily 
embedded not only in people as primary carriers and creators of intellectual property, but also 
in business processes, methods and technology to enable easy access to invaluable insights 
and capacity for growth. As a result, an integrated approach towards K, organizational 
resources and organizational capabilities and processes is the outcome of dynamic adaptation 
on a global scale, K remaining the company’s primary strategic asset underlying existing and 
would-be products. Experience as part of K manifested through physical ability to act and 
accomplish problem-solving tasks applying a required set of skills and insights, is, 
consequently, an indispensible prerequisite to secure success of the ME choice. Thus, H. 4 
was supported.  
 
H 4: WOS vs. IJV  
First and foremost, relentless onslaught of globalization, and liberalization of world 
trade intensify the competing potential between the two primarily, but strategically 
fundamental options – WOS and IJV. Each of the two has both advantages and disadvantages 
as to the degree of control over operations, resource commitment, and risks to bear (Chan, 
1995, p. 37; Onkvisit & Shaw, 2008, p. 267).  
According to results of numerous empirical and statistical research, the size of the 
corporation as well as its multinational involvement are critical factors for choosing either 
a WOS or IJV. The size of the corporation is normally indicative of its potential to cover 
transaction costs (Madhok, 1998, p. 260). Thus, only MNCs dare to enter the global arena 
considering a WOS or an IJV.  
 
Figure 24: International Operation by Company Size (Peng, 2001, p. 810) 
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In addition, SA based on contracts have different scenario outcomes as opposed to 
those based on ownership of capital, whereas the typical value chain of the local firm may be 
effected by foreign capital only in part (R&D, production, marketing and sales) (Pellicelli, 
2003, p. 7). Thus, confirming the importance of company size for the choice of MEM.  
 Yet, despite all the benefits of 100% ownership, control and higher profitability ratios 
of the WOS strategy, the IJV strategy may equally perform as its primary counterpart. 
According to Lei & Slocum (1992, p. 81), IJV is the most appropriate strategy for entering 
foreign markets, primarily because of political and legal uncertainty and risks. In addition, it 
is also confirmed by the historical choice of MEM in cooperation with the communist world 
or other nations with political instability (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 10).  
On the other hand, the principal drawback of IJV is, assuredly, the “melting pot” of 
managers with different nationalities, backgrounds, experiences, practices, priorities, abilities, 
and even objectives who attempt to combine joint resources and management approaches to 
reach common goals. These discrepancies (asset management, asset separability, and asset 
appropriation risks) entail not only a long negotiation, coordination and planning process, but 
also problems in daily operations, thus, causing adverse effects on performance indicators 
(and not only at the initial stage of joint operations) (Chan, 1995, p. 42; Pellicelli, 2003, p. 
10). 
Nevertheless, when it comes to using IJV for the first MEM, most of MNCs do 
succeed applying this strategy. Yet, upon gaining sufficient experience abroad, most 
companies terminate their IJV operations (Chowdhury, 1992, p. 115; Hilmi et al., 2007, p. 
244). Therefore, the IJV strategy is primarily intended for a newcomer and as a limited 
duration (or rather short-term) strategy to promote the firm’s brand name and learn from 
partners, competitors, and customers (small-scale entry) before upgrading the ownership 
status (M&A as a post-entry strategy) or exiting the market (Peng, 2001, p. 814). WOS, on the 
contrary, is indicative of competitive capabilities and surmounted market barriers, thus, 
experienced players.  
The results of the above mentioned analysis are summarized in the following tables.  
 Modes of Entry 
 
Exporting 
Contractual 
Agreement 
Joint 
Venture 
Acquisition 
Greenfield 
Investment 
RISK   Low Low Moderate High High 
RETURN  Low Low Moderate High High 
CONTROL  Moderate  Low Moderate High High  
INTEGRATION  Negligible Negligible Low Moderate High 
Table 7: Risk/Return/Control/Integration (Source: Kumar & Subramaniam, 1997) 
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In view of their relative high levels of outcomes (high return, high control and 
moderate integration), IJV are gaining much popularity. E.g. one third of all fast-growing 
companies are involved in IJV today (Kotelnikov, 2001). Moreover, IJV prove an effective 
MEM also for SMMs with insufficient finance and management skills to gain access to 
supplies of raw materials, local production facilities, technology, local expertise, and 
distribution channels.  
Of late, temporary IJV with host governments (state-owned or national companies) 
have gained relevance (e.g. civil engineering projects, new global technological ventures, 
etc.). Government restrictions (thus, lack of control, high risk and uncertainty) also prevent 
some potential investors from exporting and establishing a WOS. Therefore, supply of KH 
through IJV is a viable way of obtaining an equity stake in a foreign market (Kotelnikov, 
2001).  
On the other hand, IJV are very difficult to integrate on a global scale, which, in turn, 
requires substantial cross-border trading and the resultant problems related to inward and 
outward transfer pricing and the sourcing of exports. Further issues include guidelines on cash 
and working capital, management of exchange rate and remittable profits (Gutterman, 2002, 
pp. 45, 66, 182).   
 
Figure 25: The Spectrum of Agreements (Source: Pellicelli, 2003, p. 9) 
M&A, on the contrary, are characteristic of firms with valuable strategic assets which 
intend to increase their efficiency quickly (large-scale entry, or first-mover advantage) (Hill & 
Jones, 2012, p. 311). Yet, this strategy is, on the one hand, relatively costly, and is therefore 
more relevant for MNCs (Hilmi et al., 2007, pp. 248-249). On the other hand, in view of 
complexity of internal processes, primarily integration and coordination, as opposed to 
external benefits such as cost efficiency and a greater market power, M&A have a rather high 
115 
 
rate of failures. Consequently, a gradual transition through the IJV is a much more reasonable 
and realistic scenario.  
In addition, the results of numerous research indicate that MNCs that chose the IJV 
strategy were larger than those that chose WOS. Moreover, those corporations that chose IJVs 
have a significantly larger number of WOS than those that used the pure WOS strategy (Chan, 
1995, p. 41). In other words, multinationals with a high degree of multinational involvement 
tended to choose the IJV strategy as the strategy for multiple entering overseas markets 
instead of opening up WOSs (potential acquisition targets and IJV opportunities vs. GFI) 
(Raff et al., 2007, p. 1). In addition IJV, SA, IJV in particular, served as a transitional stage 
from partial liability (IJV) to 100% ownership (WOS) through acquisition (e.g. Ford’s 
acquisition of Jaguar) (Pellicelli, 2003, p. 9).   
Consequently, a particular MEM should not be view in isolation. It is also necessarily 
related to the overall strategic position of the corporation. Moreover, multiple entries help 
build core capabilities and learn from previous entry experience from various countries 
simultaneously, thus, multiplying the corporation’s tacit K or its basic strategic asset (Peng, 
2001, p. 813). Moreover, R&D-focused entries provide access to innovations resident in host 
countries, thus, generating information spillovers that can be further used as opportunities for 
organizational learning and growth in the parent corporation as well (both “pushed” by firm-
specific advantages and “pulled” by resources and capabilities of the target market to develop 
new advantages) (Peng & Wang, 2000, p. 80; Peng, 2001, p. 814).  
In view of the complexity and cost-effective nature of SA, the latter are primarily 
characteristic of firms in industrialized nations, short-term durations of contracts as well as 
creation of new products or technologies as opposed to the distribution of the existing ones 
(Bartett, 2009, p. 107). Moreover, SA are an excellent alternative to bypass constraints to 
cross-border M&A in specific industry sectors. Elimination of restrictions normally leads to 
the full-scale integration (Kotelnikov, 2001). 
On the other hand, SA are a must for some industries, since major innovations and 
breakthroughs are grounded on interdisciplinary or even inter-industrial advances. Hence, 
critical resources and capabilities to conduct its own effective R&D are extremely difficult to 
secure by one single firm, even if it is a market leader globally (Huston & Sakkab, 2006, p. 6). 
Moreover, product life cycles have shrunk significantly of late. Therefore, in order to stay 
competitive, an innovation is a must. SA are very typical for telecommunications, information 
technology, electronics, specialty chemicals and pharmaceuticals (transfer of technology). In 
addition, pooling resources also secures not only ES, but also significantly reduces risk. 
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Consequently, SA are extremely advantageous for high-risk and high-cost projects (primarily, 
when it comes to R&D) (Kotelnikov, 2001).  
On the other hand, R&D intensity is a less relevant issue for MNCs choosing between 
the WOS or IJV strategy (Chan, 1995, p. 37). In general, WOS showed higher R&D intensity 
than in the case of IJV. Yet, in view of rising Open Innovation opportunities coupled with 
rather insignificant changes in the respective values resultant from numerous research, the 
author cannot conclude that the IJV strategy requires lower R&D intensity than WOS (Chan, 
1995, p. 41). Thus, H 4 was supported only partially.  
 
H 5: Outsourcing  
During the current financial crisis, cost-effectiveness plays a major role. The premium 
sector, on the contrary, remains as always less susceptible to economic fluctuations (Spiller, 
2010, p. 38). Yet, just as mentioned above, to compete on a global level, companies have to 
proactively (thus, constantly) reduce costs. The Boeing Company, e.g. uses 132,000 
engineered parts that are produced by 545 suppliers from all over the globe. In general, 30% 
of its 777 commercial jet aircraft (by value) is built overseas. Moreover, for the production of 
its most recent jet airliner, the 787, Boeing scheduled to outsource 65% of the total value of 
the jet (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 147).  
IKEA, a proactive global leader, aims at reducing the price of its offerings by 2%-3% 
per annum, which implicates constant cost cutting, and, thus, outsourcing each item (Hill & 
Jones, 2012, p. 170). Therefore, the highest profitability of the final product enabled by the 
best outsourcing suppliers from all over the world implicates both the optimal cost-
effectiveness and high quality ratio for the above mentioned global leaders.  
Nevertheless, just as indicated above, the linear model of innovation (internal R&D) is 
now being gradually replaced by Open Innovation, i.e. innovation through collaboration and 
co-creation of all stakeholders (both internal and external) (global outsourcing of R&D, so to 
say). This strategy is used to significantly reduce time for new product development 
intensified by shortened product life cycles. As an illustrative example serves the above 
mentioned P&G and its Connect & Divide Strategy or the “proudly found elsewhere” 
approach which secured 35% of the corporation’s innovations from outside the company 
(Huston & Sakkab, 2006, p. 2).  
In particular, the corporation acquires strategic assets (licenses and patents, as a key 
indicator of K) from all over the globe and normally from already existing solutions from 
other industries: independent inventors, lead users, communities of practice, etc. (Huston & 
117 
 
Sakkab, 2006, p. 4). As a result, R&D costs are reduced significantly, products are up-to-date 
and in conformity with customer preferences, or easily adapted to local requirements (even 
customized, which is easily affordable for global market players).   
In addition, apart from purchasing licenses and patents, modern innovation theory also 
considers learning as the primary source of innovation, K creation, thus, sustainability. This 
theory is based on the assumption that most innovations do exist already as finished solutions, 
but in different industries or spheres of life. The only thing that is required is to redesign or 
adapt existing forms of K to specific requirements. And this is exactly what P&G is doing: 
searching for creative and innovative solutions from different industries and, if required, 
adapting or refining them (Huston & Sakkab, 2006, pp. 8-9).  
As a result, the role of R&D tends to be seen more as a problem-solving activity 
initiated from customer preferences and customer feedback (complaint management) rather 
than as a sheer act of discovery (Huston & Sakkab, 2006, p. 1). Hence, its primary task boils 
down to finding the best solutions, refining them and capitalizing on them. Moreover, the 
market of global talent or knowledge, Innocentive, aims at establishing the market of most 
valuable solutions (the most valuable marketplace for major global leaders), which further 
confirms the primary importance of K as strategic asset for securing success and sustainability 
in the globalized world of today (Huston & Sakkab, 2006, p. 6).  
Consequently, market players are looking for new ideas or K (i.e. the source of 
sustainability), whereas startups or emerging companies are still seeking physical resources. 
Anyway, SMEs gain invaluable K when entering foreign markets. An alternative for 
acquiring this experience can be gained only from export intermediaries in order to facilitate 
the internationalization of smaller companies. Yet, “renting” K from others may again prove a 
rather risky enterprise (Peng, 2001, p. 814). On the other hand, capability-related issues (or 
experience, skills, and K) rather than the level of transaction costs and the efficiency of the 
transaction under the uncertainty of opportunism play a much more decisive role in the choice 
of MEM (Madhok, 1998, p. 259). 
Apart from outsourcing, M&A are thriving these days too. Generally speaking, 
acquisitions as a fast move strategy secure a fast and significant market presence, create value 
and increase profitability (Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 212). In such a way, domestic monopolistic 
restrictions are broken by international expansion. The ordinary scenario of M&A runs as 
follows: a traditional market research followed by the purchase of a startup or an emerging 
company with a promising product or technology, and its subsequent integration in one’s own 
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portfolio (Cisco), or, alternatively, diversification into new industries (Google, Walmart) 
(Kotelnikov, 2001; Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 176). 
Yet, the current trend is, assuredly, related primarily to the recessive economy in most 
countries of the world. It is obvious that in view of the difficult financial situation all over the 
globe, only market leaders, or cost leader strategists, may afford both to survive and even to 
thrive (Böhner et al., 2008, p. 16).  
In particular, the global crisis makes equity affordable for much-much less, which 
intensifies the strategic relevance of M&A. Bankruptcy of numerous SMEs worldwide lead to 
repossessions and industry restructuring. Therefore, strategic purchases aimed at increasing 
market power (even globally), which might have been extremely difficult to afford a few 
years ago, become a real bargain. E.g. Adidas attempted to purchase Ashworth Golf to 
strengthen its golf product line for years. The company’s dream came true only back in 2008 
and at the price twice as low as two months before the actual purchase. Two other examples 
are: Unilever and its acquisition of Tigi (2009) and P&G and Art of Shaving (premium 
segment) (Böhner et al., 2008, p. 16).  
Consequently, the recession made clear: winners are winners even in difficult times, 
and primarily because of their strategic approach towards K, KM, acquisition of KH and other 
strategic assets, as well as adequate market research on a global scale. Thus, H 5 was 
supported.  
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6. Conclusion  
In the final analysis, it should be pointed out that in the knowledge-based society of 
tomorrow with its primary focus on knowledge, not tangible assets, as strategic assets and 
knowledge workers as carriers and creators of strategic intellectual property, MEM will be 
primarily reduced to K transfer or acquisition of strategic assets (primarily, invaluable K), 
whereas physical assets, machinery and equipment, which were prioritized by the industrially-
based economy, will become only second-rate.  
Proper leverage on intangible assets will make countries or individual companies more 
knowledge-competitive on an international scale. In addition, this development will eradicate 
asymmetries in distribution of strategic physical assets between developed and developing 
countries, thus, intensifying global competition, making K the primary (or even only) 
currency in business environment.  
Thus, within the framework of globalization, the classical question to buy or to build 
acquired a new dimension: a complementary “merger” or “SA” of both: to buy and to build. 
Hence, a typical scenario for MNCs is: (1) to start with the IJV strategy (the intermediary 
MEM), jointly develop new products, acquire host market K, new experience and 
connections, and use the residual capital for securing cost effectiveness through production 
outsourcing and specialization all over the globe, (2) parallel expansion through exporting 
enabled by economies of scale and scope (complementary strategies), (3) to merge or acquire 
the IJV partner and further expand its influence abroad through changing its proprietary 
status, and so forth (naturalization of the subsidiary). Thus, a unified modal choice proves 
always much more beneficial.  
In view of limited resources, asymmetric information, and lack of competitive 
advantage, SMEs are forced to start with exporting. Their further development depends 
primarily upon the manager’s insights into the market dynamics, global trends and 
opportunities and the ability to capitalize on capabilities.   
Yet, in both cases, constant change management (learning and adaptation to dynamic 
environmental changes) is the only source of SCA. Furthermore, globalization, ubiquitous 
Internet access, and international Internet marketing, in particular, will further intensify the 
relevance or even necessity of foreign MEM, making it the only viable growth option as 
compared to the mere presence on the regional level. The key challenge of foreign MEM will 
be then associated with adding value to already existing products (both tangible and 
intangible) through proper management of K assets as well as creation and implementation of 
novel ways of K transformation.  
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As a consequence, K, the primarily source of wealth and upliftment for millennia, will 
be dependent only upon brainpower, not machine power, as its strategic resource. Therefore, 
cooperation, not competition, is likely to be the most viable solution of tomorrow that will not 
only reshape entire industries, global economy, politics, and social structures, but will also 
secure organic growth, sustainability, emergence of innovative approaches towards creation 
and share based on democratic principles, human values to solve primary socio-economic 
issues such as well-being and happiness.  
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7. Further Research  
The emergence of the global electronic marketplace as well as its ubiquitous presence, 
gave birth both to new challenges and numerous risks. Explorations of these issues in the 
context of unsurpassed characteristics and capabilities of this unique marketplace as well as 
unique K creation and K transfer opportunities are a rather promising venue for further 
research.  
On the other hand, the importance of the physical location of firms should not be 
overlooked. Although the Internet enables markets to be increasingly interconnected and 
easily accessed, the dominance of the traditional geography-related clusters remains 
undisputable. Therefore, a double strategy (physical and digital) is a must. The Internet should 
help markets expand faster and provide market players all over the world with all the relevant 
market K to secure easier, more effective and multiple choice of MEM. Thus, K spillovers 
secured by communities of practice, actions of competitors and/or other stakeholders (that are, 
by the way, so easily traced in the Internet) could be used as the source of non-codifiable 
information. Moreover, the scope of this K increases exponentially and simultaneously all 
over the globe. The big challenge is, thus, reliable sources of information and/or fast 
information processing.  
On the other hand, the ability to codify technological KH or invaluable insights 
becomes a real problem of the knowledge-based society. Consequently, further research is 
required in this field too.  
In addition, the emergence of K as the primary strategic asset of a company and the 
relevance of Open Innovation and communities of practice lead to the supposition that K 
might soon turn into a new currency. According to Thomas A. Stewart, progenitor of the 
intellectual approach to managing products, processes and people, and his concept of 
intellectual capital, money will soon disappear and is likely to be substituted by information 
or intangible capital (Stewart, 2001). Even accounting or buying-selling transactions will be 
effected for information or intangible assets, not for money.  
In the Information Age, the era of constant change, wealth will be created as the 
product of K (probably even in the forms not known today). Thus, K as the source of organic 
growth and sustainability will have to circulate at every level of a business to secure 
permanent improvement of HC, structural capital (packaged HC or the organizational 
capabilities), and customer capital. As a result, the relevance of search for talents and K 
transfer coordination as well as experimentation with novel ways of K share and K creation 
could be considered as topics for future research.  
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Yet, business environment of tomorrow is being shaped today, primarily by proactive 
managers and lead users (Pötz, 2005). The solutions of the past become, therefore, in most 
cases obsolete. Hence, the importance of organizational learning (participation and co-
creation) enabled by IT-based solutions coupled with the intellectual capital approach to 
managing K are indispensible to understand the company’s bottlenecks and attempt to find 
creative alternatives (Wigg, 1995). 
As a matter of fact, K creation “is still at an infant state” (Nonaka & Nishiguchi, 
2000, p. 3). Consequently, it requires more creativity and more innovative approaches 
towards solving every-day business problems (the choice of MEM, in particular). As a result, 
product development and product-based competition turns into a second-rate goal (Leonard, 
1995, p. 3). The company’s progress and sustainability depend, on the contrary, upon ongoing 
refinement and development of K creation processes as well as advancements towards 
thinking not in terms of money or products, but in terms of knowledge and quality transfer. 
Yet, it is probably the task still for generations to come...  
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Anhang 1: Abstract  
 
The main issue of the paper is to prove that these days the Knowledge is a strategic asset in 
choosing a market entry mode.  
In the rapidly growing, globalized, and partly digitalized economy of today, some 
organizations are forced to expand. The world is constantly changing; therefore the 
organizations have to move with the stream. If firms decide to move abroad, the decisions 
concern the following aspects: the size of the foreign market (present vs. potential), the 
purchasing power of the target market (present vs. future wealth), and the suitability of the 
product for the chosen market, nature of indigenous competition (Koltenikov, 2001).  
Before the final decision is made, it is necessary that the ME concept contains numerous 
issues, challenges and problems. The selection of the target market and the product for sales 
constitutes the first stage of exploring a new market. It is based on internal and external 
analysis (SWOT): information on customer preferences and social structure of the target 
market, potential competitors (especially, the presence of global players), suppliers, scarcity 
vs. abundance of resources, political regulations, trade barriers, etc. Subsequently, a 
respective market entry mode (MEM) is chosen (Kotelnikov, 2001; Kotler & Armstrong, 
2009). 
Section 2 deals with different Forms of market entry, based on different market entry 
strategies, it shows which MEM is suitable.  
These days the Knowledge is seen as a source, the key driver and new product (Leonard, 
1995, p. 3). Knowledge helps the get fast access to new chances to eradicate poverty, to 
secure organic growth and constant development, economic stability, and sustainability 
(Dahlman & Utz, 2004, p. 10).  
In fact, only constant learning and striving for perfection secured by K assets may lead to 
fundamental improvements (effectiveness, efficiency, and top quality). The time of the 
“Working Smarter”, not the “Working Harder” Strategy finally arrived (Caballero & 
Hammour, 1994, pp. 1350-1351).  
The main issue is to learn how to search, store, create, share and use knowledge properly.  
There exist numerous classifications of knowledge: Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 59 
discriminate between fundamental types of Knowledge: tacit (stored only in the heads of 
people) and explicit (stored in books, CD’s, etc.).  
In addition, Knowledge can also be viewed from the following perspectives: Resource Based 
Theory, Organizational Capability Theory and Knowledge Based Theory (Leonard, 1995).  
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These theories serve as the research foundation for the current thesis, the author applies the 
premises of the aforementioned theories to investigate the following issue: Can Knowledge be 
regarded as a company’s strategic asset? 
Section 4 deals with different classifications of Knowledge, which are detailed analyzed and it 
is shown what their contribution for choosing a market entry mode is.  
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Anhang 2: Zusammenfassung 
 
Die Arbeit behandelt das Thema „Knowledge as strategic asset in choosing a market entry 
mode“ – „Wissen als ein strategischer Zug im Auswahl der Markteintrittsform“.  
In dieser schnell wachsenden, globalen und digitalen Wirtschaft sind Unternehmen 
gezwungen zu expandieren. Die Welt verändert sich konstant und somit müssen sich die 
Unternehmer diesem Lauf anpassen. Krause, 2010, s. 9 hat gesagt, dass nichts außer 
Veränderung konstant ist. Wenn Firmen sich für neuen Markteintritt entscheiden, müssen die 
folgende Punkte beachten: die Größe des Zielmarktes (gegenwärtiger vs. potentieller), die 
Kaufkraft des Zielmarktes (gegenwärtige vs. zukünftige Kraft), Produktanpassung im 
Zielmarkt und die vorhandene Konkurrenz (Kotelnikov, 2001).  
Vor der endgültigen Wahl des Zielmarktes muss der Markteintrittskonzept viele Faktoren, 
Herausforderungen und Probleme beinhalten die berücksichtigt werden müssen. In erster 
Linie muss der Zielmarkt erforscht werden, basierend auf der internen und externen SWOT 
Analyse: Kaufkraft, soziale Struktur, potentielle Konkurrenz, Lieferanten, 
Ressourcenknappheit, politische Regelungen, etc.  
Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit werden elf verschiedene Markteintrittsformen erklärt und 
verglichen. Basierend auf vier verschiedenen Markteintrittsstrategien wird dargestellt, welche 
Formen für welche Firmen in Betracht gezogen werden.  
Abgesehen von all diesen Faktoren wird der heutigen Zeit Wissen als die Quelle, der 
Schlüssel und das neue unentbehrliche Produkt gesehen (Leonard, 1995, s. 3). Wissen 
ermöglicht schnellen Zugang zu neuen Chancen die Armut zu bekämpfen, 
Organisationswachstum und konstante Entwicklung zu sichern und ökonomische und 
wirtschaftliche Stabilität zu gewährleisten (Dahlman & Utz, 2004, s. 10). Das ständige Lernen 
und Perfektion gewährleistet durch das Wissen, führen zu einer fundamentalen Verbesserung 
(Effektivität, Effizienz und Qualität). Die Zeit der intellektuellen Arbeit statt schwerer Arbeit 
ist gekommen (Caballero & Hammour, 1994, ss. 1350-1351).  
Das Wichtigste ist: Wissen zu suchen, zu erhalten, zu entwickeln, zu teilen und richtig 
anwenden.  
Es bestehen viele Klassifikationen von Wissen. Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, s. 59, 
unterscheiden zwischen dem stillschweigendem (nur in den Köpfen vorhanden) und dem 
explizitem Wissen (in den Büchern, auf den CD’s, etc. vorhanden).  
Wissen wird auch von den folgenden Perspektiven betrachtet: Ressourcen basierende Theorie, 
Organisatorische Fähigkeitstheorie und Wissen basierende Theorie (Leonard, 1995). Diese 
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drei Theorien dienen als Forschungsfundament für diese Arbeit. Die Frage: Kann Wissen als 
strategischer Zug für Unternehmer gesehen werden, ist untersucht. 
Im vierten Teil der Arbeit sind elf verschiedene Schlüsselfaktoren des Wissens vorgestellt, 
detailliert analysiert und es wird gezeigt was ihr Beitrag für die Wahl der Markteintrittsform 
ist.  
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